Washington needs to do a better job of coordinating its private sector partnerships and investments in the Greater Central Asian region.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has invested substantial political and economic capital in supporting the South Caucasus and Central Asian states, which were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Washington played a key role in supporting the development of Caspian Sea energy resources through commercial diplomacy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which helped countries strengthen their economic basis for statehood and political and economic sovereignty.
The focus at that time was on projects that connected East-West energy infrastructure throughout the Caspian, Black, and Mediterranean Seas. Currently, the United States plays a far more limited role in the region. This aligns with the overall strategic failure of US engagement with the broader region, from the Middle East to Central Asia. Until recently, the cases of Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya have developed an image of the United States as an unreliable partner lacking strategic clarity and purpose on the world stage. While US military capabilities remain superior to those of any rival around the world, strategic depth is lacking.
The inconsistency of US foreign policy in the Wider Middle East and Greater Central Asia is stark. Over the last three decades, American priorities have cycled erratically between supporting state sovereignty, promoting democracy and state-building, and disengagement, before reverting to re-engagement. Such unpredictable shifts only confuse allies and embolden adversaries.
How China and Russia Are Filling the Void
In Greater Central Asia, China is advancing its Belt and Road Initiative and has emerged as the main beneficiary of previous US investments in the region. Chinese leader Xi Jinping regularly meets with the leaders of Central Asian countries and frequently visits the region. In contrast, no sitting US president has ever visited Central Asia, and the only visit to the South Caucasus took place in 2005, when President George W Bush visited Georgia. Recent developments alone indicate how deeply the Chinese have cultivated their interests in Central Asia.
President Xi Jinping visited Astana for the China–Central Asia summit, attended by all heads of state from the region. The parties signed 58 agreements worth more than $24 billion, covering infrastructure, energy, logistics, and agriculture. Trade between China and Central Asia reached $95 billion in 2024 alone.
Beijing signed 24 agreements with Kazakhstan covering energy, nuclear industry, space exploration, digitalization, agriculture, medicine, tourism, trade, and science. Kazakhstan declared 2025 the “Year of Chinese Tourism.” Astana also plans to build nuclear power plants with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), in addition to continuing uranium and nuclear fuel exports to China.
China’s investment portfolio in Uzbekistan now exceeds $60 billion, with 2024 trade volumes reaching $14 billion. Discussions with President Mirziyoyev centered on green energy, oil and gas, logistics, digital innovation, and artificial intelligence. Tashkent endorsed the China-Central Asia power line and initiatives for a unified transport map and a digital fiber-optic backbone. A branch of the Chinese Export Import Bank opened in Tashkent, and China is playing an increasingly significant role in manufacturing, including the production of electric vehicles.
Russia is another proactive adversary of the United States, actively engaged in Central Asia. In June, Kazakhstan selected Rosatom to lead an international consortium to construct its first nuclear power plant. In Tashkent, Rosatom also signed agreements to build two Russian-designed VVER-1000 reactors. Uzbekistan is studying the possibility of building up to four large-scale plants to meet growing electricity demand.
Resource-rich Central Asia, with its growing economies, has become one of the most attractive geographic areas for investors worldwide, and the United States is falling behind not only its adversaries but also its allies. The EU has a much greater trade and investment presence in Central Asia than the United States. The combined EU-27 countries are the largest investors in the region and the second-largest trading partner.
A Coordinated Commercial Strategy in Central Asia
One way to correct the situation is to consolidate resources and achieve better utilization of commercial diplomacy via reformed US government institutions, focusing on export promotion and support of American companies operating overseas. The list of commercially oriented US government agencies is sizable, and with proper mandate and allocation of resources, these institutions could significantly enhance America’s competitiveness in the region.
To improve efficiency, these institutions need to have a higher degree of coordination among themselves. Most importantly, they need to serve an integrated strategy towards Greater Central Asia, forming a part of a global strategy. In the recent document An American Strategy for Greater Central Asia, experts from the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the American Foreign Policy Council argue that America needs to design and implement an effective strategy for Greater Central Asia to enhance the United States’ competitive position in a region that will affect the Russia-China relationship, geopolitical competition in Asia, and key resource markets, including uranium, oil, and natural gas.
One of the most important recommendations is the appointment of a Special Presidential Envoy for Greater Central Asia at the National Security Council with responsibility for designing, coordinating, and monitoring US activities in the region. The position would greatly increase coordination between the relevant departments and agencies in Washington, US embassies in the region, private sector representatives, and regional American Chambers of Commerce located in the United States.
The position of the Presidential Special Envoy for Greater Central Asia will not be totally new for the region. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a “Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy” was active.
The New Envoy’s Toolkit
There are signs of increased efficiency through the consolidation of government resources. The primary instrument in this process will be the US Development Finance Corporation, or DFC. Formed during the first term of the Trump administration by the bipartisan BUILD Act, the DFC was established through the merger of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) with the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The second Trump administration intends to further enhance the mandate of the DFC by making it an instrument of US strategic foreign policy objectives, promoting allied and potentially allied states.
On June 10, 2025, Benjamin Black, Nominee to the Chief Executive Officer of the DFC, stated that “implicitly and explicitly Congress has challenged [the] DFC to make a greater impact and to serve as a substantive economic counterweight to China and its Belt and Road Initiative and other global strategic competitors.” There are numerous indications that the DFC will have sufficient financial resources to support American and allied private sector companies in undertaking strategic projects in Greater Central Asia.
Other institutions with the mandate to assist American companies operating overseas include the US Commercial Service at the Department of Commerce, the US Export-Import Bank, and the US Trade and Development Agency. These agencies offer a range of services, including initial due diligence, funding for feasibility studies of potential projects, and support for American exports abroad. They can also support trade missions and business delegations of American companies in Greater Central Asia.
It is also important to remember that the World Bank and its private sector support arms—the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—have strong American capital participation and presence in decision-making bodies. But they need to have greater coordination with the strategic priorities of US foreign policy. The mandate of a Special Presidential Envoy for Greater Central Asia should include the ability to coordinate overall US strategy and commercial diplomacy with the international financial institutions operating in Greater Central Asia.
The United States has significant, yet unrealized, interests in Greater Central Asia—and ample political, diplomatic, and economic resources to act on them. In a region where great power competition is accelerating, the United States cannot afford strategic ambiguity. Clarity of strategy and coordination of efforts between different institutions and the private sector will help Washington achieve its strategic goals.
About the Author: Mamuka Tsereteli
Mamuka Tsereteli, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.
Image: Timur Seidalin / Shutterstock.com.
