Israel’s and Iran’s short war ends in a ceasefire, but the strikes likely failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, highlighting a reckless cycle of political theatrics and strategic futility.
With the ceasefire between Israel and Iran, as well as the United States, holding after their 12-day war, many questions remain regarding the broader, long-running Israel-Iran conflict. Still, influential figures in each government have projected an undue level of confidence in their supposed victory. Such proclamations go beyond mere foolishness: They reflect the dangerous and hawkish ideologies that led these states to commence a war that ultimately proved irresponsible and pointless.
The ceasefire decision reflects a desire on the part of each state to recoup some semblance of victory as the war began to drag on. That fighting included continuous exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran in what increasingly looked to be developing into a battle of attrition by modern means, namely, rockets and air strikes on largely civilian targets and senior state figures.
With hundreds dead and thousands injured on both sides, the countries were wise to call it quits as further operations were likely to yield increasingly limited gains and more death and destruction without ensuing ground operations.
Did Iran Want to Create a Ceasefire with Israel?
Tehran particularly welcomes the ceasefire. The country took a beating from a technologically and militarily superior Israel, with most casualties, including significant civilian deaths and injuries, on their side of the war. Strategic Islamic Republic losses relate to its military and nuclear program, as many officials and assets were either killed or destroyed in the fighting. At a minimum, many of those assets suffered severe damage.
An ongoing debate regarding available intelligence into these Iranian losses largely fails to acknowledge that little is currently known or will be known in the short or medium term about American and Israeli strikes on nuclear sites like Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Currently, political forces across the ideological spectrum in each country that participated in the war appear to be intent on utilizing publicly unavailable intelligence for political purposes. This expanding dynamic is prevalent in the United States, where new Middle East conflicts are universally unpopular.
That would explain US President Donald Trump’s bluster, arguing Iran’s nuclear program was “obliterated” in one of the largest and most significant air operations in the country’s history. Never one for modesty, the president hopes to present a political victory to his base at home while bolstering his legacy, one he obsesses over relative to previous presidents.
But another interest could be driving Trump’s thinking. It should not be lost on observers that it took the US president a substantial amount of time to decide on striking Iran. While Trump espouses strength first and foremost, he is inclined to avoid conflict. This should not be confused with an unwillingness to use force or lean into war, as his previous record highlights.
Instead, the bluster and stalling could reflect his desire to move on from a conflict that has proven intractable for his administration, as has been the case with previous US presidencies. Trump was ultimately unable to make a deal with Iran before Israel launched its surprise attack on the country. This situation may have pigeonholed the US president, who, while aware of the impending assault and unwilling to pressure the Israeli government against it, may have decided that massive strikes and an aggressive claim to victory would allow him to spin the overall situation as a win.
Whether or not that drives his recent commentary, in which he has claimed his administration does not view a nuclear deal with Iran as “necessary,” remains an open question. Washington is reportedly pushing for talks with the Islamic Republic and has signaled that Tehran is interested in those talks. However, Iranian officials say otherwise.
Ultimately, little trust existed between these parties, and it died when Israel struck Iran with the help of US deception. This point is crucial when observing the efficacy of the operations that aimed to wipe out the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. Even if one concedes that its major nuclear sites are irreparably destroyed, it is highly plausible that the Iranians moved atomic assets from the sites ahead of Israeli and US signaling of an attack.
That is not to say that the Iranian nuclear program is functional today. Instead, it is worth noting an argument numerous experts have articulated to prevent such a war: Iran’s nuclear program cannot be bombed away.
While Israel managed to kill many nuclear scientists, it did not and has not removed the nuclear knowledge base in Iran. Such an objective is arguably not possible. Coupled with the possibility that enriched uranium and centrifuges were moved to other unknown atomic sites, the outcome of the fighting appears muddled at best.
Are Iran’s Nuclear Sites Completely Destroyed?
Therein lies the tragedy of the situation: The political capital needed to restrict Iran’s nuclear program truly was effectively wasted on strikes that likely failed to achieve their intended result. And now, the Islamic Republic is inclined to hide the aspects of its program that it likely saved while rejecting serious talks that would prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon, as reflected by its decision to cease cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The only conclusion from this tragic period is that the strikes were another irresponsible and illegal use of force on the part of Israel and the United States. Rather than learn from past and present failures, the leaders of these two countries opted for a pointless and harmful tactical victory, primarily benefiting their short-term political interests at the expense of a real, strategic win. The world will reap the negative consequences as a result.
About the Author: Alexander Langlois
Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst and Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is focused on the geopolitics of the Levant and the broader dynamics of West Asia. Langlois holds a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs from American University. He has written for various outlets such as The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Sada, Atlantic Council’s MENASource, the Lowy Institute, Gulf International Forum, the New Arab, the Nation, and Inkstick. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/thomas koch.
