At the end of the day, Central Asia has more to lose by disrupting its ties with China and Russia.
Central Asia obviously does not occupy a central position in Donald Trump’s foreign policy agenda. Yet, it remains part of the administration’s broader geostrategic framework. Washington’s interest in the Central Asian states is driven by two interconnected factors: the region’s resource potential and the intersection between American interests and the goals of competing powers.
China, a strategic rival, draws particular attention. Its infrastructure corridors, which criss-cross Central Asia toward Europe and the Middle East, align Beijing’s interests with those of Russia and Iran, elevating the region’s importance in Washington’s calculations. Today, with the Trump administration focused on containing Iran and waging a trade war, Central Asia is not on the sidelines. The interests of the Trump administration in the region, along with their potential implications for individual countries, are discussed below.
The Impact of USAID Cuts on Central Asia
To understand US interests in Central Asia, it is essential to consider them within the context of Washington’s global foreign policy trajectory, which has undergone significant shifts since Trump took office. The new administration officially shuttered the US Agency for International Development (USAID), citing its alleged inefficiency. Yet, it was through USAID that the United States implemented key soft‑power initiatives.
In 2024, Tajikistan received $58.5 million from the agency—almost twice Kazakhstan’s allocation ($26.5 million). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan has received more than $2 billion from USAID to develop its social infrastructure since its independence. Today, Tajikistan risks facing a situation where the vacuum left by the winding down of American programs will be filled by other external players, primarily Russia and Iran. International media warn that reduced external support threatens a human-rights and civil-society crisis in at least three countries—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—and poses risks to journalists’ safety in Afghanistan.
Notably, Marco Rubio described the US approach as “trade over aid, opportunity over dependency, and investment over assistance,” placing a premium on economic logic over paternalistic dependency. However, this raises a broader question: can the United States continue promoting democracy and effective governance while retaining its status as the world’s sole superpower?
The answer seems obvious, but the irony is that the new administration’s actual foreign policy practice may diverge significantly from its rhetoric. Under the banner of “trade over aid,” Washington soon launched an import‑tariff offensive that may also impact Central Asia.
How US Tariffs Will Hit Kazakhstan
On “Liberation Day” in early April, four Central Asian states received a concessional rate of 10 percent, considerably milder than the 27 percent tariff applied to Kazakhstan. However, after a three-month pause, on July 7, Trump sent personal letters to various global leaders. In the updated list, only Kazakhstan remained among the Central Asian states, with a slightly softened but still substantial tariff rate of 25 percent set to take effect on August 7.
Meanwhile, although Kazakhstan leads the region in exports to the United States ($2 billion), its margin over neighbors is dramatic: Uzbekistan exported $43 million, Kyrgyzstan $16.6 million, Tajikistan $4.6 million, Turkmenistan $14.6 million. In his response to Trump, Kazakh president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev tactfully expressed confidence in a compromise on trade disputes. At the same time, analysts began offering various theories as to why Kazakhstan was included in the tariff list.
In a New York Times opinion article, Daisuke Wakabayashi argues that, beyond the US desire to secure access to resources outside China, the decision to spotlight Kazakhstan reflects a willingness to pressure BRICS-affiliated countries to weaken ties with China and Russia. This view is difficult to dispute, especially considering that Kazakhstan handles almost half of China’s trade with the entire region ($43.8 billion or 46 percent). In comparison, the other countries account for far smaller shares: Kyrgyzstan, $22.7 billion (24 percent); Uzbekistan, $13.7 billion (14.5 percent); Turkmenistan, $10.6 billion (11 percent); and Tajikistan, $3.8 billion (4 percent).
In 2024, Kazakhstan’s exports to China reached a historic high of 13.7 million tons of goods, representing a 19 percent increase in volume, alongside a notable 43 percent surge in container traffic to Europe. Amid this political rapprochement, President Tokayev described the current phase of relations with China as a “golden era.” “China is a friendly neighbor, close friend, and reliable partner of Kazakhstan,” said Tokayev.
At the same time, Kazakhstan leads the region in Chinese debt exposure, with $9.3 billion, which is 2.4 times more than Uzbekistan, the region’s second-largest economy. As researcher Nargiza Muratalieva notes in a piece for Carnegie, such debts often result in resource or land concessions instead of cash repayments.
Chinese firms already have access to a significant portion of Kazakhstan’s resource base. Kazakhstan holds the largest known reserves of rare-earth minerals in Central Asia, though exact quantities have not been disclosed. For this reason, the country is increasingly in the crosshairs of both the United States and the EU, which seek to diversify imports away from China.
The EU has already signed a €3 million contract with Kazakhstan for critical materials, and the country’s 2024–2028 development plan includes a 40 percent investment increase in that sector. Hence, Washington’s interest in Astana is perfectly logical. Javier M. Piedra, former head of KPMG’s Central Asia M&A group, argues, citing USGS data, that Kazakhstan could fulfill the US’ demand for specific rare-earth elements, placing its potential on par with China’s. However, Kazakhstan lacks domestic processing technologies and relies on external support, while China controls roughly 70 percent of global production. With that in mind, Washington’s calculations in the tariff game become quite predictable.
As for China, the multibillion-dollar agreements on strategic minerals and geological exploration signed during Xi Jinping’s June 2025 visit only underscore Astana’s significance for Beijing. Particularly noteworthy were the projects valued at a total of $24 billion: a solar power plant with Shandong REETECH and urea production with CNPC. This resource is becoming increasingly competitive in the global market. The United States is seeking to diversify its supply, while the EU, recognizing the importance of urea and ammonia for food security, has removed them from the sanctions list against Russia.
Kazakhstan, for its part, is actively developing its petrochemical sector, which makes it increasingly attractive to China, as a potential source of fertilizers, and to the United States, primarily as a tool for tariff containment against Beijing. In 2024, the sector in Kazakhstan grew by 50.5 percent, and it aims to attract around $9 billion in investment by 2035. With China projected to see 1.6 percent annual growth in nitrogen fertilizer demand through 2030, Kazakhstan could emerge as a partial supplier for China.
Meanwhile, the rapid growth of China’s agricultural sector is increasing its dependence on nitrogen fertilizers, the majority of which currently come from Russia. In this context, Kazakhstan may well be seen by Washington as a convenient testing ground for strategic competition with China and Russia, especially after Trump’s recent statement about potential 100-percent “secondary tariffs” for trading with Moscow. After all, Kazakhstan is among Russia’s top five trade partners. Thus, Trump’s targeting of Kazakhstan may, in fact, be a mere warm-up before the main act.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade has downplayed the risks, noting that the United States is not a significant market for Kazakh goods compared to Europe, Russia, and China. That said, predicting the scale of tariff escalation is already a challenging task. In his letter, Trump clearly warned that there would be a price to pay for any retaliatory measures.
Here, the main threat to Kazakhstan probably lies not so much in the tariffs themselves but in President Trump’s unpredictability. Trump has repeatedly U-turned or failed to follow through on his high-profile pledges, such as the “90 deals in 90 days” or a 24-hour peace in Ukraine.
The slowdown of the Chinese and European economies presents serious problems for the Kazakh economy. Although the United States has not imposed tariffs on oil regardless of its country of origin, global trade tensions between the United States, the EU, and China have already affected oil prices, which account for about a quarter of Kazakhstan’s GDP. Thus, a potential cascade effect poses far greater risk, even if US oil tariffs are not in force. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s growing closeness to China, Russia, and Iran leaves it exposed to “secondary tariffs” or other unpredictable measures.
How Tariffs Affect the Rest of Central Asia
The Trump administration intends to undo the policies of previous administrations; however, regional formats like C5+1 and even Biden’s proposed B5+1 seem likely to persist. In February, during a call with Uzbek foreign minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, Secretary of State Rubio confirmed US interest in strategic minerals and emphasized C5+1 as a key diplomatic platform.
In 2025, Uzbekistan launched a $2.6 billion project to develop Uzbek mineral resources. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev then hosted a US delegation, with a focus on investment in resource-intensive sectors. As the country with the second-largest rare-earth reserves after Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan offers considerable investor potential.
Since 2016, when Mirziyoyev adopted a more open foreign policy, Uzbekistan’s relations with Western partners have evolved. The country maintains a cautious stance on the Israel-Hamas and Russia-Ukraine Wars, supports stable growth and investment, but still lags behind Kazakhstan in terms of GDP ($115 billion vs. $288 billion) despite its larger population. Both countries are C5+1 pillars and equally significant to the US strategy.
The economies of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are largely dependent on the agricultural sector, remittances, and exports of raw materials. US interest in Turkmenistan increased amid Middle East tensions, as shown by Rubio’s June call with Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov.
Despite its neutrality and limited integration, the country’s border with Iran confers strategic relevance. In June, the Trump administration imposed partial visa restrictions on Turkmenistan due to its citizens allegedly overstaying their US visas. Despite the Turkmen Foreign Ministry’s bewilderment, this has had little impact on the level of bilateral relations.
The trade relationship remains quite limited: in 2024, the combined trade volume between the three states and the United States was only $304.6 million, representing a minuscule share of the overall US trade volume. The export mainly consists of low-tech consumer goods, which makes it of low strategic importance to the United States and minimizes the impact of basic tariffs for the republics.
American policy has traditionally viewed the region as a single bloc. Until 2021, Central Asia was closely linked to Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the region lost its former priority. However, it remains surrounded by four nuclear powers, China, Russia, India, and Pakistan. Iran is also striving for this status.
In May, Iran concluded a trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), of which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members. All these factors increase the region’s strategic vulnerability, keeping it firmly within Washington’s focus.
US interests in Central Asia have historically focused on access to resources, preventing conflicts over them, and supporting transcontinental trade routes—priorities that are likely to persist. Washington will also be watching the region’s deepening ties with China. Beijing and the landlocked Central Asian states are seeking alternative routes to Europe that bypass Russia, through which the majority of current trade flows pass.
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, China has noticeably increased its presence in the region. Two summits, “China-Central Asia,” held in Xi’an (May 2023) and Astana (June 2025), have become key milestones in this process. A practical step in China’s strengthening influence was the start of construction on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, a project that had been delayed for decades. The implementation of such projects will give China access to new markets and bolster its position in the region. Therefore, the United States will seek to contain the expansion of Chinese influence using whatever available tools.
About the Author: Elvira Aidarkhanova
Elvira Aidarkhanova is a Research Fellow at the Center for the National Interest. She has contributed to various research initiatives in international relations. She has held communications roles in both Kazakhstan’s private and public sectors, as well as in think tanks in the United States. She holds a Master’s of Arts in Human Science and an MBA. She is currently a PhD candidate in International Relations at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University.
Image: Brain Johnson / Shutterstock.com.
