The reported upcoming Israel-Syria security agreement could lay the cornerstone of a new Middle East security architecture.
If reports are to be believed, long-time rivals Israel and Syria may now be heading not toward yet another escalation, but normalization. The two most unlikely partners may now sign a security agreement after eight decades of hostility, under the auspices of the United States. While shying away from the level of attention drawn by the ongoing conflict in Gaza or the strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, the Syrian arena may soon initiate a sweeping re-imagination of the war-torn Middle East’s security architecture.
The Trump administration and Israel have long identified the opportunity presented by the new reality in Syria as the first domino that may usher in a new regional order. In Riyadh last May, President Trump urged Syrian President and former HTS terrorist Ahmad Al-Shara, also known as Mohammad Al-Jolani, to join the Abraham Accords and normalize relations with neighboring Israel.
In late August, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the matter with US envoys Thomas Barrack and Morgan Ortagus. Israeli strategic affairs minister Ron Dermer, Netanyahu’s close associate, reportedly met Syrian foreign minister Asaad Al-Shibani in Paris. Shara himself reportedly confirmed advanced peace talks, saying he “will not hesitate to take” any step that puts Syria first.
Granted, Shara’s transition from terrorist to a polished, besuited statesman raised some eyebrows, while also encouraging excessive romanticism and hyperbole. Yet Shara’s rationale behind this process could illuminate the newly defined rules of engagement that may serve the US regional ambitions.
While it would be naïve to suggest that, as a whole, the Middle East has left religious rifts and strife behind, it would be reasonable to notice a growing mass of pragmatic forces in leadership positions willing to treat ideological considerations as secondary, whether to secure regional stability or to consolidate domestic power.
The Druze Factor
Having ousted former pro-Iranian Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Shara is focusing on reaffirming his position as the undisputed leader of Syria. At home, he is forming a unified national army out of the remaining insurgent groups. Abroad, he is garnering international legitimacy, visiting European and Arab capitals, and shaking the hand of an American president, the same country that had previously put him on the terrorist wanted list and in prison.
Shara often stresses his focus as being national unity, reconstruction, and stability: “Syria’s war-weary condition, after years of conflict and war, does not allow for new confrontations,” he stated back in December. These self-interested goals could be the emulsifier between the current raised fist and a future handshake.
That said, former Al Qaeda affiliate Shara often struggles to explain his henchmen’s treatment of vulnerable minorities in the country, especially the Druze. Despite committing to the defense of the Druze as a “priority” and meeting senior Lebanese Druze officials to pledge a “new era far removed from sectarianism,” the recurrent targeting of the Druze community has been a frequent bone of contention between Shara and Israel, which itself includes a large Druze minority. This group’s cross-regional presence means that in Syria’s precarious climate, they may eye other regional partners.
In April, a fake video featuring a Druze leader purportedly insulting Islam led to raids in the Druze suburb of Jaramana, near Damascus, killing at least 21 people. In July, at least 1,100 were killed in widespread clashes between Druze, Bedouin, and government forces around Sweida, a Druze-majority region. Disturbing videos circulating online showed Shara’s soldiers humiliate a Druze sheikh by forcefully shaving his beard, or shoot unarmed Druze civilians after demanding they disclose their religion. Investigative journalists confirmed the location of these videos, often taken by the killers themselves. The UN also voiced grave concern over cases of executions, abductions, looting, and sexual violence against women.
Israel vowed to prevent further bloodshed and sent an inflow of aid, while also directing the IDF to target the regime’s military sites, command centers, and even Shara’s Presidential Palace. “Israel is committed to preventing harm being inflicted on the Druze in Syria,” warned Netanyahu, citing the historic “covenant of blood” with the Druze. Shara, on his part, accused Israel of having “crossed the lines of engagement in Syria” and risked “unwarranted escalation.”
The First Domino—or Detonator
While hardly the only minority in Syria to suffer the consequences of a regime void in the country, the Druze give Israel a seat at the table. Reportedly, Israel is demanding the creation of a “humanitarian corridor” to the Druze region, cementing its status as a regional protector of minorities. This may even give Israel an opportunity to reach all the way into Iraq, replacing Iran’s former “Shia crescent” with its own sphere of influence. Israel has made it clear to Shara that any deal that leaves the Druze vulnerable to his henchmen’s mercy is dead on arrival.
Israel is also expecting recognition of the Israeli Golan Heights, calling its status “nonnegotiable.” Syria, for its part, could agree to joint management of the strategically-located Syrian Golan, right across the border, an area Israel has taken over after Assad’s ousting, creating a buffer zone largely based on the 1974 disengagement lines. Israeli defense minister Yisrael Katz called the Syrian Golan “vital to defending [border] communities” from invasion. Shara himself was quoted as referring to the 1974 lines as a preliminary baseline.
Prior to Hamas’ October 7 massacre in southern Israel, it was Saudi Arabia, rather than Syria, that had been considered the leading contender to sign up for the Abraham Accords club. Iran’s orchestrated multifront attack against the Jewish state through its regional proxies reshuffled the cards and made the kingdom step back and wait its turn.
As the custodian of the Muslim holy sites, Saudi Arabia’s normalizing its ties with Israel would carry sweeping significance far beyond simply a bilateral peace accord. Until the Gaza arena is put to rest, Riyadh will keep pulling strings behind the scenes. Quietly, the Saudis are rooting for a clear outcome in Gaza that will rid it of Hamas, part of the Muslim Brotherhood that Riyadh views as a threat. Pragmatism, along with a strong willingness to align with President Trump, may drive Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman to push his second-fiddle neighbor to normalize ties with Israel first, paving the way for him.
Whether now or at a later point, Israeli-Syria rapprochement can reflect the driving forces behind it: narrow vested interests by a new generation of Arab rulers to put their national interests first; Israel’s projection of power following the October 7 attacks, taking on Iran’s nuclear program and its regional militant network; and the current White House’s realism and determination to pursue diplomacy based on interests, rather than history lessons.
Trump not only removed sanctions to allow Syria to “shine” but also to invest in Saudi Arabia and prevent its tilt toward China. His trajectory is also threatening the well-established diplomatic inertia surrounding the conventional path to peace in the region, forcing an unrealistic two-state vision upon Israel. He may now succeed in swapping the Iranian sphere of influence with an American-Israeli-Arab coalition, transitioning the region from a hotbed of ideological conflict into a hub of pragmatism and interconnectivity.
About the Author: Or Yissachar
Or Yissachar is the Executive Director of the David Institute for Security Policy (IDSF) an Israeli think tank.
Image: Brian Jason / Shutterstock.com.
