If Cambodia could solidify its territorial holdings in this war, it could not only enhance its own geopolitical and geoeconomic power, but also expand China’s influence.
Over the weekend, President Donald Trump celebrated the fact that he had used America’s trading relationships with both Thailand and Cambodia as leverage to get the two warring neighbors to sign a temporary ceasefire. Unfortunately, less than 20 hours after the ceasefire was enacted, it was broken by Cambodia, according to local reports.
While updated information is understandably scattershot on these events, it appears as though Cambodia’s military has attacked the Thai Army at Chong An Ma, Ta Muen Thom, and Phu Makheua.
Why Didn’t the Thailand-Cambodia Ceasefire Hold?
Cambodia’s recent assaults in the forests separating the two countries is part of a broader strategy by Phnom Penh to resolve its long-standing territorial disputes with Thailand that stretch back to the French colonial era of more than a century ago.
The Thai Army has ordered its troops to be prepared for intense fighting, placing them in defensive bunkers and keeping them ready to defend against Cambodian invaders. Specifically, the Cambodians appear interested in taking the Don Tual Temple area. Notably, each of the disputed areas with Thailand under attack by Cambodia’s forces are within 50 miles of each other.
There are now concerns that the Thai-Cambodian War may truly become a proxy conflict, as the grand strategic aims of the Cambodians are becoming clearer with this renewed round of violence directed at their neighbors in Thailand. As always, domestic politics factors heavily into any country’s decision to go to war. This is certainly the case with Cambodia.
But, so too, do international considerations—especially if Cambodia has a close relationship with great powers, such as the People’s Republic of China, and those great powers are keen on expanding their influence in the region.
The domestic political situation inside Cambodia merits examination. Hun Sen is a name that is well known in southeast Asia. Once a member of the bloodthirsty Khmer Rouge communist regime, Hun Sen later defected and joined the Vietnamese-backed rebels. In gratitude for his service, Hanoi appointed him Foreign Minister of its puppet government—making him, at age 26, the youngest foreign minister in the world. Over the next 40 years, Hun Sen rose to the pinnacle of power in Cambodian politics. Nearing retirement, he handed off power to his eldest son, Hun Manet, who became the country’s prime minister in 2023 after winning what most observers considered to be a sham election.
Yet Hun Sen remains a powerful player in the Cambodian political scene, the head of what amounts to a ruling political dynasty. According to The Guardian, “Hun Sen may be trying to whip up nationalism domestically to increase support for his son, [Prime Minister Hun Manet].”
As Tita Sanglee, associate fellow with ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, told The Guardian, “Hun Sen ‘holds near absolute control in Cambodia’ … He has stamped out virtually all opposition voices and independent media.”
There is an entire side saga involving Hun Sen’s ruling clan in Cambodia and a decades long friendship and political alliance with a Thai political leader named Thaksin Shinawatra and his family—which, for reasons still unclear to outsiders, led to a spectacular falling-out between the two. Speculation is rampant. What is known is that this personal breakdown between Hun Sen and Thaksin Shinawatra’s families is playing heavily into the current war.
Is China Promoting the Thailand-Cambodia War?
Here’s where the larger geopolitical game enters the equation. On July 2 of this year, Hun Sen apparently had a secret meeting with the leaders of China, just as tensions between Cambodia and Thailand were set to boil over.
As previously noted, Cambodia is a major client of China’s growing arms industry—just as Thailand is a huge consumer of American military technology and is even considered a major non-NATO ally.
Beyond arms sales, however, Beijing and Phnom Penh have a far deeper geopolitical relationship. Recall that China paid for the modernization and expansion of Cambodia’s all-important Ream Naval Base, located near Sihanoukville, on the Gulf of Thailand—a key waterway that Beijing fantasizes it can gain dominance in.
At Ream, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “China maintains exclusive access to some facilities, including the base’s largest pier. And recent photos of progress at a nearby air defense site only raise more questions about the true extent of Beijing’s military presence in the area.”
With Hun Sen and Cambodia’s aggressive push into Chong An Ma, Ta Muen Thom, Phu Makheua, and the Don Tual Temple, Cambodia is cutting a swathe of territory for itself straight to the sea beyond.
Cambodia Wants a Straight Line to the Gulf of Thailand
If Cambodian forces can take those disputed areas from Thailand, they can essentially rewrite the geopolitical map all the way down to the Gulf of Thailand. And then the Cambodians can gain control over vast natural gas and petroleum deposits there, taking them from Thailand, a key US ally. Or so the thinking goes among Thailand’s military elite and among Western military leaders, at least.
Both Thailand and Cambodia claim overlapping portions of the Gulf of Thailand, in an area unoriginally titled “Overlapping Claims Area” (OCA). The OCA spans around 10,424 square miles of seabed; this includes up to 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 300 million barrels of oil. This dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over these resources traces back to the 1970s. The value of these untapped energy sources in the Gulf of Thailand is around $300 billion. If Thailand controlled these sources, it would expand its offshore gas supply, leading to a windfall for Bangkok.
On the other hand, Cambodia, whose hydrocarbon industry is far less advanced, would finally have the opportunity to build out its indigenous oil and gas production.
It cannot be overstated how significant it would be if Cambodia, a key Chinese military partner, managed to sweep through the disputed temple areas listed above, create for itself a land corridor going straight down to the Gulf of Thailand, and be able to press a viable claim to the contested regions.
If Cambodia could solidify its territorial holdings in this war, it could not only enhance its own geopolitical and geoeconomic power, but also expand China’s influence in the region—largely at the expense of the United States.
These are the stakes in this current war. It is rapidly becoming a proxy war between China’s nascent alliance structure and America’s established coalition in the Indo-Pacific. Whichever side loses will be dealt a devastating blow.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / Andy.LIU.
