Technology cooperation between the US and South Korea is entering a fragile phase as bargaining tactics shift and collaboration becomes increasingly selective.
About two years ago, I published an op-ed in this same venue on the principles that should guide technology cooperation between Seoul and Washington, with a focus on artificial intelligence (AI). I argued that both countries should prioritize diffuse reciprocity—emphasizing normative and moral values derived from cooperation—rather than a narrow conception of reciprocity based on strict equivalence or quid pro quo exchange. Today, however, the context has shifted significantly. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is emerging from the aftermath of emergency martial law, and new administrations have recently taken office in both countries, reshaping the conditions under which cooperation is pursued.
Two days after President Trump’s election, he held an inaugural phone call with President Yoon. Trump praised South Korea’s shipbuilding and vessel maintenance capacity and expressed interest in cooperation in this sector, where the United States faces significant shortcomings. Aligned with the US executive order to “[restore] America’s maritime dominance,” the South Korean trade delegation sought to ease the impact of new tariffs by proposing a “Make American Shipbuilding Great Again” plan, involving roughly $150 billion in investments. This initiative reflected South Korea’s willingness to leverage its comparative advantage in shipbuilding to mitigate trade frictions.
Issue Linkage as a Bargaining Tool
In political science, this is a classic example of issue linkage, a bargaining strategy that integrates two or more disparate issues into a single negotiation to facilitate agreement. By creating additional benefits, issue linkage can bring parties to the table who might otherwise lack incentives to cooperate. Because actors seek to improve their positions relative to the status quo, this strategy enhances the likelihood of reconciling divergent interests. Empirical evidence from European cases between 1860 and 1945 demonstrates that including trade cooperation clauses in military alliance agreements significantly increased the probability of reaching and sustaining settlements by enhancing credibility. In short, issue linkage raises the chances of cooperation while lowering the risk of defection by elevating both the interests and salience of the agreement.
Centripetal vs. Centrifugal Forces in Technology Cooperation
Technology cooperation emerges from the interplay of centripetal and centrifugal forces. A study of international cooperation in the aerospace industry during the late twentieth century shows that market and industry structures often drive firms to collaborate in order to reduce risk and share research and development burdens. At the same time, when technologies carry high strategic utility and salience for national security, governments adopt more direct, interventionist roles. Applied to the current landscape of US–ROK technology cooperation, centrifugal forces emphasizing autonomy and competition appear to outweigh centripetal pressures for interdependence. The perceived costs of dependence are now viewed as more severe and politically untenable than the burdens of independence. As President Lee once reassured, citing his confidence that President Trump would not “inflict a wound on our alliance,” the expectation was that alliance commitments would ultimately prevail over unilateral impulses. Yet the trajectory of US policy suggests otherwise: Washington’s pursuit of autonomy, whether through centrifugal pressures or by leveraging its structural advantages over partners, raises serious questions about the future of the alliance.
In detail, Washington and Seoul increasingly emphasize self-sufficiency over collaboration, producing dissonance rather than harmony. The Trump administration’s executive orders and national AI strategy framed the issue in terms of “[cementing] US dominance” and “[winning] the race,” departing from earlier efforts to build trustworthy AI through more cautious, cooperative approaches. Central to this vision is the export of US AI capabilities to allies and partners as a means of consolidating influence. In contrast, President Lee Jae-myung created a new Senior Secretary for “AI Future Planning” and launched the $383 million Sovereign AI Foundation Model project, aimed at building a fully domestic AI stack, from semiconductors to data infrastructure, and producing open-source models on par with those of OpenAI or Anthropic. These national strategies illustrate how both countries prioritize technological autonomy, leaving limited room for genuine international cooperation in AI.
From Partnership to Leverage
Although linking US tariffs with Korea’s shipbuilding capacity produced a short-term bargaining success, it has had adverse implications for bilateral technology cooperation. Whereas earlier US–ROK initiatives emphasized positive-sum outcomes, current dynamics increasingly reduce cooperation to a principle of quid pro quo. For instance, while the Biden administration pledged $4.7 billion in subsidies under the CHIPS Act and Samsung is nearing completion of a cutting-edge fabrication plant in Taylor, Texas, political contestation has introduced uncertainty. The Trump administration denounced these subsidies as “a horrible thing,” generating uncertainty and risk for their business.
What was originally conceived as an incentive for partnership has thus been reframed as a tool of leverage, eroding the cooperative ethos necessary for sustainable technological collaboration. Access to the subsidies now appears contingent on a firm’s willingness to provide equity or other concessions in return. Although the US government publicly insists it is not seeking equity from TSMC, another recipient of $6.6 billion, a media report suggests that TSMC, given its strong financial position, is unlikely to accept funding under such conditions. Samsung, by contrast, remains attentive to potential conditions, even while reiterating plans to begin operations in 2026. The situation is further complicated by the Trump administration’s decision to acquire a 9.9 percent stake in Intel, worth $8.9 billion, a move that directly benefits one of Samsung’s main competitors in the foundry business. In effect, economic issue linkage has replaced cooperation, with Washington prioritizing political leverage over genuine partnership.
Selectivity and the Future of Technology Cooperation
The bits and bytes of cooperation in emerging and critical technologies are now woven by strict selectivity. Technical areas where Washington recognizes the necessity of international collaboration are selectively elevated to the international agenda, while domains in which the United States retains dominance are instrumentalized as tools of issue linkage to secure favorable bargaining outcomes. For partners, this means identifying the unique value of their contributions and strategically converting them into leverage to manage US linkage tactics. Cooperation, therefore, is no longer framed in terms of broad positive-sum gains but rather in terms of necessity—limited, contingent, and conditioned by the distribution of advantages across issue areas.
About the Author: Sanghyun Han
Sanghyun Han is a Ph.D. student in International Affairs, Science, and Technology at Georgia Tech’s Sam Nunn School of International Affairs. His research interest lies in the intersection between economic statecraft and emerging technologies, where he is currently working on his research about the relationship among state power, interdependence, and technology. He has previously worked with research institutions in both Washington, D.C., and Seoul, such as the Atlantic Council, the National Bureau of Asian Research, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, and the East Asia Foundation.
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