Either due to overconfidence or inability, Russia was unable to destroy Ukraine’s air force at the outset of the conflict—and the Kremlin has suffered greatly as a result.
The conflict in Ukraine can offer many lessons to the careful observer. The three-year conflict has shown the effectiveness of unmanned aerial systems, the deadly force of rocket artillery, and even the immense volume of munitions necessary to sustain offensive and defensive operations on the modern battlefield.
These and many more lessons from Ukraine are available to military and intelligence observers. But a lesson of particular value is air power operations in a contested battlefield, which has proven to be one of the decisive forms of combat in Ukraine—and has often made the difference between victory and defeat.
Why Russia’s Early Air Campaign Against Ukraine Flopped
When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many inside and outside Ukraine believed that the smaller country would quickly crumple under the immense weight of the Russian invasion force. Moscow, after all, could field one of the most advanced militaries in the world, one powerful enough for the U.S. military to consider it a near-peer adversary.
Instead, Russia’s forces quickly proved to be a paper tiger. The Russian military failed to achieve any of its primary objectives—capturing Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, and the Donbas region, among other goals—and its losses in the opening months of the war were extremely heavy. A major reason behind the Kremlin’s failure to achieve its initial war objectives was the Russian Aerospace Forces’ failure to immediately establish air superiority over the battlefield, and Ukraine’s subsequent opportunity to punish advancing Russian columns from the air.
On paper, the Russian Aerospace Forces were numerically and qualitatively superior to their Ukrainian adversary. The Ukrainian Air Force used older Soviet- and Russian-made fighter and attack jets that were supposedly no match for their Russian adversaries. Yet the Ukrainian Air Force survived the initial wave of Russian air strikes, losing only some aircraft and air defense systems. Since then, the two militaries have been struggling for victory in contested airspace. The Russian Aerospace Forces and Ukrainian Air Force have been severely limited in their operations, cautious of losing precious fighter jets to the sea of anti-aircraft systems on the ground. Russia, alone, has lost over 100 combat aircraft.
A Lesson from Ukraine: Win the Air War Early
One lesson from the Ukraine war is the importance of establishing air superiority at the outset of a conflict. It is worth taking the time and amassing the resources for a devastating initial strike on enemy air forces, rather than attacking before your own forces are prepared and losing a precious opportunity to win the skies as a result. Either due to overconfidence or inability, the Russian Aerospace Forces were not up to the task of destroying Ukraine’s far smaller air force at the outset of the conflict—and the Kremlin has suffered greatly for it in the years since.
Another lesson from Ukraine is that ground-based air defenses remain a powerful deterrent. The Ukrainian military managed to save a considerable portion of its air defense systems from the initial Russian strikes. Thereafter, Kyiv’s air defenses became stronger with the influx of advanced US and NATO systems. To be sure, air defenses are not all-powerful; Russia has still managed to hit Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure with long-range munitions such as glide bombs, as well as hundreds of missiles and smaller kamikaze drones. But Russian air strikes are far from as effective as they could have been in an air superiority environment.
It has been a long time since the US military fought a war in contested airspace. The Korean and Vietnam wars are the most recent conflicts where US air power was seriously contested by an adversary. Even then, the balance of power tilted heavily toward the US military’s side. However, in a future near-peer conflict with China, America would very likely operate in a contested airspace. American military strategists would be wise to study the ongoing air operations in Russia and Ukraine.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
Image: Shutterstock / Andrew Harker.
