Both President Lee Jae-myung and President Donald Trump have reasons to avoid contentious issues that might derail the summit.
President Lee Jae-myung will visit Washington, DC, on Monday, August 25, 2025, for his first summit with President Donald Trump. This will be the first presidential summit between the two countries since President Trump’s re-election last November. Much has happened since then. South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, was impeached in April for his failed martial law declaration last December, triggering a snap election on June 3, in which Democratic Party candidate Lee won decisively.
On the American side, President Trump announced sweeping tariffs—25 percent on all Korean imports—to take effect on August 1, 2025. South Korea managed to negotiate the tariff rate down from 25 percent to 15 percent, but many trade issues remain unsettled. So, what can we expect from the summit? What does President Lee hope to achieve?
President Lee comes to Washington seeking to solidify the most important relationship that spans both economics and security, especially during a period marked by global tumult and anxiety. Numerous “hot” issues could disrupt the relationship—from stabilizing trade tensions to developing the alliance into a “future-oriented comprehensive strategic” partnership that China may perceive as an attempt to contain it. Furthermore, President Lee hopes to demonstrate to the Trump administration that, despite his progressive background, he is a centrist committed to strengthening Korea’s security and economic ties with the United States.
Thus far, President Lee has made all the right moves in signaling to the Trump administration that his government is committed to the alliance. In June, China’s President Xi Jinping invited him to attend China’s Victory Day Parade on September 3. Lee’s muted response—deliberately avoiding a visit to Beijing before Washington—signals his priorities.
Additionally, he is stopping over in Tokyo to underscore the importance of the trilateral relationship, despite some opposition from nationalist groups in both Korea and Japan. Again, Lee is signaling to the United States that he is a pragmatist who understands the need for South Korea to maintain strong trilateral relations—an issue of paramount importance to US Asia policy.
As the saying goes, so far, so good. But what could derail the summit? The summit risks failure if either side puts forward demands that are politically or economically untenable. For instance, if President Trump demands that South Korea increase its “host nation support” from $1 billion to $5 billion annually—as he pressed during his first administration—or insists that Seoul raise its defense budget of 2.3 percent of GDP to 5 percent, the relationship could quickly spiral downward.
On trade, if the Trump administration pushes too aggressively for agricultural liberalization (such as beef and rice) or backtracks on the tariff reduction agreement, President Lee would almost certainly face severe political backlash at home.
While such contentious issues may surface, the summit will likely avoid direct confrontation. Instead, both presidents will emphasize positive aspects of the relationship. President Trump will highlight the recently negotiated trade agreement, which reduced tariffs on Korean products to 15 percent in exchange for Korea’s pledge to invest $350 billion in the US economy. President Lee will stress the strength of the economic and security partnership by reiterating Korea’s commitment to purchase $100 billion in US energy and pledging $150 billion toward the “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” initiative. Other areas of cooperation may include semiconductors, batteries, critical minerals, and advanced technologies.
A discussion of potentially contentious issues will likely be postponed, such as the question of US Forces Korea’s “strategic flexibility”—the possibility of redeploying US personnel in regional crises, particularly involving China or Taiwan. One strategic issue President Lee may raise is the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON); he may seek at least a principled agreement to expedite the OPCON transition process.
From the Lee administration’s perspective, the best outcome of this summit would be to strengthen personal rapport between the two leaders and reaffirm the alliance. At a minimum, President Lee will be guided by the Hippocratic principle of “do no harm.”
About the Author: Jae Ku
Dr. Jae H. Ku is the Senior Fellow, US-Korea Relations at the Center for the National Interest. He is an expert in US-Korea relations, Korea’s relations with China and Japan, and human rights in Asia. From 2007-2018, he was the Director of the US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a research institute he co-founded. He was also the director of Freedom House’s Human Rights in North Korea Project, a Congressionally mandated international campaign under the North Korea Human Rights Act of 2004.
Image: Wikimedia Commons / Republic of Korea / Public Domain
