South Korea under President Lee Jae-myung is returning to pragmatic diplomacy, maintaining its US alliance while rejecting confrontation with China, reflecting public sentiment and prioritizing peace, trade, and regional stability.
Despite the hopes of many China-hawks in Washington DC, South Korea’s new president Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party is expected to pursue a foreign policy more open to engagement with China and North Korea.
Signaling a departure from the confrontational stance of the now disgraced Yoon Suk-yeol administration, Lee reflects the swing of South Korea’s political pendulum back toward reassurance, placing renewed emphasis on reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and managing uncertainty in East Asia through dialogue and engagement.
South Korea Will Balance Their Relationship with America and China
What is often overlooked is that South Korea shares some, but not all, American priorities. This is not new and shows no signs of changing.
Every Korean president, whether liberal or conservative, has sought strong ties with the United States and upheld the existing alliance as a pillar of national security. At the same time, all have recognized the necessity of living with China. None have embraced a policy of containment or economic decoupling; the enduring orientation has been pragmatic coexistence.
In that sense, Yoon was the aberration. If his presidency served as a litmus test for how far to the right South Korea is willing to go, the results were telling: As a general rule, Seoul prefers to maintain cooperative ties with China.
Even President Yoon, arguably the most conservative South Korean leader in decades, did not abandon relations with Beijing in favor of an exclusive alignment with Washington.
For instance, when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022 and made a subsequent stop in Seoul, Yoon declined to meet her, citing “a comprehensive consideration for national interest.”
Foreign Minister Park Jin traveled to China the next day for his first official visit, and when Yoon’s top national security advisor was asked in mid-2023 whether South Korea still upheld the “One China” Policy, he replied, “We made our policy toward China when we normalized relations in 1992, and we haven’t changed that policy.”
Further, many Western analysts and media outlets focused on Seoul’s adoption of the term “Indo-Pacific” and the emphasis on the South Korea–US–Japan trilateral cooperation in its 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, interpreting these signals as a major strategic realignment.
Yet this interpretation often overlooks a key element of the document: its simultaneous emphasis on cooperation with China. The strategy states, “We seek to contribute to regional peace and stability by harmoniously developing ROK–US–Japan cooperation and ROK–Japan–China cooperation [emphasis added].”
What Is President Lee’s Foreign Policy?
President Lee Jae-myung appears to prioritize the US–ROK alliance while also managing good relations with China.
His foreign policy stance marks a clear contrast with that of his predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol, who championed “peace through strength” and emphasized deterrence and military alignment.
Instead, Lee promotes his vision of “peace through dialogue,” emphasizing that “peace and economy go hand in hand” and that “no matter how expensive, peace is better than war.” While not discarding deterrence, Lee places greater emphasis on reassurance, inter-Korean coexistence, and pragmatic diplomacy.
South Korea’s position, grounded in the “One China” policy, is unlikely to change regarding the Taiwan issue. When asked whether South Korea would come to Taiwan’s aid if attacked by China, Lee responded, “I will think about that answer when aliens are about to invade the earth.”
The remark implied that, realistically, South Korea does not intend to become militarily involved in cross-Strait relations in the foreseeable future. President Lee’s approach reflects broader South Korean public opinion: In 2024, most Koreans (53.3 percent) wanted no involvement if a war occurred over Taiwan and the US was involved; only 15.6 percent supported providing weapons and ammunition, and 5.9 percent supported sending combat troops.
South Koreans Do Not Think of China as a Threat
Similarly, while the South Korean public expresses some apprehension about China, it generally does not view China as the existential threat many in the United States perceive it to be. Surveys by the East Asia Institute (EAI), a leading research institute based in Seoul, consistently show that South Koreans are more concerned about being drawn into the escalating US–China rivalry and becoming collateral damage in a broader great power contest. When asked the reasons for having a negative view of China, 67 percent of Koreans replied “China’s coercive retaliation about the THAAD radar batteries,” but only 12 percent responded “China’s military power.”
Korea’s military expenditures have dropped from 4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 2.5 percent in 2024, while spending on education has increased by 3 to 4.8 percent. And that military spending is still overwhelmingly focused on North Korea contingencies, not Chinese ones. For most South Koreans, the most immediate and enduring security threat that remains is North Korea.
To conclude, all South Korean presidents, liberal or conservative, have recognized the need to work with China. Korea cannot afford to distance itself; geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and strategic realities demand a modus vivendi.
As a democracy, South Korea’s foreign policy must also reflect public sentiment. Polling data suggests that, like their policymakers, South Korean citizens do not view China’s rise as inherently threatening. Instead, they see the intensifying US–China rivalry, especially when it involves economic pressure and technological decoupling, as a more immediate and multifaceted source of insecurity.
While South Korea seeks to diversify its economic relations, there is little doubt that China will remain a critical partner in trade, investment, and innovation.
About the Authors: Dr. Park Kyuri and David C Kang
Dr. Park Kyuri is a Security and Foreign Policy Postdoctoral Fellow at the Global Research Institute (GRI) and a faculty affiliate of the College of William & Mary Public Policy Program. She is completing a book manuscript, Connection Strategies of Asia-Pacific Secondary States: Security Cooperation and Network Power.
David C Kang is the Maria Crutcher Professor of International Relations at USC. His latest book is Beyond Power Transitions: the Lessons of East Asian History and the Future of US-China Relations (Columbia University Press, 2024) co-authored with Xinru Ma.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/LegoCamera.
