The fact that the Soviets were using large numbers of their older tanks did not inherently mean that they were likely to lose.
Picture the scene. A group of Western military analysts are snickering at the sight of ancient Soviet T-55 and T-62 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) leading attacks on the battlefield in Russia’s latest foreign conflict. Many in the West believe that the presence of these antiquated tanks, rather than more modern and sophisticated equipment, are a sure sign that the Kremlin is on track to lose.
No, this is not a reference to the Ukraine War—though it very well could have been. In fact, this is an allusion to the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989 that defined the geopolitics in the 1980s. It also speaks to a fundamental misunderstanding by many Western analysts about the Russian (or, in this case, Soviet) way of war.
Of course, as those same analysts would point out, the Soviets lost in Afghanistan. But in spite of many of the same disadvantages, Russia is gradually winning in Ukraine. Why the difference? Because the Soviet-Afghan War was never viewed by Moscow as an existential struggle in the same manner that Russian leaders today think about the Ukraine War—and the Kremlin never devoted the same resources to victory in Afghanistan that it has in Ukraine.
The Use of Older Soviet Tanks in Afghanistan
There were a plethora of T-55s and T-62s left over in the USSR when the Soviet-Afghan War erupted. Moscow figured that their newer, more advanced T-72s and T-80s would be needed to continue deterring NATO’s more advanced tanks arrayed against the Soviet bloc in Europe. Conversely, given the abundant supply of older T-55 and T-62 MBTs—as well as the fact that the mujahideen in Afghanistan were by no means a near-peer adversary with sophisticated anti-tank weapons—the Red Army’s leadership assessed their arsenal of T-55s and T-62s were more than sufficient for squelching the rebellion.
Indeed, in a straight up conflict, Soviet tanks deployed in Afghanistan were powerful elements. Of course, the mujahideen’s guerilla tactics stunted many of the tactical advantages that the more advanced systems of the Red Army would have ordinarily conferred upon the Soviets.
However, even with the added complication of the Mujahideen’s guerilla tactics—as well as the Kremlin’s growing alarm at their copious support from the United States—Moscow did not believe it was necessary to divert their most advanced MBTs from the main theater of operations in Europe.
Another aspect that few in the West appreciate about the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was that many of the initial formations deployed by the Red Army were little more than rearguard formations from the USSR’s Central Asian holdings. These elements had older systems and were not as well trained as the crack Red Army troops facing NATO in Europe.
The T-55 Was One of the World’s Most Common Tanks
The T-55 MBT is considered to be one of the most widely produced and exported tanks in history. The Soviet Union’s vast industrial capacity constructed roughly 100,000 units of the tank throughout its life, and it was widely exported to the developing world. Developed in the late 1940s and entering service in the 1950s, it was an evolution of the older T-54 that was specifically built to counter Western tanks such as the M48 Patton during the Cold War.
T-55s came equipped with 100mm D-10T rifled gun, capable of firing APHE, HEAT, and APDS rounds. These units also had a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun and, in some variants, a 12.7mm DShK “Dushka” anti-aircraft gun. T-55s featured frontal armor (up to 200mm effective thickness) and a low-profile turret, providing decent protection for their four-man crew against early post-WWII anti-tank weapons. A 580-horsepower V-55 diesel engine powered the T-55 giving a top speed of 31 miles per hour.
By the 1970s, the tank had become increasingly vulnerable to newer NATO weapons. Yet in Afghanistan, particularly at the start of the campaign before Western aid to the Mujahideen really became a threat to the Red Army, these tanks were more than sufficient for countering light infantry.
The T-62 Tank Improved on the T-55
The T-62—the next variant in the Kremlin’s tank arsenal—was the direct successor to the T-55. Entering service in 1961, it was an evolutionary design intended to bridge the gap between the T-55 and more advanced tanks like the T-64. Around 20,000 units were produced, and it saw extensive use by Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and export client states during the Cold War.
T-62s had a 115mm T-5TS smoothbore gun, the first of its kind on a production tank, capable of firing APFSDS, HEAT, and HE rounds. The larger barrel gave it superior penetration compared to the T-55’s 100mm armament. It also had a 7.62mm PKT coaxial machine gun and, in some models, a 12.7mm DShK anti-aircraft gun.
A cast turret and a sloped hull with up to 242mm effective thickness on the turret front and 100mm on the hull was its armor—an improvement over the T-55. Yet, like the T-55, the T-62 was still vulnerable to advanced NATO anti-tank weapons by the 1970s.
Like the T-55, the T-62 carried a four-man crew. Interestingly, it also lacked an autoloader, a common design feature of later Eastern bloc tanks.
The T-62 was powered by a 620-hp V-55 diesel engine giving it a top speed of around 31 mph.
Why Russia Lost in Afghanistan—but Not in Ukraine
The fact that the Soviets were using large numbers of their older tanks did not inherently mean that they were likely to lose. The Kremlin lost in Afghanistan for multiple reasons: Western support for the mujahideen, innovative and brilliant guerrilla tactics by the rebels, the country’s mountainous and inhospitable geography, and the fact that the Soviet Union’s geriatric leadership was deeply ambivalent about Afghanistan from the outset amid a sharp escalation in the Cold War and an increasingly tenuous economy.
Nevertheless, the Soviets held on for nearly a decade before they decided to call it quits. In Ukraine today, the situation is quite different. Putin’s grip on power is secure; Russia is wholly devoted to the war; and the Russian military does not rely on antiquated Soviet-era equipment, but on modern tanks and aircraft as well as emerging drone technology. Western analysts predicting a second coming of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan will be sorely disappointed.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Wikimedia Commons.
