That Ukraine has reliably deployed these systems—and done significant damage to Russia itself with them—indicates a degree of innovativeness as well as the importance of indigenization for the conflict.
The old Soviet S-200 (NATO designation SA-5 “Gammon”) is having a surprising moment in the sun. At his new Substack, Trench Art, legendary war reporter David Axe has shared some incredible stories about how this long-range, high-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) system developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War has been used to great effect by Ukraine against Russia.
Ancient Weapons Still Work!
According to Axe, “The first confirmed S-200 strike, around July 9, 2023, may have blown up an industrial site somewhere in Bryansk Oblast. The second confirmed strike, 17 days later, ended with a 5V28 plunging into Taganrog, a city on Russia’s Black Sea Coast 20 miles from the border with Ukraine and a hundred miles from the frontline.”
Here again, observers are given a great example of how the Ukraine War is reshaping expectations of weapons. The S-200 is a fossil by modern standards. It’s a behemoth, too; the 5V28 missile it launches from its 5P72V-fixed launcher weighs eight tons and can carry a whopping 500-pound warhead. But its heyday was the 1960s.
Yet because this system is well-known to the Ukrainians, and its supply chain is largely indigenous, it has probably been far more useful to them than many of the newer similar weapons provided by NATO.
Ukraine’s Venerable S-200 Missile Launchers Pack a Punch
Back in the 1950s and 60s, the Soviet design bureau of Alma-Antey (then known as KB-1) was created as a means for destroying NATO’s increasingly long-range bombers that threatened Soviet territorial integrity. In effect, the S-200 was meant to be a B-52 Stratofortress killer. The S-200 was designed to intercept such massive targets at long ranges and higher altitudes than the older S-75 SAM that the Soviets had been fielding.
The S-200 was not intended for mobility or rapid deployment. The Soviets designed it to be a static, or semi-static, system for defending fixed high-value targets. This large, complex system comprised several key components, including a missile battery, multiple launchers, radar systems for target acquisition and tracking, and command-and-control infrastructure.
The system’s primary missile, the V-880 (or 5V21 in later versions), is a two-stage missile with a solid-fuel booster and a liquid-fuel sustainer rocket. Depending on the variant, it can engage targets at ranges of around 93 to 186 miles, making it one of the longest-range SAMs of its day. Moreover, the system can intercept targets at altitudes of up to 131,000 feet—sufficient to engage any aircraft in the sky, then or since. What’s more, the S-200’s missile can reach speeds of up to Mach 4, enabling rapid interception of fast-moving targets. A 500-pound high-explosive fragmentation warhead with a proximity fuse to maximize lethality against aerial threats takes care of deadly business for this system.
Originally, the S-200 employed semi-active radar homing, relying on ground-based radars like the 5N62 (Square Pair) for target illumination. The system’s fire control radar provides precise tracking, while early warning radars, such as the P-14 (Tall King) support target acquisition.
Ukraine’s Brilliant Repurposing of the S-200
Axe speculates, “Given the reasonably good accuracy of the resuscitated Ukrainian S-200s in the surface-to-surface role, there’s a good chance Kyiv’s engineers have installed a better seeker.”
The S-200 was deployed in batteries, typically consisting of six single-rail launchers, a command post, and associated radars. Its static nature and large radar signature made it vulnerable to suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations, but its longer range allowed for it to engage threats before they could approach defended areas.
That Ukraine has reliably deployed these systems—and done significant damage to Russia itself with them—indicates a degree of innovativeness as well as the importance of indigenization for the conflict. One can also see this in Ukraine’s effective use of cheap drones from off-the-shelf components, helping to keep balance with Russia’s massive advantage in artillery.
Indeed, Ukraine’s current situation might not be so precarious if they had been encouraged from the outset to keep their own systems instead of coming to rely on foreign ones. How did Faisal’s army take Aqaba, after all? It was because they followed their old Bedouin ways to victory.
NATO has done Ukraine a disservice by forcing them to become a miniature European-style military reliant on all the same technological accoutrements. Had Ukraine been left to its devices, they would have figured out the best way forward for themselves—both for their country and the disposition of their armed forces.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / Below the Sky.
