No U.S. administration should legitimize the Taliban by seeking its assistance for re-engagement in Afghanistan.
The abrupt collapse of the Afghan government on August 15, 2021, effectively concluded what many have described as the “longest war in American history.” Although this monumental event should have invited extensive debate on the strategic, moral, and logistical implications of the worst withdrawal, it instead prompted a curious U.S. silence. Under the Biden administration, the U.S. government minimized discussion of Afghanistan, and within weeks, most news outlets pivoted away from the country—reasoning that the United States had outstayed its welcome there to begin with. When questioned in a press conference, President Biden dismissed further comment on the subject, saying that he wanted to “talk about happy things” instead.
Four years later, President Donald Trump has breathed new life into the Afghanistan issue—criticizing Biden’s departure from the country and the ensuing Taliban takeover, and attempting to re-litigate some outstanding issues with the militant group. In particular, Trump has focused on two issues: the recovery from the Taliban of billions of dollars’ worth of military equipment left behind in Afghanistan following the withdrawal, and the possibility of a continued U.S. presence at Bagram Air Base, the major airfield in northern Afghanistan. Trump has shown regret about the United States not securing a long-term U.S. presence at the base, which is fairly close to China’s western Xinjiang region and would allow the United States a base of operations from which to observe it.
At first blush, Trump’s remarks appear far-fetched. Most of the weapons America left behind in Afghanistan are no longer usable, or were intentionally sabotaged by U.S. forces on the way out. That which is still useful is mostly in use by the Taliban—which is hardly likely to surrender it. Even if Washington were able to reclaim a portion of this equipment, it would cost more to repair it than it is worth.
More importantly, the Taliban does not hold much of the equipment, as it has found its way into the hands of global terrorist organizations around the world. According to reports, the Taliban has already sold much of the abandoned American military equipment to foreign state and non-state actors, including Al Qaeda, as well as criminal groups worldwide. American weapons in Afghanistan have turned up in nearly every ongoing conflict or insurgency in the Middle East and south Asia. Hamas in Gaza, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, anti-Indian terrorist groups in Kashmir, and Islamist anti-government insurgents in Pakistan have all been found with American small arms and equipment originating in Afghanistan.
The effects of America’s pullout from Bagram Air Base have been somewhat more subtle. On multiple occasions, Trump has stated he would have “kept Bagram, not because of Afghanistan but because of China,” and recently claimed that China controls the base. In early April, a mysterious U.S. military flight to Afghanistan that local media claimed landed at Bagram Air Base prompted widespread speculation that Trump had begun negotiations with the Taliban to return to the base. Russian media further alleged that the C-17A involved carried senior CIA officials who met with the Taliban at the base, although these claims later denied by U.S. Department of Defense officials.
Given Trump’s interest in Bagram—which he considers strategic because it is about an hour from where he believes China develops its nuclear weapons—it seems highly likely that he may explore negotiations with the Taliban to gain control of the base, if these negotiations have not already begun. In turn, the Taliban may be open to discussing the prospect of international legitimacy for their unrecognized government, which has not been formally acknowledged even by close allies such as Pakistan and other regional powers.
But a bargain of re-engagement in Afghanistan with assistance from the Taliban regime, in exchange for some measure of legitimacy, is one that no U.S. administration should make.
Human rights in Afghanistan are at their nadir under the Taliban government. The group has established a regime of gender apartheid that effectively imprisons half the country’s population within the confines of their homes. Women—and men—face extreme restrictions on what they wear and how they appear in public. Afghan children are indoctrinated in Taliban schools to become future torchbearers of global terrorism. Ethnic oppression against Afghanistan’s non-Pashtun groups has intensified substantially, and according to reports, the country has once again become a hub for militant groups around the world.
That the Taliban regime is unfit for diplomatic engagement at any level is self-evident. Any sort of foreign military presence at the Taliban’s behest would inadvertently lend legitimacy to their violent and theocratic rule, further emboldening them to impose harsher restrictions on the population. And a security partnership between any significant power like the United States, China, or Russia with the Taliban would further marginalize the republican insurgency in Afghanistan, which has fought against the Taliban for nearly four years against all odds and with little outside support. Those forces have already been harmed by the misguided Western notion of “humanitarian aid” to Afghanistan, which the Taliban has skimmed from and distributed to its supporters as patronage. Granting legitimacy to the Taliban, regardless of the form it takes, will harm them further.
More immediately, in today’s chaotic geopolitical landscape, a security partnership between the Taliban and any significant global power could increase instability across South Asia. Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan has once again become a hub for global terrorist organizations. According to the United Nations, the country now serves as a command-and-control node for jihadist factions from around the world, including al-Qaeda, the Islamic State’s Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and transnational terror cells from Central Asia and China’s Xinjiang region. These networks have expanded recruiting pipelines, rebuilt the once-shuttered training camps throughout Afghanistan, and planned operations in South Asia and beyond. While Taliban leaders may court tactical accommodation with capitals abroad to gain recognition and revenue, they remain deeply enmeshed with these groups, as evidenced by the recovery of Taliban-owned American weapons at the sites of their worst atrocities. The Taliban government has provided safe haven to these groups, accelerating their growth and expansion outside of Afghanistan. It has also encouraged them to try to topple the governments of the countries they oppose—a threat made more real both by the American weapons they now possess, and by the successful example of the Taliban before them.
Under those conditions, an American presence at Bagram would not only be unwise for the legitimacy and economic benefits it would confer upon the Taliban. It would also be unsafe for the U.S. troops stationed there. Though the country’s terrorist groups have many internal divisions, they share a hatred of the United States—and a reopened airbase at Bagram would provide a lucrative target for future attacks. Even if the Taliban could be trusted to protect the base from these groups, it might not be able to; by most accounts, it attempted to protect Kabul International Airport during the 2021 evacuation, but failed to stop the infamous Abbey Gate attack, resulting in the deaths of 13 U.S. servicemembers and 150 innocent Afghan civilians.
These unfortunate conditions need not persist into the future. Afghanistan is a nation of rich ethnic diversity, and the Taliban—in spite of their present strength—are not the only power source within it. When the United States initiated its war on terror, it compelled the anti-Taliban United Front (or “Northern Alliance”), predominantly composed of members of the Tajik ethnic group, to serve as its ground forces. United Front fighters placed their trust in American leadership, assisting with military and intelligence operations while contributing to efforts aimed at democratic governance. Hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers—particularly Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks—fought valiantly alongside American forces during the U.S. “war on terror.” Many members of the Trump administration, including former National Security Adviser Michael Waltz and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, are veterans of these campaigns, and counted thousands of Afghans among their allies.
Today, these former soldiers face systematic purges, cultural repression, and targeted attacks by the Taliban. Many now live in hiding or under threat; others have joined armed resistance groups and begun to fight back. The anti-Taliban resistance is not confined to any one ethnic group, but it is particularly strong within the Tajik community—and Bagram Air Base lies at the heart of this community. Every approach road to the base is secured by villages whose residents trace kinship networks northward into Central Asia. In the event of a broader uprising by anti-Taliban groups, this region would be among the easiest to hold.
If Trump truly wants to return an American presence to Bagram Air Base, he might consider strengthening these resistance groups. The National Resistance Front (NRF), an anti-Taliban resistance movement devoted to democratic principles, is composed mainly of former Afghan soldiers who fought alongside U.S. and coalition forces against the Taliban and have continued the struggle even after America’s withdrawal and the fall of the republican government. These fighters have already proved themselves trustworthy allies in counterterrorism operations. Aiding them would preserve crucial leverage—and ensure that any country wishing to engage with Afghanistan, whether a Western power or another global or regional actor, is not beholden to Taliban whims.
About the Author: Abdullah Khenjani
Abdullah Khenjani is the head of the Political Bureau of the National Resistance Front, a rebel group opposing the Taliban inside Afghanistan. Prior to the fall of the former government, he served as Senior Deputy Minister for the State Ministry for Peace, playing a significant role in the Doha peace negotiations with the Taliban. He also previously served as Editor-in-Chief for 1TV Media Afghanistan, an independent news outlet that contributed greatly to Afghan political and social discourse. A frequent and insightful commentator on local and international news outlets, Mr. Khenjani holds an MA in War Studies from King’s College London.
Image: Shutterstock / beeksmad.
