Rather than continue to invest in the Kiowa fleet or a successor, the Army retired it, dividing its reconnaissance mission among larger helicopters and newly-emerging drones.
In 2017, after more than four decades of service, the Bell OH-58 Kiowa, a light armed reconnaissance helicopter, was fully retired from the US Army.
The decision to retire the Kiowa from service was questioned by some at the time, given the aircraft’s reliability and its continuing effectiveness. However, the decision to phase the venerable helicopter out came as the result of gradually shifting priorities, operational realities, budgetary pressures, and ultimately, a shift in military aviation doctrine.
The Bell OH-58 Kiowa’s Specifications
- Year Introduced: 1969 (OH-58A); upgraded OH-58D Kiowa Warrior entered service in 1983
- Number Built: ~2,200 OH-58s of all variants; ~340 converted to OH-58D Kiowa Warrior configuration
- Length: 42 ft 2 in (12.85 m), including rotors
- Rotor Diameter: 35 ft (10.7 m)
- Height: 12 ft 10 in (3.9 m)
- Weight: ~3,200 lb (1,450 kg) empty; ~5,200 lb (2,360 kg) MTOW
- Engine: One Rolls-Royce (Allison) T703-AD-700 turboshaft (~650 shp)
- Top Speed: ~149 mph (240 km/h; 130 knots)
- Range: ~299 mi (481 km)
- Service Ceiling: ~15,000 ft (4,570 m)
- Loadout: Two hardpoints; combinations of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, Hydra 70 rockets, and .50 caliber machine guns
- Crew: 2 (pilot and co-pilot/observer)
The Kiowa Was the US Army’s Scout Helicopter for Many Years
Dependable and versatile, yet small and agile, the Kiowa entered service during the era that the helicopter helped to define: Vietnam. Used as a nimble scout helicopter, and adept at sleuthing out enemy positions, designating targets, and working in sync with attack platforms, the Kiowa benefitted from a low profile and high maneuverability. Used for reconnaissance throughout the Cold War, through Desert Storm, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Kiowa became known as the eyes of Army aviation, capable of spotting threats early and relaying targeting information to more heavily armed platforms like the Boeing AH-64 Apache.
By the turn of the century, however, with the US embroiled in two “forever wars,” the heavily-relied-upon Kiowa was beginning to show signs of aging. Despite repeated upgrades, the Kiowa airframe was a product of the Vietnam era, lacking the power, protection, or sensory capabilities needed for continuous operations in high-threat environments. As older helicopters began to require more labor and parts to stay airworthy, maintenance costs climbed steeply.
After the War on Terror, the Army Rethought Its Helicopter Program
Despite the Kiowa’s deficiencies, during the two decades of counterinsurgency work in Iraq and Afghanistan, the light reconnaissance platform made sense. The Kiowa could loiter over battlefields, synchronize with ground troops, and operate in permissive air spaces—all functions that larger helicopters struggled with.
But with the eventual conclusion of US combat operations in both theaters, and with US grand strategy reoriented towards great power competition—and, crucially, against adversaries who would not have permissive air spaces—a small, lightly armored helicopter like the Kiowa could not survive. Accordingly, rather than continue to invest in the Kiowa fleet or a successor, the Army retired the Kiowa, dividing its reconnaissance mission among larger helicopters and newly-emerging drones.
Of course, the decision to retire the Kiowa was controversial. Pilots and ground troops alike praised the Kiowa’s agility—and its ability to interface directly with troops on the ground, a feature larger platforms would not be able to replicate fully. Critics argued that the AH-64 was too expensive, and too few in number, to replace the Kiowa’s reconnaissance mission appropriately.
The Kiowa’s retirement shares a compounding effect with the gradual phaseout of the Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II (or “Warthog”) attack aircraft. Together, the retirements significantly reduce the US military’s inventory of dedicated close air support and reconnaissance specialists. While both platforms proved invaluable through various Middle Eastern conflicts, Army leadership has assumed that neither could survive against a near peer like China or Russia. One hopes that the merits of that decision will not be tested in combat!
About the Author: Harrison Kass
Harrison Kass is a senior defense and national security writer at The National Interest. Kass is an attorney and former political candidate who joined the US Air Force as a pilot trainee before being medically discharged. He focuses on military strategy, aerospace, and global security affairs. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global Journalism and International Relations from NYU.
Image: Shutterstock / Marko Dimic.
