Regime change operations are tempting in the short run—but they often give way to open-ended “nation-building” projects that rack up immense political, financial, and human costs.
The Trump administration has executed a successful exfiltration of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro, removing the authoritarian leader from power. According to President Donald Trump, the United States plans to “run” the country during the interim.
The situation sounds dramatic at first brush, and it is to some extent. However, regime change is a recurring tool in US foreign policy. Like so many other comparable operations, Maduro’s removal is being justified as a stabilizing, democracy-promoting, threat-removing success, a moral victory. Still, while the operation was a success from a tactical perspective, regime change almost never unfolds cleanly, or as advertised, in the strategic sense.
America Has a Long History of Overthrowing Foreign Governments
For most of its first century, the United States was focused inward on its own development, expanding across the American continent and developing industries concentrated in the east. However, individual Americans played a colorful role in the politics of South and Central America. The 1800s gave rise to “filibusters,” American soldiers of fortune who launched unsanctioned military expeditions into Latin America, sometimes with financial support from wealthy Americans. The most famous among these was William Walker, who briefly took over Nicaragua in the mid-1850s before his ouster and execution.
The US began directly overthrowing governments in the 1890s after it sanctioned the removal of the Hawaiian monarchy. The trend accelerated during the Cold War, with regime change operations in Iran, Guatemala, South Vietnam, and Chile. The drawdown and conclusion of the Cold War did nothing to temper US regime change operations, which continued in Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Through the dozen or so cases a pattern emerged: short-term success leading to long-term instability.
Why Regime Change Almost Never Works
The core assumption behind recurrent US regime change operations is the idea that removing a leader results in system improvement, through a power vacuum that moderates move in to fill, with institutions that can be rebuilt quickly. But this logic often underestimates the complexity of local politics, sectarian divides or nationalism, and overestimates America’s ability to control postwar dynamics.
The shortsightedness of regime change has been especially apparent in the 21st century, in which the US abandoned the covert or limited operations of the 20th century, in favor of full-scale nation-building. The War in Afghanistan was initially successful; the removal of the Taliban enjoyed strategic justification and popular support. But the lightning-fast victory over the Taliban was followed with a monumental nation-building endeavor, complete with efforts to build more roads and enroll more girls in school. After two decades of perpetual deployment in-country, the United States withdrew, and the Taliban swiftly returned to power.
A similar story followed in Iraq, where the United States was able to quickly overthrow longtime dictator Saddam Hussein after its invasion in 2003. But the process of building an inclusive government afterward was far more complicated—particularly as various groups within Iraq turned to violence rather than democracy to achieve their political goals. After eight years in Iraq, the United States pulled out—only for the weak central government to collapse amid the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) terror group, necessitating America’s return.
Today, Iraq is relatively stable and has quasi-democratic institutions, and some have described America’s campaign in Iraq as an eventual success on that basis. But it is hard to argue that the immense costs of the operation justify its meager benefits. The United States has maintained a military presence in Iraq for 21 of the last 23 years—and a limited number of US troops are still present in Iraq for counter-ISIS operations, raising questions over what might happen after they depart a second time.
War Is Expensive for the United States
The costs of regime change are steep. The US military sustains casualties. Local civilian populations typically sustain far more casualties. Refugees flow from the toppled state, usually northward, causing second- and third-order effects in the Western world. Trillions of dollars are spent. Untold opportunity costs are wasted. Alliances are strained. In the process, US credibility is eroded—and America’s adversaries are often empowered.
So while the Venezuelan regime change appears to have gone smoothly, because no US troops were killed in the initial operation, and because a democracy-defying dictator was removed from power, history suggests that the bill is still forthcoming. And if the US should engage in full-scale nation-building in Venezuela, defying 21st century lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, then those costs may be extreme and enduring.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer at The National Interest. Kass is an attorney and former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a pilot trainee before being medically discharged. He focuses on military strategy, aerospace, and global security affairs. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global Journalism and International Relations from NYU.
Image: Shutterstock / Evan El-Amin.
