While air-to-air kills are all valuable, the ability to destroy the enemy’s high-value assets is the real metric worth watching.
The prevailing consensus amongst my colleagues at The National Interest is that Operation Sindoor, the latest hot war between India and Pakistan, was a defeat for the former and a victory for the latter. Without a doubt, it was definitely a tactical victory for the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) over the Indian Air Force (IAF), as the PAF’s Chinese-made Chengdu J-10 ”Vigorous Dragon” fighters inflicted shocking and embarrassing losses against India’s vaunted French-made Dassault Rafale and Russian-made MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-30 jets.
However, a tactical victory doesn’t necessarily equate to a strategic victory. A recent New York Times assessment offers such a contrarian perspective vis-à-vis Operation Sindoor.
A Better Performance for India’s Operation Sindoor Than Initially Thought?
As noted by an India Today World Desk article reshared on MSN on or about May 15, 2025, titled “India had ‘clear edge’ in military strikes on Pakistan: New York Times report”:
“India demonstrated a decisive advantage over Pakistan in targeting high-value military assets during their recent four-day confrontation, according to a detailed New York Times report supported by high-resolution satellite imagery … [A]s per the NYT analysis, India’s strikes were significantly more effective and better targeted … ‘Where India appears to have had a clear edge is in its targeting of Pakistan’s military facilities and airfields, as the latter stretch of fighting shifted from symbolic strikes and shows of force to attacks on each other’s defence capabilities,’ the report added … Among the most significant attacks was a precision strike on the Bholari Air Base near Karachi, where satellite imagery showed visible damage to an aircraft hangar … Even more notable, according to the NYT, was India’s successful strike on the Nur Khan Air Base, ‘perhaps the most sensitive military target that India struck.’ The base is near Pakistan’s army headquarters and is close to the country’s nuclear command infrastructure.”
By contrast, there was no concurrent satellite imagery substantiating Pakistan’s claims of successfully launching equivalent strikes against India’s bases.
While air-to-air kills are all good for pride and bragging rights, the ultimate demonstration of airpower performance is the ability to destroy the enemy’s high-value assets on the ground. And by that standard, India seems to have gotten the upper hand—its embarrassing dogfighting losses notwithstanding.
More Light Shed on the PAF F-16 Nonuse
Meanwhile, India’s strikes against the Pakistani bases also shed some light as to why Pakistan’s U.S.-made F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter fleet wasn’t used in Operation Sindoor. As I wrote for The National Interest back on May 13, the biggest reason we didn’t see the PAF’s prized “Vipers” in the clash was a stipulation in the foreign military sales agreement between the United States and Pakistan that these jets can only be used for internal counterterrorism missions. In other words, the PAF’s F-16s are implicitly verboten for use against India’s conventional forces.
Well, upon further review, even if it weren’t for those legalese restrictions, it would’ve been too risky for the PAF to deploy its Fighting Falcons during Operation Sindoor, as the F-16 bases such as Shahbaz Airbase in Jacobabad were getting shellacked by India’s Brahmos-A air-launched cruise missiles.
Tactical Defeats Yet Strategic Victories: Historical Precedents
The concept of a warring nation suffering a tactical defeat yet concurrently a strategic victory isn’t as contradictory and paradoxical as it sounds at first thought, and there are quite a few historical precedents for it.
For example, during the Vietnam War, the 1968 Tet Offensive was a huge tactical defeat for the communist North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC), as they suffered massive losses at the hands of the United States and its South Vietnamese ally. Yet, because of the shock and surprise on America’s part that the NVA and VC launched the attack in the first place, it ended up becoming a huge propaganda victory for the communists, as it compelled Western mainstream media pundits like Walter Cronkite to claim that the war was “unwinnable.”
Going back a quarter-century to a World War II naval battle: the Battle of the Coral Sea. Though overshadowed by the epic Battle of Midway the following month, the Coral Sea engagement was plenty significant in its own right. Though a tactical victory for the Imperial Japanese Navy in terms of ships sunk, it was a strategic victory for the United States and Australia, as it marked the first time since the start of the war that a major Japanese advance had been turned back.
About the Author: Christian D. Orr
Christian D. Orr was previously a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ) and 19FortyFive. He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.
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