Reintegrating Turkey into the F-35 program could lower costs, improve NATO airpower, and contain Russian influence, if Ankara complies with safeguards on its S-400 system and realigns with alliance standards.
Removing Turkey from the F-35 program has increased unit costs and created a strategic gap along NATO’s southern flank. Re-admitting Ankara would restore a proven supply chain and markedly strengthen allied air power from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean.
Turkey’s 2019 removal from the F‑35 program triggered an immediate bill of roughly $500 million to $600 million and is projected to add about $7 million, $10 million per aircraft, sending cumulative costs into the billions by 2030. Six years on, the jet is pricier, NATO’s southern flank still lacks a fifth-generation fighter, and Ankara is exploring European and indigenous alternatives. The opportunity to adjust the course is limited. Washington can contain costs and reinforce ties with a pivotal ally through prompt, targeted measures.
Why Was Turkey Removed from the F-35 Program?
Turkey once milled more than 1,000 parts per jet, from landing gear forgings to composite skins. When those bolts vanished, Lockheed Martin requalified vendors at premium prices, burning through a nine-digit budget line while bottlenecks lingered. Recommissioning Turkish plants, modernized by a booming drone sector and the homegrown Kaan fighter, could relieve pressure more quickly than building capacity elsewhere. Allies such as Poland or Japan might help, yet scaling their smaller aerospace sectors would take years and hundreds of millions, keeping production costs elevated in the interim.
Turkey would not reenter as a passive customer. Its pilots patrol the Black Sea, the Aegean, and northern Syria, airspaces thick with Russian and Syrian surface-to-air missiles. Data on Syrian SAM evasion tactics gathered during these sorties could be directly integrated into the F-35’s digital backbone, refining tactics, and software for every operator. Israel’s combat logs have already spurred upgrades; Turkey’s higher tempo could significantly enhance that dividend.
Turkey Has Russian Technology to Track the F-35’s Movement
Skeptics point to the Russian-made S-400 air defense system near Ankara, warning that its radar could passively log the F-35’s signature. The concern is genuine, yet not unprecedented: Greece’s standalone S300 battery has coexisted with allied F-35 aircraft for two decades. Like the Greek system, Turkey’s S400 is air-gapped from NATO networks. Risks may be mitigated through geographic separation, unannounced inspections, periodic security updates to the jet’s software, and, if Ankara agrees, withdrawal of any remaining Russian technicians, if present.
Such safeguards cannot eliminate every doubt, but they transform an opaque liability into a monitored and manageable system. Engagement yields inspection rights; exclusion leaves the United States in the dark.
The US Is Skeptical of Turkish Loyalty to NATO
The US Congress remains wary of Turkey’s government, some lawmakers citing CAATSA sanctions and human rights concerns as barriers to renewed defense ties.
At the same time, Ankara continues to voice concerns about US support for Syrian Kurdish forces. The Trump administration’s plan to withdraw US troops in Syria, and potentially, Iraq, signals a shift that could ease one of Ankara’s core grievances and open space for renewed defense cooperation. Re-engagement might overlook Ankara’s divergence from NATO standards; however, losing Ankara to Russian or Chinese partnerships would impose far greater, longer-term costs on the Alliance.
Although Turkey’s recent pursuit of non-NATO systems introduces uncertainty, coupling F-35 access to clear compliance and retaining the right to suspend parts or software gives Washington a practical safeguard. A time‑limited trial phase, backed by live tracking of Turkish flight activity, would replicate the end‑use safeguards long enforced on Pakistan’s F‑16 fleet.
Joint NATO drills that pair Greek and Turkish aircrews could lower Aegean frictions and rebuild confidence. Domestically, legislators gain a fiscal upside: less expensive jets release funds for other programs while bolstering NATO’s southern shield against Russia and Iran.
In an era of budget restraint, bringing Turkish suppliers back into the fold could trim millions from the F‑35’s yearly bill. This outcome aligns neatly with deficit‑minded lawmakers who still want to preserve deterrence.
How Can Turkey Re-enter the F-35 Program?
Step 1 – Reopen factories. Re‑establish purchase orders with pre‑approved Turkish vendors, holding off on aircraft transfers for now, so that lower‑priced components can start feeding US production lines.
Step 2 – Secure the S400 air defense system. As those parts begin to flow, the S-400 battery would be relocated away from any F-35 base, with remaining Russian technicians (if present) sent home, and surprise NATO inspections would be accepted. Six months of spotless audit reports, shared in routine Alliance briefings, should reassure capitals such as Athens and The Hague. If Ankara falls short, Washington could immediately suspend supplier contracts.
Step 3 – Deliver jets and build a hub. Turkish pilots rejoin multinational Red Flag drills, and an initial F-35 squadron stands up at a jointly certified base doubling as the Mediterranean’s overhaul center. Oversight would rest with a proposed Joint F-35 Compliance Board, co-chaired by a US Air Force general and NATO’s Deputy SACEUR, supported by a dozen Allied Air Command inspectors. The estimated $5 million yearly cost would be dwarfed by any month of production delay.
Beyond prestige, Turkey would regain contract revenue, earn service fees as a regional sustainment center, and diversify away from overreliance on Russian or Chinese systems. Ankara may hesitate to remove Russian personnel (if present), but the combination of jobs, technology transfer, and an upgraded NATO role could outweigh concerns about sovereignty.
If talks stall, Eurofighter Typhoons may fill Turkey’s near-term gap; Gulf investment could accelerate Kaan, and a Turkish stealth jet, unconstrained by US export policy, might enter the market in the 2030s. Such an aircraft could appeal to states seeking alternatives to American platforms, thereby challenging US influence in areas ranging from the Caucasus to North Africa.
Turkey’s factories, pilots, and geography could make the F-35 more affordable and NATO stronger. Reintegrating Turkey risks S-400 tensions, but exclusion has incurred significant upfront costs and billions in added aircraft expenses, weakening Alliance ties.
With US troop drawdowns in Syria opening new dialogue, Washington could greatly benefit from restoring its partnership with a key NATO ally.
About the Author: Deniz Karakullukcu
Deniz Karakullukcu is a foreign policy and security advisor in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. He advises senior officials on international security and conducts independent research on Middle East geopolitics and the defense industry. His work includes policy briefings on regional stability and NATO interoperability.
Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons/US Air Force photo by Lt. Sam Eckholm.
