Even building 1 million drones per year might not be enough for the US Army during a great-power conflict—given that China’s industrial base can build at least 8 million.
The United States Army knows that the modern battlefield has fundamentally shifted since the last time their forces were engaged in a major conflict. Unmanned systems now define the modern battlefield in ways that were once reserved only for manned platforms. As a result of these changes, as exemplified by recent conflicts in the Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East, and most notoriously Ukraine, the Army wants to procure at least one million drones over the next two to three years.
After that initial batch, the Army is talking about purchasing hundreds of thousands of additional drones per year—anywhere from 500,000 to millions.
Understanding the Army’s Procurement Math
Currently, the US defense industrial base only produces around 50,000 drones per year. To say it would need to scale up is a massive understatement.
One of the biggest shifts is that the Army wants to treat many of these drones the same way they currently treat ammunition—cheap and expendable, rather than the high-end prestige drones such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper that defined the War on Terror. This mirrors lessons learned from the Ukraine War, where low-cost drones have been used in large numbers to gather intelligence, adjust fire, and even strike targets.
To hit these volumes, the Army is launching a unique public-private industrial strategy that it has dubbed “SkyFoundry.” By building up domestic manufacturing—including motors, sensors, batteries, circuit boards—it envisions not just buying but having a surge-capable supply chain. That would be key in any crisis, since the Army wants the ability to churn out as many drones as needed to meet any threat it may face.
What’s more, the indigenization component of this new drone procurement program is a direct response to the fact that, under current conditions, China is the source of many critical components for most drone systems. That’s a severe vulnerability, especially as the US Army (and other militaries around the world) shift to relying more on unmanned systems.
Alongside buying these drones, the Army is experimenting with ways to defend against enemy drones. They are researching net projectiles, electromagnetic tools, and new forms of explosives to stunt the threat that drones pose on the battlefield. So, the strategy the Army is employing is not only related to procuring as many drones as possible (and indigenizing their production). The Army wants to create viable defenses against these systems, too.
Even 1 Million Drones Per Year Might Not Be Enough
Russia and Ukraine currently each produce around four million drones per year. China, with its vast industrial capacity, may produce more than eight million drones per year—mostly civilian-made for export, yet easily armed and transformed into military ones. If a conflict between near-peers erupted, the Americans will be at a serious disadvantage.
Yet scaling up as the Army wants to do is much easier said than it is done. There is a significant lead time required for building the machines needed to make drone parts. Defense News details the Rock Island Arsenal and how they need months to establish certain production lines. And with so much of the supply chain still running through places, like China, scaling up domestically is a complicated, slow affair.
There’s also the added issue of treating drones as being expendable. One can throw such systems away easily, but one must be willing to lose a great many of these systems as a result. High attrition rates means that a military engaged in drone-heavy armed conflict will constantly be buying replacements. In a high-intensity conflict, the rate of loss of these machines might outpace even one million per year if things go poorly.
The one million drone goal is a very bold goal that represents a key strategic pivot by the US Army, but achieving this lofty goal is not so easy. Even the very impressive-sounding one million drones will not guarantee dominance. Still, if the Army can build out the supply chain, streamline manufacturing, and integrate drone use across its units, then it could significantly boost its tactical flexibility and resilience in future conflicts.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert is a senior national security editor at The National Interest. Recently, Weichert became the host of The National Security Hour on America Outloud News and iHeartRadio, where he discusses national security policy every Wednesday at 8pm Eastern. He is also a contributor at Popular Mechanics and has consulted regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including The Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, and the Asia Times. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / Jasjka.
