The “Golden Dome” cannot rely upon long-range continental defenses; it will need short- and medium-range defenses as a backup. This is where the Army’s DE M-SHORAD system could come in.
America’s military has fallen behind in several key areas when compared to its great power rivals. Among those areas are weapons systems like hypersonic missiles and directed-energy weapons (DEWs). Interestingly, it is the United States Army which claims to have made the most progress on hypersonic weapons—with the so-called “Dark Eagle” project—and DEWs.
In the specific case of the Army’s DEWs, the Army claims their Directed Energy Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense System (DE M-SHORAD) is fully matured and capable of being integrated into the larger Golden Dome missile defense network that the Trump administration is developing. Army leaders have yet to disclose any official documents explicitly outlining how the DE M-SHORAD, which is a tactical and short-range system, will play into the Golden Dome, which is envisioned as a longer-range and more comprehensive missile defense system.
What Is the “Golden Dome”?
With a proposed $175 billion investment over three years, the Golden Dome project aims to counter ballistic missile, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—emphasizing rapid deployment through industry mobilization, akin to the Manhattan Project that produced the atomic bomb in record time.
It should be noted that the White House plans to have working Golden Dome defenses no later than the end of President Donald Trump’s second term in office. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin and other American defense contractors claim that they will have operational Golden Dome defenses ready for demonstration by next year.
Trump’s aggressive timelines for the project notwithstanding, it is likely to run into difficulties in the years ahead. During World War II, when the Manhattan Project was underway, America’s industrial might was second to none. Today, the United States lacks the same latent industrial capacity it once had—so it remains unlikely that the Golden Dome will achieve these ambitious goals on the timeline proposed.
Of course, the project is still very much worth doing. The threat to the US homeland from missiles and UAVs is persistent and growing. But Americans’ expectations of instant success must be tempered; this is a long-term project. The undertaking is itself a herculean task—made all the more difficult by the compressed timeline and the extreme difficulty that US defense firms have in achieving meaningful development goals on time and under budget. Therefore, the Golden Dome’s planners should consider creating the defense network by fast-tracking technologies that already exist.
How Lasers Could Fill in the Golden Dome’s Gaps
The fact that the Golden Dome is a true national missile defense shield likely means that it will not rely upon long-range continental defense alone. There is always a risk, given both Russian and Chinese saturation techniques, that something would get through the long-range proposed Golden Dome defenses necessitating short- and medium-range defenses as a backup.
That’s where the Army’s DE M-SHORAD system could possibly come in handy. Keep in mind, however, that the Golden Dome as it has been described thus far is largely—and wrongly—focused on kinetic-kill systems rather than enduring high energy lasers (E-HELs). The Army’s DE M-SHORAD is part of a larger Army project called the Enduring High Energy Laser (E-HEL) system.
Budget constraints and manufacturing challenges, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted, have delayed full funding of these systems. In other words, lawmakers and strategists thinking that lasers amount to a quick fix to their current missile defense challenges must reassess these assumptions.
The Army’s DE M-SHORAD and its subsequent E-HEL system are both critical for America to achieve DEW capabilities—and for those capabilities to be integrated into the larger Golden Dome national missile defense system.
Of course, these programs remain immature. For now, what is needed is patient resolve and constant political support—and proper, intensive oversight—to ensure that the program reaches maturity in a reliable time and at budget, and can be scaled meaningfully.
So, good on the Army for seeking these systems out. But everyone should be much more realistic than what’s being said publicly about the feasibility of the DEWs. There is still a long road to travel.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Wikimedia Commons.