Lee is easing tensions with North Korea by reversing his predecessor’s hardline approach. However, with Kim Jong-un uninterested in diplomacy and backed by Russia, prospects for peace remain slim.
Former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s short tenure was disastrous for inter-Korean relations. Other than offering up a vague proposal in August 2024 to establish working-level groups on increasing economic interactions between Seoul and Pyongyang, the former administration’s time in office was Obama-esque: short on creative ideas and long on strategic patience.
Yoon’s North Korea policy could best be summarized as “kick them in the teeth and see what sticks.” He clobbered his predecessor Moon Jae-in’s attempt to reconcile with North Korea, suspended the 2018 comprehensive military de-escalation agreement that aimed to ease tensions along the Demilitarized Zone (although the North Koreans abrogated the deal months earlier), resumed loudspeaker broadcasts against the North and even talked up the notion of South Korea attaining an independent nuclear weapons arsenal.
South Korea’s New President: Lee Jae-myung
With Yoon out and Lee Jae-myung in, South Korea’s policy towards its communist neighbor is on the road to reform. Lee isn’t as starry-eyed about Korean unification as Moon was, but he still intends to move South Korea away from the stance that dominated the Yoon era.
During his campaign, Lee promoted the resumption of the military-to-military hotline established with the North during Moon’s presidency to ensure the two sides could talk to each other if an emergency happened. Lee spent his first week on the job trying to implement some of his promised detente, first by ordering his Unification Ministry to request a stop to the propaganda balloons that North Korean defectors based in the South frequently launch over the border and then by shutting off the loudspeakers.
Lee’s spokesperson justified the suspension of the cross-border broadcasts as an effort to build goodwill with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
The hope is that low-cost initiatives like these will eventually be compensated by the Kim regime, producing a more benevolent atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula at large. It’s not out of the realm of possibility that Lee will try to renegotiate a mutual return to the 2018 military accord that separated North and South Korean forces, banned military drills near the DMZ, and created various communication channels between their respective military officers.
These items would be beneficial when the Kim regime seems more irritated about Northeast Asia’s security landscape than usual.
President Lee’s Relationship with America
Yet like all presidents before him, Lee has a problem: he’s only one piece of the puzzle and can only do what’s under his control. As the adage goes, it takes two to tango. Except for the Korean Peninsula, it usually takes three: South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. The first wants to rewind the clock to 2018 and 2019, when in-person summits, photo opportunities, and signing ceremonies were the norm.
However, the verdict is out on the other two players.
Trump would like to return to those happier times as well. He still occasionally talks about how he got along with Kim and why being on friendly terms with somebody possessing dozens of nuclear weapons is a good thing. He sometimes flirts with the possibility of reaching out to him again. Trump has done more than flirt; according to NK News, the administration tried to pass a letter to Kim through its mission at the United Nations.
But to be realistic: North Korea is only one of the many foreign policy issues on Trump’s desk, and it’s not the most serious. Add Trump’s incapacity to focus and his disinterest in the technical nuts-and-bolts of diplomacy into the equation. It’s not hard to envision the North Korea nuclear file getting pushed off to the next administration. However, Kim Jong-un is the most critical person in this dance. If he doesn’t want to participate in renewed diplomacy, then there’s little either Lee or Trump can do to move the needle toward better relations.
While that may sound obvious, it’s also worth mentioning because US officials habitually overstate their power to coerce others into adopting policies more to Washington’s liking.
Kim Jong-un Doesn’t Want to Talk to South Korea or America
The incentive structure for Kim to explore a reconciliation with Washington and Seoul existed in 2018 and 2019, but it no longer exists in 2025 for three big reasons.
First, Kim now has Russia in his corner and doesn’t need to concern himself with more sanctions at the UN Security Council.
Second, US sanctions relief is less urgent for North Korea today than during Trump’s first term.
And third, Kim has no intention at this stage of risking a repeat of the failed summit experience of February 2019, when he left Hanoi downcast, humiliated, and with nothing to show for his diplomatic gamble.
Until Kim’s mind changes on any or all of that, Lee Jae-myung has few options other than chipping away at the acrimony and hoping Pyongyang reciprocates.
About the Author: Daniel R DePetris
Daniel R DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy think tank based in Washington, D.C., where he focuses primarily on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the geopolitics of East Asia. He’s a syndicated foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune, a regular contributor to the Spectator magazine as well as a writer for Newsweek. His prior work can be seen in Foreign Policy magazine, the Los Angeles Times, USA Today and the National Review, among other publications.
Image Credit: Wikimedia/Jeonnam Provincial Government.
