Tehran has plenty of reasons to run out the clock and ensure that a deal with Trump does not stray too far from the terms of the 2015 JCPOA.
As President Trump explores a nuclear deal with Iran, he would be wise to recognize that Tehran probably comes to the negotiating table less because it fears Washington than because it smells opportunity.
That is, the talks could pave the way for Tehran to free itself from the threat of “snap-back” global sanctions this fall while strengthening the regime at home at a time of rising public discontent.
With those dynamics in mind, U.S. negotiators should set a firm deadline of no more than a few weeks to strike a deal that truly serves U.S. interests—lest they let Iranian negotiators drag out the talks, enabling Tehran to advance its nuclear program further while freeing itself from the threat of economic retaliation.
Let’s consider the likely view from Tehran after three rounds of talks that, not surprisingly, left major issues unresolved.
The president, publicly and in a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, has threatened to use force against Iran’s nuclear sites in the absence of a deal. Still, Tehran has good reason to be skeptical.
For starters, Trump is the fourth president over the last quarter-century who threatened force while opting for conciliation, enabling Tehran to advance its nuclear and related ballistic missile programs. The mullahs might reasonably assume that Washington has no appetite for force, no matter which party is in power.
Moreover, Trump threatened many weeks ago that “all hell is going to break out” against Hamas if it didn’t release all of its post-October 7 hostages in Gaza forthwith. Nevertheless, he did not follow through with military action. With the potential consequences of military action against Iran far more serious, why would the regime conclude that he’d follow through to cripple its nuclear program?
Nor does Washington seem firm on its negotiating bottom line. Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, suggested recently that, as part of a deal, the president would let Tehran continue enriching uranium at low levels of purity rather than force it to dismantle its nuclear program.
After critics expressed fears that Trump was looking for something like the much-maligned 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—that President Obama fashioned and from which Trump withdrew in 2018—the administration toughened its stance. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Iran could retain only a civilian nuclear program that uses imported nuclear fuel.
Under Resolution 2231, the UN Secretary Council has only until October to decide whether to impose “snap-back” sanctions against Iran for violating the 2015 deal. And while any party to that agreement—the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany—can trigger the snap-back mechanism, America’s withdrawal from the deal raises the question of whether it retains the power to do so.
As a result, Washington may have to convince Britain, France, or Germany to trigger the sanctions. The problem, as Tehran can see, is that U.S.-European relations are strained over Trump’s tariffs, his efforts to impose a Russia-friendly peace settlement on Ukraine, and his derision of the Western alliance. In fact, as it now requests to meet with those European nations before continuing its talks with Washington, Tehran may well try to separate the United States from its allies over Iran policy as well.
All of that leaves U.S. negotiators with less leverage over their Iranian counterparts, who, in turn, have every incentive to stretch out negotiations in the interest of reaching October.
No U.S. president conducts policy, foreign or domestic, in a vacuum, and, at the moment, Trump’s approval ratings are sinking, consumer confidence is plummeting, and the chances of recession are rising. Those challenges could increase his desire to continue negotiating as October approaches in hopes of striking a deal—even a questionable one—to claim a victory and boost his standing at home.
Tehran is facing its own domestic turmoil, and these negotiations could give the regime a timely lifeline. Partly due to U.S. sanctions, Iran’s economy is sliding, potentially threatening the regime’s hold on power. Its currency is collapsing; inflation sits around 40 percent; energy and water shortages are growing more frequent; poverty is rising, and job prospects for Iran’s many young people are poor.
At the same time, this week’s massive explosion in Iran’s commercial port of Bandar Abbas, which has killed at least seventy people and injured more than 1,000, will likely drive further public anger at the regime.
As it explores the possibility of a deal, Washington must do two things: keep its eye on the sanctions clock and avoid a deal that does more to strengthen the regime in Tehran than serve U.S. interests.
About the Author: Lawrence J. Haas
Lawrence J. Haas is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of, among other books, Harry and Arthur: Truman, Vandenberg, and the Partnership That Created the Free World. Haas writes widely on foreign affairs, is quoted often in newspapers and magazines, and appears frequently on TV and radio. Previously, he was Communications Director for Vice President Al Gore and, before that, for the Office of Management and Budget.
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