Future tensions between the United States and Iran could ignite more conflict, disrupting global energy markets, threatening oil stability, and broader economic security.
The “12-Day War” between Israel and Iran in June 2025 witnessed the largest direct military confrontation between the decades-long Middle Eastern foes and drew in the United States to intervene by striking the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan with its ordnance penetrator “bunker-buster” bombs. Despite President Donald Trump’s characterization of the operation that sought to remove Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities as an all-encompassing win, and his announcement of a ceasefire on June 24, the nuclear risk remains—and with it, the specter of a regional escalation that could destabilize energy markets, raise oil prices, and deal a blow to global energy security.
The US Defense Intelligence Agency noted that centrifuges may still be intact beneath the rubble at the above three sites, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned that it cannot locate 410 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, likely removed before the war, and potentially sufficient for the construction of ten nuclear warheads. As the nuclear risk and related threat perceptions that prompted Israel’s initial attacks persist, the road back to war does not appear to be long, and the value of an alternative settlement increases each day.
Regime Change is Unlikely
A new and potentially more intensive round of fighting would impose significant costs on all actors that have a stake in the conflict, especially in light of the fact that a military resolution cannot be guaranteed. Talks of regime change in Iran, whether facilitated by foreign actors or emerging organically from within Iranian society, fall short of being realistic at present. While a large proportion of the population opposes the Islamic Republic and the demonstrations of the Green Movement from 2010, and the Woman. Life. Freedom. movement in 2022 proved capable of shaking the leadership, there is no unified coalition of stakeholders that could implement a vision for an alternative form of governance. Despite notable divisions between the establishment’s hardliner and reformist camps, a numerous and ideologically committed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to prop up the regime. In the potential absence of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s ultimate authority, the 150,000-strong IRGC and Iran’s weakened but surviving network of proxy militias could form the basis of a regional resistance movement, effectively splintering Islamic Republic ideology.
An Unwanted Future Conflict
Considering the United States’ strong relationships with Israel and Gulf monarchies, and its broader interests in the stability of global energy prices, the eruption of a new round of war would make it unlikely that Washington abstains. This option is increasingly unpalatable as domestic pressure in the United States rises against engaging in a longer military operation—or engaging militarily at all.
A war threatens the very survival of the Iranian regime, and during the June hostilities, Tehran repeatedly signaled its preference for de-escalation by giving advanced warning of its retaliatory strike on the United States’ Al Udeid Airbase—which President Trump alluded to—as well as stating willingness to cease its military operation, should Israel reciprocate. The United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign, which President Trump has preferred since his withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term in 2018, renders any Iranian effort at rebuilding the country’s deterrence capabilities difficult. This would be even harder in the face of reinstated United Nations (UN)-level sanctions after the “snapback” is activated by Europeans. The remaining option of clandestine nuclear enrichment and the race for a bomb—even under immense economic strain—would inevitably attract Israeli (and potentially, also US) attacks.
Still, the reconstruction of a measure of Iran’s deterrence power is necessary for the regime, which suffered a tremendous blow by means of combined Israeli-US attacks in the 12-Day War, as well as the weakening of the “Axis of Resistance” in the wake of Israel’s wars on Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, combined with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria over the course of the past year. This must be achieved without triggering Israeli threat perceptions, and indeed, US, Gulf, and European concerns about a nuclear breakout that might push all actors towards a harder policy approach.
Iran’s preferred means of deterrence link back to the core of President Trump’s criticism and eventual abandonment of the JCPOA. Besides the primary focus of the 2015 deal on nuclear proliferation, Iran’s ballistic missile development program and regional destabilizing activities via members of its “Axis” were not adequately addressed. In addition to this, the United States’ partners in the Gulf, facing significant threats from Iran, were wholly left out of the framework. In light of the current state of affairs, the United States would demand nothing short of a complete end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, including recovery of the “lost” uranium stockpile. Preventing Iran from rehabilitating its “Axis” would likely be another sticking point for Trump. In exchange, however, Iran might demand certain concessions to be granted to allow it to develop traditional means of deterrence, for example, by focusing on its long-obsolete air force, air defense systems destroyed in the 12-Day War, and other military avenues. US commitments in front of the international community for non-interference would likely also be desired.
Negotiations and the Role of Mediators
The alternative path of working towards a negotiated settlement crucially relies on the involvement of the United States. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany may try to incentivize Tehran’s return to negotiations and compliance with the IAEA’s inspection regime by having activated the “snapback” mechanism, which threatens to restore full UN sanctions on Iran that preceded the JCPOA, come the end of September. Indeed, Gulf monarchies, including Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, which have on previous occasions proved instrumental in facilitating talks between Iran and the United States, would fall short in effecting meaningful change, too. Their mediation efforts are inseparable from their status as major energy exporters, whose own economic and political stability depends on preserving reliable oil and gas flows through the Gulf. Without strong US buy-in that can prevent further interventions in Iran and lift sanctions on the country’s economy, no deal can materialize.
Direct negotiations are off the table for Tehran after the United States violated Iran’s sovereignty with its strikes. This renders the involvement of interlocutors an absolute necessity at this point, as a report recently published by the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum highlighted. European and Gulf states might not sway Iran on their own, but their intermediation could pave the way for an opening for indirect talks between Iran and the United States, especially if President Trump sends the right signals. China and Russia would be key actors at this stage, whose support for a new deal is not only necessary by virtue of their veto power in the UN Security Council, but can also provide additional positive influence on Iran.
China and Russia’s Influence
China’s deep reliance on stable flows of oil and gas from the Gulf, combined with its status as the foremost customer for Iranian oil, creates a doubly advantageous situation for furthering an agreement. This dependence on Gulf energy makes Beijing particularly sensitive to disruptions, as even short-term instability in the Strait of Hormuz could trigger global price spikes with direct consequences for China’s growth. On the one hand, China’s interests also lie in avoiding a new round of war that would destabilize the region. On the other hand, Iran’s reliance on Beijing for 90 percent of its oil sales, which Tehran has used to offset the loss of income that resulted from broad Western sanctions on the country, creates a dependency that can be leveraged. Beijing’s role in facilitating Iranian-Saudi rapprochement in 2023 presents an additional link that would encourage Gulf countries’ involvement in a new regional settlement agreement. Russia’s close cooperation with Gulf monarchies in the OPEC+ configuration also supports this argument.
In addition to this, Russia’s military and energy cooperation with Iran, which deepened during Moscow’s three years of war in Ukraine, positions it well to participate in the rebuilding of Iranian deterrence by means excluding nuclear proliferation. Moscow’s influence in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries+ (OPEC+) means it plays a dual role, shaping not only regional diplomacy but also the stability of global oil output and pricing. This provides an incentive for Russia to take an active stake in negotiations. President Trump’s ongoing talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin vis-à-vis the Ukraine front are instrumental in this regard, but this issue linkage also guarantees that progress on Iran would likely be tied to concessions made on Ukraine.
The Narrow Path Forward
As the current status quo vis-à-vis Iran is defined by a heightened risk of war and diplomatic engagement without a US buy-in would only delay but not prevent re-escalation, President Trump’s policy options circle back to the logic of negotiating an agreement. While the path forward is narrow, the strategic considerations of both Iran and the United States point towards re-engagement. Navigating US-Iran talks via European and/or Gulf-based mediation, keeping Chinese and Russian interests and leverage in mind, and mitigating the risk of unilateral actions on the side of Israel simultaneously would likely constitute the greatest test of Trump’s art of making a deal. For Washington, however, the stakes extend beyond diplomacy: the avoidance of energy market turmoil and the preservation of stable global oil prices are just as central to any lasting settlement. With the Middle East accounting for more than 30 percent of global oil output, the stakes of renewed conflict extend well beyond regional politics to the core of global energy security.
About the author: Patrik Kurath
Patrik Kurath is the executive vice president at the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum (MENAF).
Image: donfiore/shutterstock
