The day of Saudi recognition of Israel appears no closer than it was two years ago.
Israel is a land full of prophets. During his first official tour as head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee last week, MK Boaz Bismuth (Likud) visited a number of settlements and observation posts in the West Bank, saying, “Normalization is important, but applying sovereignty is even more so. We will do this b’ezrat Hashem [by God’s grace] soon, because this war must end in victory.”
This tone of absolute confidence, far-sighted vision, and divine will might seem a bit exaggerated. But he may be quite right, at least about further normalization with the Arab world and the possibility of sovereignty for the West Bank and Gaza, too. Not in the sense of full annexation, which is still only a remote possibility. But rather in terms of a transition from the military courts and regulations to normal Israeli law, which is an important distinction from full annexation, even if that distinction is more political than legal.
There is a pattern in which action in Gaza provokes reaction in the West Bank, which could have real implications for the Abraham Accords and Israeli diplomacy. As hundreds of thousands of Israeli protesters turn out in the streets calling for a hostage deal and a ceasefire in Gaza, Western countries pledge to turn up at the United Nations and vote in favor of Palestinian statehood, the United States presses for a real humanitarian response, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) struggle to raise the necessary reserves for a new offensive.
Then comes reaction. The far-right Religious Zionist and Otzma Yehudit parties fear Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will cave and threaten to bolt from the coalition. Netanyahu can only water down the Haredi draft law (allowing for the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Israelis) so much, and even that is not enough to appease Shas and United Torah Judaism, and the only tools left at his disposal to alleviate the pressure are in the West Bank.
The IDF has expanded Operation Iron Wall beyond Jenin to Tulkarm and other towns. Minister of National Security Ben Gvir led prayers atop the Temple Mount, and approval was granted for 3,401 new housing units in the E1 area near Ma’ale Adumim. Finance and Defense Minister Bezalel Smotrich characterized the proposed settlement activity as a death-knell for Palestinian statehood: “The Palestinian state is being wiped off the table, not with slogans but with actions. Every settlement, every neighborhood, every single housing unit is another nail in the coffin of this dangerous idea.” That may be a bit of an exaggeration, especially since nothing is actually built yet, but the intent is there.
Perceptions Become Reality
Netanyahu needs to buy more time to reach an end-state in Gaza where Hamas is not a threat and Israel is not an occupying power. The last thing he wants is to empower the Palestinian Authority (PA) in its current form or allow anything that looks like a path to statehood. But as the situation escalates in the West Bank, the more he pushes the Saudis into a corner on normalization.
Before the war began, the informal Saudi position was that Israel would have to enter into a negotiation process with the Palestinians from which it could not simply back out. That could have meant some sort of deposit or guarantees from the outset. The modality didn’t matter as long as the commitment was there. And if the Palestinians rejected the offer or other unforeseen factors intervened that were not the fault of the Israelis, then normalization could still proceed apace.
The war has narrowed Israel’s room to maneuver, with Saudi Arabia and France co-hosting a multilateral Conference on the implementation of a two-state solution at the United Nations and issuing the New York Declaration, which calls for a “timebound process…resolving…all outstanding and final status issues.” They want the PA in control of Gaza and their Global Alliance to serve as the mechanism for following up through a series of working groups.
We can still imagine a lengthy process that lingers for years, reaching no definite conclusion for reasons entirely out of the control of the Israeli government. Still, it is now the Saudis, the French, and their international alliance that will make that determination, not Netanyahu. And certainly those are not conditions that any right-leaning Israeli government would ever concede.
It means we are now likely caught in a self-fulfilling prophecy. If normalization with the Saudis is so far out of reach, and normalization with so many other Arab states is probably contingent on steps toward fulfilling these Saudi demands, then why wouldn’t the Israeli government give up on the prospect? It would not openly reject the possibility, of course. But it would at least quietly accept the reality that normalization with Saudi Arabia and many other countries is simply out of reach. It seems that we are now in a situation where Jerusalem has every incentive to push the limits of settlement and sovereignty in the West Bank.
Not Quite the Abraham Accords
Where does that leave the United States? At the outset of this administration, back in February, there was considerable hope for a meeting between Netanyahu and Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman at the White House, if not for an actual deal, then at least for a handshake to reassure everyone that a deal was in the works. That visit was postponed indefinitely, but news outlets have recently reported that the crown prince may come to America in November.
It is an acknowledgment by the Trump administration that normalization is no longer top of the agenda. Besides, it would be impossible to fulfill Saudi expectations for a defense treaty and nuclear energy agreement by then. And the UN General Assembly will likely convene in chaos this month, with several states promising to recognize Palestinian statehood in a virtue-signaling gesture that will fail to shift Israel’s position in any meaningful way.
There is still a lot of follow-up work to be done from the May summit in Riyadh, during which the Saudis pledged an unprecedented $600 billion in investment. But is that enough to justify a visit by the crown prince? A visit that should be a major undertaking, involving multiple cabinet ministers, corporate CEOs, and teams of advisors on both sides, preferably accompanied by a tour to New York, Silicon Valley, and other destinations.
The plain and simple answer is no, it is not enough to justify a visit. Unless such a visit is only to Washington or Mar-a-Lago, and it is held in conjunction with another multilateral event in which the crown prince is a special guest of honor. That means a bilateral with President Trump is simply the icing on the cake, and the whole visit could be overtaken by other events, with Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan taking his place.
It is possible to imagine the United States incentivizing a visit by rolling out a program of cooperative ventures to promote artificial intelligence and semiconductor production in the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia has announced the launch of the National Semiconductor Hub, aiming to create an entire ecosystem of facilities and training opportunities that will encourage companies from around the world to set up shop and develop materials that will drive AI growth across a wide range of sectors.
If this were to bring Saudi Arabia into a new forum that builds on the I2U2 initiative (comprising Israel, India, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States), it would offer an opportunity to rebrand and revitalize the Biden-era effort. It would also allow the White House to declare victory on achieving a new level of cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, without having to wade into the deep end on normalization and statehood. Barring some major high-tech offering and a sudden and unexpected end to the war in Gaza, it seems more likely that the visit—and any talk of normalization—could be postponed once more.
About the Author: Joshua Yaphe
Joshua Yaphe is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and was a Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He has a PhD in History from American University in Washington, DC, and is the author of Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared, currently out in paperback through the University of Liverpool Press. In 2020, he was a Visiting Fellow at the National Council on US-Arab Relations, and from 2022 to 2024, he served as a visiting faculty member at the National Intelligence University. His latest book, Time and Narrative in Intelligence Analysis: A New Framework for the Production of Meaning (Routledge, 2025), is available for free in an Open Access online edition.
Image: Brian Jason / Shutterstock.com.
