China has invested heavily in electronic warfare, cyber operations, and space denial capabilities—all of which threatens to disrupt the communications, GPS, and intelligence of an adversary like the United States.
At the heart of China’s 21st century military modernization is a concept known as Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)—essentially, the effort to prevent adversaries from operating freely in the Western Pacific. A2/AD encompasses a layered system of weapons, platforms, and doctrines—all of which are designed to complicate, delay, or outright prevent foreign forces from projecting power into China’s near seas. Specifically, China has integrated missiles, naval power, air power, and electronic warfare into a combined effort to keep enemies out.
China Has Built Up a Vast Stockpile of Sophisticated Missiles
Arguably the most important facet of China’s A2/AD structure is an extensive missile arsenal, mostly in possession of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF has hundreds of both short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, plus ground-launched cruise missiles—giving China the ability to strike US bases in Japan and Guam.
China also possesses the DF-21D and DF-26 missiles, known as “carrier-killers,” which pose a threat to US carrier strike groups, the US’s key to projecting power into the region. The point of China’s missile arsenal, which enjoys the backing of an increasingly sophisticated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network, is to create a buffer zone within which US forces would likely need to endure significant and perhaps unacceptable losses to enter and operate.
China’s Air Force Is Growing Every Month
China is currently undertaking one of the largest naval power expansions in world history, an effort that extends the effects of their missile arsenal. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has evolved from a humble coastal defender into the world’s largest navy by ship quantity, featuring modern destroyers, cruisers, and submarines. Each surface vessel is outfitted with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, drastically extending the missile reach of Chinese forces—capable of threatening US forces beyond the PLARF’s ground-based buffer zone.
China’s air power and integrated air defenses further complement the country’s A2/AD structure. Modern fighters like the fifth-generation Chengdu J-20, along with legacy fighters such as the J-10 and Su-27, extend China’s offensive reach. China has also built a robust network of surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems, featuring both the renowned Russian S-400 and various indigenously produced systems. The result is one of the world’s most formidable integrated air defense networks, within which US non-stealth fighters could not hope to survive, severely complicating any effort to gain air superiority. Indeed, this A2/AD network has prompted massive American investment in new stealth technology, chiefly through the B-21 Raider and F-47 NGAD projects.
Lastly, China has invested heavily in electronic warfare, cyber operations, and space denial capabilities—all of which threatens to disrupt the communications, GPS, and intelligence of an adversary, like the US, who relies so heavily upon such electronic systems to wage war.
The net effect of these overlaid A2/AD efforts is a multi-domain shield, extending from the Chinese coast to (at least) the “first island chain,” dramatically raising the risks and costs of intervention. For adversaries like the United States, China’s A2/AD efforts change the calculus, making intervention in the Indo-Pacific less likely given the increased costs. For China, the heavy investment in A2/AD shows an effort to reassert itself as the dominant regional player.
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer at The National Interest. Kass is an attorney and former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a pilot trainee before being medically discharged. He focuses on military strategy, aerospace, and global security affairs. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global Journalism and International Relations from NYU.
Image: Shutterstock / Igor Grochev.
