Taiwan’s energy missteps are no longer a domestic debate, but a strategic liability for U.S. defense planning. They must be reversed.
Taiwan just made a catastrophic mistake. On May 17, it shut down its last operating nuclear reactor and declared a milestone in its pursuit of a “nuclear-free homeland.” Exactly one week later, the White House issued an executive order to “rapidly deploy advanced nuclear technologies” for AI infrastructure and national security.
The irony could not be starker. At a time when the United States is doubling down on nuclear for national security, a far more vulnerable island with deep supply chain dependencies took the opposite path. It is a self-inflicted Achilles’ heel, and more than that, as Mr. Weichert sounded the alarm in his recent commentary, Taiwan is completely unserious about its national defense.
There is hardly anything more painful than watching this island unravel from within. To US policymakers, most importantly, this decision has complicated U.S. operational planning, even handing Beijing a fresh leverage point in its calculus. Strengthening the island’s energy security must now become a core priority for Washington.
To get the full picture of the island’s energy fragility: 97.73% of energy imports, eighty-two percent of electricity from gas and coal, and barely ten days of gas reserves and thirty days of coal. Renewables remain unreliable, and the removal of nuclear power will increase dependence on seaborne fuels. And the recent Strait Thunder 2025A drills just again rehearsed a large-scale blockade and mock attack on energy infrastructure.
Days after the mistake, Taiwan’s blackout risk is already emerging. The island’s reserve margin fell below eight percent in May, well ahead of peak summer demand and far short of its fifteen percent safety target. This left authorities scrambling to restart a coal-fired plant with an expired operating license. Should Taiwan further exacerbate this energy vulnerability, a persistent pressure campaign could escalate into formal military action anytime.
For years, Taiwan’s defense strategy has centered on the belief of holding the line until help arrives. But U.S. forces will not appear like a superhero landing. There are no teleporting fleets. In every major U.S. wargame, time is the key variable. Taiwan must hold out for at least a month, sometimes up to ninety days, before allied reinforcements can arrive. A blackout-stricken island with failed infrastructure would drastically complicate U.S. operations, raising costs and limiting options.
That’s why the first step to reverse the deterioration is to keep Taiwan’s existing, operational nuclear reactors running through safety checks and upgrades.
Their fuel lasts up to twenty-four months, is resistant to maritime disruption, and is crucial for sustaining military operations. This will help maintain the island’s military infrastructure and defense operations.
As Taiwan modernizes its military, the power demand from command-and-control systems, intelligence platforms, drone operations, and joint battlespace integration is only increasing. Yet it still relies on the civilian grid, with generators as backup. This integration with the national grid highlights the critical need for a stable baseline of electricity, ensuring the prioritization of power for defense facilities during a prolonged blockade— a requirement nuclear energy uniquely meets.
Another reason this is necessary is that relying solely on fuel-powered generators for backup electricity is not comprehensive. Fuel delivery logistics remain a glaring vulnerability, as they are highly susceptible to disruption or attack if communication networks and fuel logistics falter.
Looking ahead, Taiwan’s military must develop islanded power systems for critical bases to minimize vulnerabilities during a prolonged blockade or attack. Achieving this entails investment in next-generation nuclear technologies.
The development and deployment planning of such technologies is underway in the United States. For example, there is the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s joint Project Pele — a mobile reactor boosting energy independence at forward military sites.
Another option, perhaps even more critical for Taiwan, is the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) to provide stable power for key infrastructure. These reactors can be installed in dispersed or hardened locations, making them especially well-suited for high-risk environments to isolate and secure power for mission-critical functions.
Concerns Are Real, But Inaction Is Riskier
Taiwan has been haunted by the long-standing fear of nuclear waste for too long. Yet it has already implemented on-site dry cask storage and has proposed plans for interim solutions. The real problem is politics. Taiwanese leaders have failed to commit to expanding facilities and institutionalizing transparent consultation. To avoid confronting the hard challenges, Taiwan chose to walk away from the option altogether. It doesn’t make sense.
As for critics over SMRs like immature development, cost, safety, and waste management challenges, action itself is the answer. You don’t get strategic capabilities for free. New technologies demand serious investment, especially those with military relevance. Governments and companies are already developing solutions that range from fuel recycling to faster, cheaper reactor designs. Why, then, has Taiwan given up before even trying? With survival risks looming large, any political hesitation looks negligent.
Next Steps for Washington and Taiwan
Washington has called on Taiwan for higher military spending, longer conscription, and stronger reserve capabilities, but it has made few demands with regard to energy security. Given the stakes, decision-makers must now recognize that energy resilience is central to the island’s survival and its strategic space.
Taiwan should fully join US efforts to strengthen energy resilience through nuclear revival. That requires a foundational nuclear energy cooperation framework. As per its agreement with Japan, the United States can offer technical guidance on extending existing reactors and collaborate on next-generation technologies.
Energy security should be incorporated into routine bilateral security dialogues. Combatant commands need to factor Taiwan’s energy structure into their war plans by recognizing it as a core component of the island’s wartime endurance. U.S. Army and Navy efforts to deploy advanced nuclear systems at select bases can be valuable references for Taiwan.
This approach carries strategic benefits well beyond defense. As Russia and China continue to export nuclear technologies, Taiwan’s participation in U.S.-led innovation and investment would help accelerate American nuclear industrial growth and anchor security practices and geopolitical influence among frontline allies.
To ground the push, Taipei and Washington should capitalize on existing semi-official mechanisms. The U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference is a mainstay for bilateral defense technology and industrial policy discussions and should incorporate energy resilience and nuclear cooperation into its agenda.
Congress will determine the momentum behind the cooperation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes the Taiwan Security Cooperation Initiative and bilateral military trauma-care programs. Adding energy security provisions would signal that Washington sees it as a key defense issue.
For Beijing, taking down Taiwan’s grid may be cheaper than launching an invasion. Don’t fixate on 2027. If the conditions align, Beijing won’t wait. Washington cannot let Taiwan’s missteps become liabilities for the United States. Washington must act if Taiwan drifts off course.
About the Author: Kevin Ting-Chen Sun
Kevin Ting-Chen Sun is a senior legislative policy advisor in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. He currently works with legislator Ching-hui Chen and previously advised former Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee Chair Charles I-hsin Chen. He is also a licensed attorney and a non-resident research fellow at the Institute for Taiwan-America Studies in Washington, DC.
Image: Shutterstock/e-crow
