In the short term, normalization between Damascus and Jerusalem is not likely. But progress is still possible.
In a major moment somewhat overshadowed by the Middle East’s competing headlines, Syria’s transitional government confirmed that it held a second trilateral meeting with Israeli and US officials on August 19—the first public acknowledgement of any such engagement in 25 years. The announcement comes as Syria watchers debate the possibility of a Syria-Israel normalization agreement that would officially end their decades-old state of war. However, while the events culminating in the August trilateral meeting are notable, the states are far from achieving a full diplomatic opening under the Abraham Accords today.
To be sure, there are plenty of reasons for Damascus and Jerusalem to hit the diplomatic channels. Following the collapse of the former Assad regime in December 2024, Israel rapidly advanced on Syrian territory, destroying much of what remained of the Syrian Arab Army’s depots and infrastructure and capturing and occupying significant swaths of southern Syria’s Quneitra Governorate under the guise of preventing threats on its disputed border. That decision has infuriated Syrians, putting the transitional government of President Ahmed al-Shara in a difficult position.
Largely unable to respond to the Israeli assault given its weakness, Damascus opted for talks under US auspices. Reportedly starting in Paris and Baku, Azerbaijan, over the summer, diplomatic engagements have advanced equally as rapidly as Israel’s invasion, leading to the recent trilateral talks in Paris. Negotiations have largely focused on security, with Israeli media reporting that talks over a security agreement are “advanced.”
Given the file’s sensitivity, officials in Damascus quickly denied that any such agreement was close, although al-Shara did admit the talks were advanced. He also pumped the brakes on a broader deal or so-called “peace” under the Abraham Accords, highlighting Damascus’s interest in a more pragmatic deal under today’s conditions. Al-Shara has previously stated that he prefers a return to the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement regarding the Golan Heights, indicating his preference for a return to the status quo as it was before December 1974.
Realistically, the truth in the talks lies somewhere in between the reporting and public stances of either the state of Israel or Syria. Each actor has an interest in the talks, albeit for different reasons.
For Jerusalem, its new security doctrine centralizes external security in the form of buffer zones along its border, reflecting the post-October 7 geopolitical landscape. Just as in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, Israel refuses to let real or perceived threats build up on its border after the worst terror attack in the country’s history. It is willing to create facts on the ground—including and particularly the occupation of a sovereign state’s territory—to bolster its security or garner the leverage necessary in talks to achieve a preferential deal.
That approach heavily informs Syria’s thinking. Damascus needs economic support and political legitimacy to rebuild itself after roughly 14 years of brutal conflict, which it cannot achieve with ongoing Israeli strikes and occupation or without sustained easing of US sanctions. Whether Syrian officials traded steps towards normalization with Israel in exchange for sanctions relief is unclear, but not unlikely.
If so, it is now following through with talks with its southwestern neighbor, likely with the hope of retaining that relief and ending the occupation. Whether Syria still hopes to regain the Golan Heights, which Israel illegally occupied and annexed decades ago and which the first Trump administration unilaterally recognized as Israeli territory in 2019, remains to be seen as well. Israel has said that it will not cede the territory under any circumstances and is unlikely to do so, barring serious pressure that is simply not coming.
Still, Israel’s ongoing brutality in Gaza, which continues to whip up widespread anger in the Arab street, is critical to understand in this context. Al-Shara appreciates the importance of discretion and caution in this regard, especially following over a decade of Syrian non-state insurgencies.
For Washington, expanding the Abraham Accords is the stated goal. President Donald Trump still considers his first-term accomplishments as central to his Middle East strategy. For Trump, the Accords are about cementing his legacy, especially in ways his predecessors could not. He wants a Nobel Peace Prize and will continue to press leaders in Damascus for a deal that can further bolster his case.
Typically, the convergence of interests in such a manner is enough to produce full diplomatic normalization or a lesser deal, even one of such historic magnitude. Furthermore, Trump’s willingness to make any issue existential and to utilize every arm of the US government to achieve the goal surrounding that existential issue only bolsters the idea that normalization is forthcoming. Syria’s relative weakness to not only both countries, but also globally, could further indicate that an Israel-Syria thaw is close.
At the same time, however, Syria’s general weakness also inhibits advances in the talks. Damascus is beholden to its people and cannot sustain clear control over its sovereign territory, whether it be against Israel, local militias, or the Islamic State. It is likely keen to avoid giving its domestic rivals more reasons to fight it, even amid a war-weary climate in Syria. That is particularly true with respect to the Sunni armed factions that supposedly constitute its base today, which would be loath to see or support any Syrian opening with Israel and could come to view such a move as opening the door for a coup.
Thus, the question of normalization between Damascus and Jerusalem is not one of certainty, but rather one of scale in public and private, not unlike that of other Arab states. Security topics sit atop the reporting agenda because they are arguably the most pressing to address today, and somewhat ironically, the most practical. Syrians will applaud al-Shara should he end the latest Israeli occupation of Syrian land, just as Israelis will applaud Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for securing the borderlands and sticking it to Salafist Arabs to the north that originally applauded the October 7 massacres. Meanwhile, Trump will relish the spotlight—per usual.
But any deal normalizing diplomatic relations feels like a hill too steep for Damascus. To be sure, that conclusion does not suggest that a future Israel-Syria normalization will not happen. Rather, it is to argue that conditions are not ripe for an agreement of that scale under present conditions.
Still, Trump’s willingness to use massive pressure to achieve his goals is a wild card in this context. That should be notable for Syria watchers today as they aim to make predictions in a notoriously unpredictable region. Even with historic recent shifts on issues like US sanctions on Syria, more time is ultimately needed for any Abraham Accords expansion today.
About the Author: Alexander Langlois
Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst and Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets such as The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, Gulf International Forum, the New Arab, the Nation, and Inkstick. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.
Image: Barbara Ash / Shutterstock.com.
