By envisioning a carrier with over 100 aircraft, the project aimed to enable the USSR to achieve naval superiority in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific theaters.
Conceptualized in 1939, two years before Nazi Germany betrayed their Soviet “ally,” the Soviet Navy was developing Project Kostromitinov. This Soviet aircraft carrier was a truly ambitious project—and represented one of the USSR’s earliest, serious attempts to build for itself a large-scale aircraft carrier that could project power on a global scale, just like the Americans, British, and Japanese had for their navies.
Why Stalin Wanted the Kostromitinov
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin began prioritizing capital ships and aviation as tools for power projection in the 1930s. Project Kostromitinov was an outgrowth of that fixation by the Red Tsar.
For his part, Lieutenant Kostromitinov, the designer and namesake of the proposed carrier, drew his own inspiration from the German Kriegsmarine aircraft carrier, Graf Zeppelin, which was under construction at the time. This influence reflected the Soviet Union’s intelligence gathering on foreign naval technologies, as Soviet designers sought to adapt and scale up proven concepts to meet their operational needs.
The project was part of a series of carrier studies initiated after carriers were formally incorporated into the Soviet naval building program in 1938, following earlier experiments with seaplane tenders and conversions during the First World War and Russian Civil War. Envisioned as a formidable heavy aircraft carrier—comparable in size to the US Navy’s Midway-class aircraft carriers, and with a high-wing hull configuration and two superimposed hangars akin to Britain’s Ark Royal—this proposed carrier would have immediately catapulted the Soviet Navy to great power status.
The flight deck included two forward catapults for rapid launches, a fully enclosed bow, and three axial elevators, with a smaller starboard lift optimized for folded-wing aircraft. Its aircraft complement would have been impressive, too. This Soviet heavy aircraft carrier was designed to accommodate a whopping 106 planes. Among the airwing on the carrier would have been 66 warplanes for air superiority and 40 torpedo bombers for strike missions, rivaling the capacity of America’s Yorktown-class or Essex-class carriers.
The proposed carrier’s armament reflected the Soviet emphasis on self-defense. She would have possessed eight twin 152mm guns in casemated mounts (fore and aft), four triple and six twin 100mm anti-aircraft guns, eight quadruple 37mm mounts, and 22 twin 23mm guns. Protection was likewise robust, with a 130mm armored hangar floor, a 50mm flight deck, a 100mm belt, and 40mm hangar walls, prioritizing survivability in contested waters.
Propulsion on this boat would have consisted of four steam turbines, likely adapted from the USSR’s Chapayev-class cruisers. These would have delivered a top speed of 32 knots and a range of 8,000 nautical miles at 18 knots, or slightly over 20 mph. The island superstructure on this heavy Soviet aircraft carrier integrated the funnel and fire-control tower for a low profile, enhancing stability.
Crew requirements were estimated at around 2,000 personnel. These specifications positioned Project Kostromitinov as a multi-role platform, capable of operating with minimal escorts and supporting amphibious assaults or fleet actions.
The Carrier’s Design Reflected Changes in Soviet Naval Tactics
Prior to the 1930s, the Soviets concentrated on coastal defense, submarines, and destroyers, lacking the airpower and power projection that aircraft carriers provided to Moscow’s rivals in London, Tokyo, and Washington. By envisioning a carrier with over 100 aircraft, the project aimed to enable the USSR to achieve naval superiority in the Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific theaters, supporting operations against potential aggressors such as Germany or Japan.
More than anything, the proposed carrier’s true importance resided in fostering self-reliance and technological advancement for a Soviet military that was in many ways woefully backward when compared to its neighbors. It hardly helped matters that the carrier’s design process took place during Stalin’s military purges of the late 1930s, when most of the nation’s best-trained officers were executed.
Ultimately, though Stalin envisioned a “big ocean-going fleet,” he was still deeply enthralled by the cult of the battleship and preferred those systems over carriers. Accordingly, in spite of its impressive design, the Reds never built the monstrosity.
Even as a paper project, however, Project Kostromitinov had a lasting impact on Soviet military evolution. It contributed to doctrinal changes, emphasizing carriers as force multipliers for joint operations, which later materialized in the Moskva-class helicopter carriers and Kuznetsov-class aircraft carriers during the Cold War.
By exploring heavy armament and armor, this proposed heavy aircraft carrier addressed key vulnerabilities the Soviet Navy faced in contested environments, influencing hybrid designs like the Kiev-class aviation cruisers. The project’s scale demonstrated the USSR’s industrial potential, boosting morale and expertise among Soviet naval engineers, despite the serious disruptions that the war with Germany beginning in 1941 caused.
Despite the early identification of the role that aircraft carriers could play in modern naval operations, the war and Stalin’s own preferences for battleships conspired to stymie the USSR’s development of aircraft carriers. This delay in development would dog Soviet naval planners for the rest of the century, as the Reds never managed to build for themselves a proper carrier—or to reorganize their surface warfare fleet around the doctrines and principles that undergird aircraft carrier operations.
Even today, the Russian Navy, the successor to the Red Navy, lacks aircraft carriers. Its sole entry into that category, the shambolic and disaster-prone Admiral Kuznetsov, has spent most of the last decade in drydock—contributing to the Kremlin’s pragmatic decision to scrap it earlier this year. Moscow today has no real plans to build its own modern carrier force, preferring instead to focus on systems like submarines and Kirov-class battlecruisers.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Wikimedia Commons.
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