The conflict in Sudan now resembles more of a proxy war than a civil war.
Sudan’s civil war has transitioned from an internal contest for power into a multidimensional regional security challenge. What initially appeared to be a struggle between rival armed formations has evolved into a conflict increasingly shaped by external military involvement, long-range strike capabilities, and the proliferation of unmanned systems.
Recent investigative reporting by The New York Times, documenting the use of a covert drone operating base on Egyptian territory to conduct strikes inside Sudan, highlights a broader and consequential trend: Sudan’s instability is now intersecting directly with regional force posture, deterrence dynamics, and Red Sea security. Advanced long-range drones have been operating for months from Egypt’s Western Desert, striking targets hundreds of miles inside Sudanese territory.
From a military perspective, the precise nationality of the operators is secondary to the operational implications. The conflict is no longer geographically bounded. External actors are influencing tactical outcomes and shaping the operational environment, not merely providing material support to local forces.
This development reflects a broader pattern evident in numerous conflicts worldwide, namely, a migration toward high-techdrones hybrid warfare. Sudan’s battlefield has become a testing ground for drone employment, counter-drone measures, and long-range precision strike in a low-governance environment. Both principal belligerents now rely on unmanned systems for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions.
This evolution has reduced warning times, expanded the depth of engagement, and increased the vulnerability of civilian infrastructure and incidences of horrific collateral damage. It has also lowered the threshold for escalation, as drone losses are politically easier to absorb than the loss of manned aircraft or personnel.
However, these operational shifts do not explain why the conflict persists. The central structural driver remains unchanged: the absence of a clear separation between military command and political authority. Sudan’s armed leadership continues to function simultaneously as a fighting force and as the executive power of the state. From a security standpoint, this fusion undermines any negotiation framework. A military command that controls the instruments of violence, the intelligence apparatus, and state resources has little incentive to accept binding constraints or irreversible concessions. The “D” in DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military Power, and Economic Power) is noticeably absent.
Sudan’s recent history reinforces this assessment.
Periods labeled as “transitional” have repeatedly been used to reorganize force structures, absorb allied militias, marginalize civilian institutions, and consolidate control. Command reshuffles and institutional reforms have occurred, but always within a framework that preserves military primacy. The result has been neither stabilization nor professionalization, but recurring cycles of confrontation, violence, and damage to infrastructure and the civilian population.
The humanitarian impact, while severe, is also strategically relevant. Large portions of Sudan are now effectively ungoverned. Food distribution networks have collapsed, medical systems are degraded, and population displacement is widespread. The impact of the elimination of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is both tragic and palpable. Such conditions create permissive environments for armed groups, transnational smuggling, and external influence operations. From a security perspective, this level of state failure cannot be contained indefinitely within Sudan’s borders. Therein lies the danger and hence the reason for both the strategic and tactical involvement of Egypt.
Sudan’s geographic position amplifies these risks. Its Red Sea coastline lies adjacent to critical maritime corridors linking Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Prolonged instability in Sudan increases the probability of spillover effects that could affect freedom of navigation, energy transit, and regional deterrence balances.
Of particular concern is the re-emergence of Iranian military engagement in Sudan, including the provision of drones, air-defense systems, and advisory support. With the demise of its terrorist proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, and the limitations placed on the Houthis, Iran is clinging to whatever footholds it can maintain in the region. This suggests an effort to establish strategic reach toward the Red Sea rather than merely influence internal outcomes.
The increasing use of Sudanese territory as an operational depth for external actors—whether for drone staging, logistics, or influence—signals a shift from civil war to contested regional space. This trajectory carries risks not only for Sudan but also for neighboring states and US partners operating in and around the Red Sea basin.
Against this backdrop, conflict management approaches centered on temporary ceasefires and military-to-military engagement are unlikely to produce durable results. A more viable framework must address the institutional configuration that sustains the conflict. From a stability standpoint, sustainable de-escalation is improbable as long as uniformed military leadership retains executive authority. This is not a political judgment but an assessment grounded in command incentives and historical precedent.
For the United States, this argues for a more conditional and structured approach. Diplomatic engagement, economic assistance, and international legitimacy should be explicitly linked to measurable steps separating military command from political governance. A transition framework that leaves executive authority in the hands of serving military officers is unlikely to generate compliance or accountability.
A civilian, technocratic interim administration—limited in duration and mandate—offers a functional alternative. Its purpose would be to restore basic state capacity, stabilize administrative systems, secure humanitarian access, and establish conditions for elections. Equally important would be civilian oversight of defense institutions, including budget transparency, command accountability, and the integration or dissolution of paramilitary forces under the authority of the law.
International involvement should prioritize verification rather than substitution. A coordinated oversight mechanism involving regional actors, the African Union, and key international stakeholders could help ensure compliance while reducing incentives for unilateral military intervention. Conditioning assistance on verifiable benchmarks would reinforce credibility and reduce the likelihood of regression.
Arguments that military disengagement risks destabilization overlook current realities. Sudan’s instability is already systemic. Continued military governance sustains fragmentation, invites external intervention, and entrenches conflict economies. Stability achieved through coercion is inherently brittle; institutional legitimacy remains the only durable basis for order.
The emergence of foreign-operated drone infrastructure should therefore be understood as a warning sign. External militarization may shift battlefield dynamics, but it cannot compensate for the absence of legitimate governance. Left unaddressed, it risks locking Sudan into a long-term pattern of proxy competition with direct implications for Red Sea security.
Sudan does not require another externally brokered pause in fighting. It requires an internal institutional reset that returns armed forces to a professional defense role and removes them from direct governance. Ending the war ultimately requires ending the system that perpetuates it. The cost of delay will be measured not only in Sudanese lives but also in the expansion of regional instability and diminished strategic control over a critical maritime domain.
History will assess this moment not by the sophistication of weapons deployed, but by whether strategic clarity prevailed over tactical expediency.
About the Author: James Foggo
Admiral James G. Foggo, US Navy (ret.), is the dean of the Center for Maritime Strategy. He is the former commander of US Naval Forces Europe and Africa and Allied Joint Force Command, Naples. He commanded NATO joint exercises (Baltic Operations) in 2015 and 2016, as well as Exercise Trident Juncture in 2018.
Image: Mohammed al-Wafi / Shutterstock.com.
