Had the Aquila been completed, it could have bolstered Italy’s Mediterranean operations by providing fleet air defense and strike capabilities.
Not wanting to be viewed as the ‘sick man’ of the Axis Powers in the Second World War, Benito Mussolini’s Italy was on a perpetual quest to prove its own might was equal to the Nazis and the Imperial Japanese. While Italy’s capabilities never matched the other Axis Powers, the fact remains that its navy was probably the most effective branch of its Armed Forces, even as it left much to be desired. One such capability the Regia Marina (Royal Italian Navy) desired, but never successfully developed, was an aircraft carrier.
Italy’s main maritime theater was contesting control of the Mediterranean with the British Royal Navy. Given how increasingly naval airpower dominated naval engagements, and the advantages that Britain’s aircraft carriers conferred on the Royal Navy fighting in the Mediterranean, Rome wanted to match London.
Enter the Aquila (Italian for “Eagle”). Converted from a transatlantic passenger liner, the SS Roma, Italy had its first aircraft carrier in 1941 and was completed by 1943—the year of the armistice. Aquila was a bold but ultimately doomed project, hampered by industrial limitations, strategic missteps, and the unpredictable tides of war.
The Origins of Italy’s Aircraft Carrier Program
During the Interwar Period, the Italians watched as the various great navies of the modern world developed aircraft carriers of one kind or another. As early as 1923, the Italian College of Admirals, chaired by Admiral Umberto Cagni, discussed the tactical value of aircraft carriers, recognizing their potential to project air power at sea.
Italy’s limited industrial capacity, however, and the country’s prewar focus on combating French battleships—and, indeed, the belief that Italy itself served as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean—all negated any serious investment before hostilities commenced. Mussolini himself was skeptical of the project, arguing that Italy’s geographic position and land-based airfields negated the need for carriers.
The Regia Marina’s perspective on the carrier shifted only after many early wartime setbacks. The raid on Taranto in November 1940, when British torpedo bombers crippled three Italian battleships, exposed the vulnerability of Italy’s surface fleet without air cover. The Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941, where the loss of three heavy cruisers might have been prevented with carrier-based aircraft, further underscored the need for naval aviation. These disasters prompted Mussolini and the Regia Marina to greenlight the conversion of the SS Roma, a 30,800-ton passenger liner laid up since 1940, into a fleet carrier.
Renamed the Aquila to avoid confusion with a new battleship, the project began in earnest at the Ansaldo shipyard in Genoa in November 1941.
The Makeshift Italian Carrier’s Specifications
Converting the SS Roma to the Aquila was a truly radical undertaking. Indeed, transforming a civilian liner into a warship capable of carrying 51 aircraft was a difficult task under the best of conditions. The liner’s interior was gutted to accommodate a hangar deck, workshops, and new machinery.
The hull was lengthened and fitted with deep bugles for stability and torpedo defense. The flight deck was partially armored with 76mm plates over aviation fuel and ammunition magazines. Two octagonal elevators, limited to carrying five tons each, connected the flight deck to the hangar.
The Aquila’s propulsion system was upgraded with eight boilers and four steam turbines, producing 151,000 shaft-horsepower and a top speed of 30 knots (34 miles per hour), comparable to American carriers such as the USS Ranger. The ship’s “pseudo-chess” machinery arrangement, with turbines and boilers alternated for damage control, enhanced survivability.
The quasi-carrier’s armaments included eight 135mm dual-purpose guns, repurposed from incomplete Capitani Romani-class cruisers, and 12, 65mm anti-aircraft guns (though the AA battery was incomplete by the time Italy surrendered in 1943). Its aviation facilities relied heavily on German technology, acquired during a 1941 technical mission. Two Demag compressed-air catapults, originally intended for Germany’s unbuilt “Carrier B,” were installed at the flight deck’s forward end, capable of launching one aircraft every 30 seconds.
Five sets of German arrester gear were also acquired, but their initial installation proved faulty. This raised concerns among Italian naval planners that aircraft might need to ditch at sea or land at airfields after missions—a severe operational limitation. After months of testing at the Perguia Saint’Egidio airfield, the gear was deemed usable by March 1943; a postwar evaluation of the system by the US Navy criticized the absence of a crash barrier, which would have made landings hazardous.
Aquila’s air group was planned to consist of 51 Reggiane Re.2001 fighter-bombers, with 41 stowed in the hangar—15 suspended from the deckhead due to non-folding wings—and ten on the flight deck. The Re.2001, chosen over the Fiat G.50 and German Junkers Ju 87C Stuka after land-based trials, was a capable aircraft but not optimized for carrier operations. A folding-wing variant, the Re.2001G, could have increased the air group to 66, but it was never adopted.
The ship’s starboard-side island featured a large funnel and a command tower with fire control directors for the 135mm guns.
The Aquila Was Never Completed
Had the Aquila been completed, it could have bolstered Italy’s Mediterranean operations by providing fleet air defense and strike capabilities. The Regia Marina envisioned it as an “air defense umbrella” for battleships, like the Littorio-class, addressing the coordination issues between the navy and land-based Regia Aeronautica.
The Re.2001’s ability to serve as both a fighter and a bomber offered flexibility, potentially countering British carriers like the Illustrious. German engineers, who assisted with training in 1943, noted the Re.2001’s superiority over their own Messerschmitt Bf 109T for carrier use.
At the same time, Italy lacked experience in carrier operations. Pilot training was limited to land-based simulations. The non-folding wings of the Re.2001 reduced hangar capacity, and the elevator’s low weight limit constrained aircraft handling. The faulty arresting gear, even after modifications, posed risks, and the absence of a crash barrier, as noted by the US Navy, heightened the danger of accidents.
Italy’s strained industrial base, already stretched by destroyer, submarine, and cruiser construction, struggled to prioritize Aquila and its sister ship, the Sparviero (a less ambitious version of the liner Augustus). By September 1943, Aquila was 80 to 90 percent complete, with engines and catapults tested, but it lacked a full crew, anti-aircraft guns, and operational aircraft.
Italy’s abrupt decision to withdraw from the war on September 8, 1943, halted the Aquila’s construction. In the subsequent “Operation Achse”—in which German forces seized control over northern Italy and reinstalled Mussolini as dictator of a breakaway state there—German forces took control of the ship in Genoa. The Nazis intended to repurpose or dismantle it, but Allied air raids damaged it on June 16, 1944, putting it out of action for the remainder of the war.
On April 19, 1945, Italian frogmen from the Mariassalto unit—loyal to the co-belligerent Kingdom of Italy, which had joined the war on the Allied side—attacked the Aquila with human torpedoes to prevent its use by the Germans or as a blockship. The attack caused minor damage, leaving the ship but afloat. After the war, Aquila was refloated in 1946, towed to La Spezia in 1949, and eventually scrapped in 1952, marking an unceremonious end to Italy’s first carrier.
Like so much about Italy’s wartime experience, the Italian Navy’s experience with aircraft carriers missed its moment. Some scholars have argued that if the war had begun in 1945, perhaps Italy would have been more of a player. Or if the Italians had focused on their shipbuilding capabilities in the Interwar Years, perhaps then Italy would have been more lethal. Nevertheless, the Italians were overwhelmed because they could not keep up with the demands of modern warfare.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Wikimedia Commons.
