The FCC must streamline submarine cable licensing while enhancing threat resilience to safeguard US economic and national security.
Arteries of American prosperity lie beneath the ocean. Submarine cables carry over 95 percent of international data traffic, supporting everything from financial transactions to military intelligence. American companies and the cable networks they support are the envy of the world, and increasingly an area of economic and strategic cooperation between the US and allies. Preserving American firms’ competitive edge in the development, deployment, and management of such networks is crucial for our economic and national security.
Recognizing the importance of these undersea networks, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently initiated a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to review and update its submarine cable landing license rules. To best serve America’s economic and national security interests, the Commission should focus on two key themes: streamlining application processes and enhancing security oversight without creating duplicative requirements.
Eliminate Redundancies Through a Joint Questionnaire With Team Telecom
Modernizing the submarine cable licensing process starts with eliminating redundancies. One way the Commission could do this is by creating a standardized joint questionnaire shared between the FCC and the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, or Team Telecom, as it is informally called. Team Telecom is an all-star team of agents from across the executive branch who provide expertise on the best approaches to securing and protecting telecommunications infrastructure. A joint questionnaire would create greater continuity between the bodies, improving awareness about potential vulnerabilities among license-holders and partners while accelerating approval timelines.
Develop Smart Vendor Security Lists
Another way to streamline regulatory review without undermining security standards would be to create comprehensive “blacklists” and “whitelists” of vendors based on the FCC’s existing Covered Entity List. The Covered List is a list managed by the FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau that are deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States. The Covered List functions as a blacklist, automatically triggering heightened scrutiny for systems using components from these firms. The Commission’s recent moves to ensure compliance with this list are commendable and could serve a complementary purpose in this proceeding. Conversely, a whitelist would provide certainty for cable developers planning new projects, identifying pre-vetted providers and partners. This approach could leverage the Commission’s Cyber Trust Mark initiative for securing industrial-grade hardware, combining FCC authority with Team Telecom expertise to mitigate threats while reducing uncertainty for operators.
Limit Licenses to Operators With Material Control
The FCC should also limit the number of entities who are required to receive licenses for submarine cable landing stations and connected infrastructure to entities with material operational control over physical cable systems. The NPRM’s proposal to require licenses for indefeasible right of use (IRU) holders and submarine line terminating equipment (SLTE) operators has drawn skepticism from some stakeholders because of regulatory costs without commensurate security benefits. A more targeted approach would focus on entities with operational control while addressing specific security concerns on a case-by-case basis.
Submarine cable projects require hundreds of millions of dollars in capital investment, so improving certainty for licensees ensures that investors can have confidence that projects can be completed on-time and within budget. These suggestions would strengthen the regulatory predictability without sacrificing security considerations, particularly when it comes to the equipment and providers supporting a new cable system.
Create Standardized Information Sharing Mechanisms
Streamlining and clarifying regulations would limit regulatory delays, but this does not mean compromising network security. To ensure submarine cable systems remain secure, the Commission should leverage its new Council on National Security as a clearinghouse for information sharing between relevant agencies, specifically the Commission and Team Telecom. The Council should prioritize creating a standardized portal where FCC licensing materials can coexist with Team Telecom disclosures. This would address industry concerns about duplicative processes while improving information access.
Establish Threat Intelligence Networks With Industry
Beyond sharing information for license review and approval, the Council should develop a two-way portal for sharing threat intelligence between private and public entities. Submarine cable systems face increasing physical and cyber threats, with recent reports linking cable-cutting attacks to foreign adversaries, such as the People’s Republic of China and Russia. A network for distributing information on current and emerging threats would help operators improve security protocols while providing government agencies with critical insights into attack patterns.
To anticipate and prevent potential security threats to cable infrastructure, the private and public sectors must work together. Reducing friction between various parties and encouraging greater cooperation on questions of security is valuable and will pay dividends over the long term. Whether threats are coming from nation states or a wayward fishing vessel, submarine cable system operators and their government counterparts need to know about them quickly to act decisively.
America’s Digital Edge Depends on Smart, Secure Cable Regulation
The security of our digital future depends on getting these regulations right. By creating standardized information sharing mechanisms, developing vendor security lists, limiting license requirements to entities with operational control, and establishing threat intelligence networks, the Commission can maintain America’s competitive edge in submarine telecommunications while protecting these vital assets from increasingly sophisticated threats. Submarine cables may be hidden beneath the ocean, but their importance to our national security and economic prosperity couldn’t be more visible.
About the Author: Joshua Levine
Joshua Levine is a Research Fellow of Technology Policy at the Foundation for American Innovation.
Image: Shutterstock
