At the upcoming US-ROK summit in Washington D.C., one area that might be discussed is the matter of civilian nuclear fuel supply.
The United States and the Republic of Korea represent one of the most iconic and successful bonds in global nuclear cooperation. For Korea, the introduction, transfer, and localization of key nuclear technologies were achieved through collaboration with the United States. This partnership not only elevated Korea into a global nuclear powerhouse but also helped the United States disseminate its technology and regulatory standards, reinforcing its leadership in nuclear power.
This week, as President Lee Jae Myung visits Washington for the August 2025 US–ROK summit, our nuclear cooperation is likely to enter a new phase. For Korea, securing reliable nuclear fuel is essential for sustaining its energy security at home and prospective customers abroad. For the United States, the priority is countering the growing dominance of China and Russia in the global nuclear market while revitalizing its domestic nuclear sector, which has long suffered from a lack of economic competitiveness. Though these national interests may appear separate, they are highly complementary—and expanding cooperation to the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle offers an opportunity to explore a new frontier of cooperation.
Cheap and reliable access to fuel has always been the fundamental premise of nuclear power. Nuclear plants face high construction and operating costs, making affordable fuel the first principle for offsetting these burdens. Historically, this was possible because enriched uranium was abundant and inexpensive, keeping nuclear power economically competitive. For small modular reactors (SMRs), where economies of scale diminish, this principle is even more critical. Without affordable and dependable fuel, the value proposition of nuclear power is shaken, and plants can be built only by mandate, not by merit.
The war in Ukraine has disrupted this balance. With Western nations moving to phase out Russian uranium, which accounted for about forty percent of the world’s supply, enrichment prices have surged by about seventy percent. These elevated costs are likely to persist. For Korea, which operates twenty-six reactors supplying over thirty percent of its electricity but has no domestic enrichment capacity, this poses a direct challenge to national energy security.
The United States faces the same challenge but has acted more proactively, enabled by a far wider range of policy options than those available to Korea. The Department of Energy has backed Centrus Energy’s enrichment facility in Ohio, while Congress has legislated a ban on Russian uranium imports by 2028.
Korea, however, remains uniquely vulnerable among the world’s five largest nuclear power operators—the only one that relies entirely on foreign suppliers for enriched uranium. This reality calls for a revisit of the High-Level Bilateral Commission (HLBC), established under the 2015 US–Korea nuclear cooperation agreement but dormant for years. That agreement explicitly states that “the Government of the United States of America shall endeavor to take such actions as may be necessary and feasible to ensure a reliable supply of low-enriched uranium to the Republic of Korea …”
Yet to translate this commitment into practical, substantive discussion through the HLBC is indispensable.
At the commercial level, progress is evident. The recent ten-year enriched uranium contract between KHNP and Centrus Energy marked an important milestone in front-end cooperation. Such private-sector initiatives, however, can evolve into more effective, sustainable, and innovative arrangements when supported by intergovernmental coordination under the US–ROK nuclear cooperation agreement and through the active engagement of the HLBC.
Another area of opportunity is advanced fuel qualification. The United States has unmatched assets in this domain: historical data from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-II) program, the sustained development and qualification of tristructural-isotropic (TRISO) fuel, the preparation of HALEU (high-assay low-enriched uranium) fuel, unique test facilities such as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) and the Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT), and regulatory experience in licensing advanced reactors. These capabilities form the backbone of global efforts now underway to move advanced reactors from research to practical deployment. Leveraging these US assets within Korea’s advanced reactor demonstration programs could both accelerate Korea’s progress and reinforce America’s prominence in next-generation nuclear technology, ultimately disseminating the global peaceful use of advanced nuclear power.
In conclusion, US–ROK nuclear cooperation is poised for a new leap forward—particularly on the broad front end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Achieving this will require revisiting the 2015 US–Korea nuclear cooperation agreement by resuming the HLBC. At the same time, public–private cooperative initiatives on fuel supply must be expanded alongside collaboration on advanced fuel qualification—steps that can ensure a reliable fuel supply globally with reduced geopolitical risk and elevate the alliance to a new level of strategic importance.
About the Author: Youho Lee
Youho Lee specializes in nuclear fuel materials, nuclear reactor engineering, and nuclear fuel cycle policy. He is an associate professor in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Seoul National University (SNU), currently on sabbatical as a visiting scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Prior to joining SNU, he served as an assistant professor in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, from 2016 to 2018. He received his B.S. from KAIST (2009) and his M.S. and Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from MIT (2011, 2013).
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