The rising number of Russian general officers killed in combat highlights Ukraine’s effectiveness in going after high-value targets.
As of this past April, 11 of Russia’s general officers had been confirmed killed in the ongoing fighting in the war in Ukraine, exceeding the 10 generals who died as a result of the nearly decade-long Second Chechen War from August 1999 to April 2009. However, the ratio of general officers to overall military personnel lost in the more recent war is far smaller, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported earlier this month that around 250,000 Russian soldiers had died in Ukraine.
The think tank explained that “Russia has suffered roughly five times as many fatalities in Ukraine” as all the wars Moscow has fought since the Second World War.
Russia Is Getting Better at Protecting Its Generals
It is also worth noting that the Soviet Union lost 416 general officers in the Second World War, while it also saw more than 27 million Soviet citizens—civilian and military—killed. That meant roughly one general was lost for approximately every 65,000 Soviet citizens.
By contrast, in the war in Ukraine, a general has succumbed for every 22,727 Russian soldiers. Kyiv has claimed to have taken out four additional generals, but this has not been independently verified. If true, that would mean that the ratio shifts to roughly 1:16,666.
Yet the higher attrition rate numbers are still a stark improvement from the opening stages of Russia’s so-called “Special Military Operation”—when four generals were killed in only the first three weeks of fighting, which meant that a general was killed for every 1,750 soldiers.
The loss of so many top officers was a shock to the Kremlin, as it had expected a quick victory, followed by parades. Instead, the Ukrainians put up stronger-than-expected defenses, and Russian losses mounted quickly. That included the general officers, many of whom took unnecessary risks and likely underestimated the abilities of the Ukrainian military and Kyiv’s intelligence service.
Since then, the Kremlin’s top officers have also stayed further from the front, but that has not guaranteed their safety.
Ukraine Is Killing Russian Generals at Home, Too
The number of generals killed in the fighting has slowed down considerably, but high-ranking officials are still in Kyiv’s crosshairs.
Major General Pavel Kilmenko, commander of the 5th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade, was killed last November, reportedly in eastern Ukraine, while Major General Konstantin Smeshko, deputy commander of the Russian Engineer Troops, was allegedly taken out in a HIMARS strike in an unknown location in late December 2024. Sheshko is believed to have been the last Russian general officer killed inside Ukraine.
However, two other generals have been killed far from the front lines. Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, chief of the Russian Nuclear Biological Chemical Protection Troops, died after an explosive device disguised as a scooter detonated outside his front door as he left his apartment in Moscow. He was killed only days before Smeshko.
Lt. Gen. Yaroslav Moskalik is now reported to be the most recent Russian general officer to be killed; he was also assassinated in Moscow. On April 25, 2025, the deputy chief for the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff became the victim of a car bombing believed to have been planned by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and carried out by a Russian national who formerly lived in Ukraine.
Russia Is Struggling to Replace Its Generals
Recent figures suggest that more than 5,000 Russian officers have been killed, including 524 in senior positions. This has impacted the Russian Army’s logistics and coordination, but even the loss of the junior officers has been a damaging blow for the Kremlin.
As the BBC reported in May, “Russia lacks a strong corps of non-commissioned officers (NCOs),” and instead relies on junior officers to play a far more significant frontline role. Those officers are responsible for training their men and then directing them in combat. That required the junior officers to “lead ground-level operations,” and their deaths have had serious consequences, beyond any damage to the morale of the platoon.
The loss of the direct combat leader breaks the command structure and its ability to coordinate with other military branches, notably the artillery. According to the BBC report, it has led to an increase in “friendly fire” incidents.
Replacement officers may not have the same level of combat experience or combat readiness. To address this issue, the Kremlin has even recalled reserve officers who have fought in conflicts including Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Syria. That has “allowed command positions to be restaffed quickly,” and it buys time until new officer cadets can be trained at Russia’s military academies.
The Russian strategy for replacing lost junior officers is similar to how it deals with its losses of modern main battle tanks (MBTs); it retrieves an old model from storage while a new replacement is produced. In both cases, attrition is outpacing the supply of newer versions. Likewise, just as the older tanks are outdated and have limited combat effectiveness, it remains unclear if even combat-hardened veterans of the past conflicts are suited to leading men in the ongoing conflict.
Failing to adapt to new threats, such as drones, and sticking to old ways is why Russia has struggled to maintain momentum. But someone needs to lead those troops in combat!
About the Author: Peter Suciu
Peter Suciu has contributed over 3,200 published pieces to more than four dozen magazines and websites over a thirty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. He is based in Michigan. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: [email protected].
Image: Shutterstock / Dmytro Larin.
