The campaign against Yemen’s Houthi rebels was ineffective and costly. Now, the president should resist pressure to reengage.
When the United States launched “Operation Rough Rider” against the Houthis in mid-March, the group was targeting Israel but not U.S. ships. Around $1 billion later, the same is true today. While President Donald Trump declared victory against the Houthis in announcing his surprise ceasefire, the agreement merely restored the status quo that existed between the United States and the Houthis before the campaign.
Nevertheless, the Trump administration was right to take an offramp from what was quickly becoming an open-ended campaign with rising costs and escalation risks. However, with Houthi attacks on Israel continuing and criticism mounting, even among some of Trump’s allies, Washington could very well be drawn back in. The administration should reject pressure to “finish the job” and stand firm in its decision to walk away from the campaign.
A Futile and Costly Campaign
The campaign against the Houthis was misguided from the beginning—neither necessary to protect U.S. economic and security interests nor likely to succeed. Fundamentally, the limited economic disruption caused by Houthi attacks on shipping did not warrant costly military intervention, nor was the bombing campaign conducted by the United States capable of eliminating the Houthis’ ability to attack shipping.
Shipping firms quickly adapted to strikes on ships, rerouting vessels around Africa without major price increases for consumers, particularly in the United States. Moreover, even with the U.S.-Houthi ceasefire, most shippers do not plan on returning to the Red Sea until the Gaza War ends.
After “Operation Rough Rider” was launched, the limits of airpower against the Houthis quickly became apparent. One month in, despite carrying out near-continuous strikes, the United States had failed to establish air superiority. As Houthi attacks continued, the main measure of success U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) touted was the volume of munitions expended—not the strategic effect. The campaign failed to eliminate Houthi senior leadership or significantly degrade their ability to strike in the Red Sea or at Israel. U.S. intelligence assessments warned that the Houthis could quickly reconstitute. As one official admitted after the ceasefire, the group still retains “significant capabilities.”
It should not have come as a surprise that the United States was unable to “completely annihilate” the Houthis, as Trump vowed to do. There is a long history of overwhelming air power failing to achieve political objectives, particularly against militant groups.
The Houthis had withstood years of bombardment from the Saudi-led coalition, developing effective means to disperse, protect, and replace their weapons. Likewise, they have survived numerous attempts at leadership decapitation. No matter how long the campaign lasted or how many targets were struck, the Houthis’ ability to threaten regional shipping was never going to be eliminated from the air.
The campaign against the Houthis drew resources and attention to a region that Trump, like his two predecessors, hoped to retrench from. Defense officials grew increasingly worried that the rapid expenditure of precision munitions and deployment of in-demand assets, including two aircraft carriers and Patriot air defense systems, was undermining U.S. readiness in the Indo-Pacific. The United States was using $2 million interceptors to destroy $2,000 drones—an unsustainable pattern that added further strain to the U.S. defense industrial base.
Most worrisome was the growing risk of mission creep and escalation, both with the Houthis and Iran. According to The New York Times, CENTCOM had proposed an eight-to-ten-month campaign that included “targeted assassinations modeled on Israel’s recent operation against Hezbollah.”
As it became clear that airpower alone was insufficient to eliminate the Houthi military threat, officials reportedly considered a more expansive campaign to support anti-Houthi Yemeni forces. Escalation pressures would have intensified even more had the Houthis killed U.S. military personnel, something they nearly did on multiple occasions, according to recent reporting.
The risk of conflict with Iran also loomed large. In early May, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth threatened to target Iran over its support for the Houthis. Such saber-rattling threatened to derail nuclear talks at a critical juncture and push the United States closer to war. Reports suggest this risk to nuclear negotiations with Iran spurred Special Envoy Steve Witkoff to push for the ceasefire.
Will Trump Stay the Course?
Pressure to resume strikes against the Houthis will linger and likely intensify as Houthi attacks on Israel continue, and shipping stays away from the Red Sea. The ceasefire agreement has been met with predictable criticism in Washington, largely because it does not include Israel, and was reached despite Houthi military capabilities remaining intact.
Sen. Rick Scott (R-Fl) complained, “We’ve got to hold Iran accountable. This is not going to stop until Iran is held accountable, either by the United States, by Israel, somebody.” Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) urged Trump to “hold bad actors accountable” amid continued Houthi attacks on Israel. Most troublingly, Trump himself has raised the prospect of resuming the bombing campaign, threatening on May 15 to “go back on the offensive” if the Houthis attack U.S. vessels again.
If the United States wants a lasting end to Houthi attacks, it should prioritize reaching a ceasefire in Gaza, not restart an ineffective and costly bombing campaign. The Houthis have maintained that their attacks are intended to pressure Israel into a Gaza ceasefire, and they notably paused attacks during the ceasefire reached in January. Time is of the essence, as the Houthis may resume attacks on Red Sea shipping in response to Israel’s expanded operations in Gaza. An end to the Gaza War—which is in US interests anyway—may be the best shot to put an end to Houthi aggression.
The ceasefire doesn’t absolve the Trump administration of launching the ill-advised effort. However, Trump deserves credit for recognizing that the approach wasn’t working and changing course. In doing so, he showed a noteworthy willingness to break with harmful foreign policy orthodoxies. Too often, sunk-cost thinking, concerns about “credibility,” and fears of political backlash have prevented leaders from cutting their losses. But Trump smartly walked away. Now, he must face down calls to reengage in a futile endeavor.
About the Author: Will A. Smith
Will A. Smith is a Research Associate with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center. His research interests include Middle Eastern and European security affairs, defense policy, and grand strategy. Prior to joining Stimson, he was Assistant Managing Editor of The National Interest and Assistant Editor at the Arab Gulf States Institute.
Image: Ranchorunner / Shutterstock.com.
