A lack of domestic sites in which the United States can reprocess nuclear fuel will preclude reaping all of the benefits of nuclear energy.
Amid rising geopolitical tensions and the reshaping of energy alliances, a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability looms over Western nuclear power in the form of Russia’s virtual monopoly on re-enriching reprocessed uranium (RepU). This capability underpins the nuclear fuel cycles of key US allies and rivals alike, and the strategic implications for American energy security could hardly be more urgent.
Russia’s Unique Grip on Advanced RepU Re-enrichment
Russia operates the world’s only large commercial-scale facility capable of re-enriching RepU, the Seversk plant in Siberia, managed by Rosatom’s TVEL Fuel Company, with partial use of its 2.8 million SWU/year capacity. Spent nuclear fuel, after its first burn in a reactor, retains uranium with isotopic content too low for direct reuse. Reprocessing separates this RepU, but re-enriching it by converting uranium hexafluoride (UF6) from oxides and isotopically tailoring it to produce reactor-grade uranium (three to five percent) ready for reuse requires integrated infrastructure that only Seversk provides at scale.
This technical and infrastructural integration means that Moscow controls a critical chokepoint in global nuclear fuel supply chains, with substantial influence over countries that rely on RepU recycling, including France, which has historically sent large stocks for Russian processing despite persistent geopolitical frictions between the two countries.
The French Paradox: Diverse Uranium Supply, But Deep Dependence on Russia
France, boasting many nuclear power plants and considered a nuclear power cycle leader, sources uranium from Niger, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Australia, enriching and fabricating it mostly in-country.
Yet, when it comes to reprocessing recycled uranium, a vital piece in its closed fuel cycle model, the reality reveals a stark strategic exposure. France’s RepU stocks, stored mainly near Pierrelatte and exceeding 34,000 tons, have no domestic facility for large-scale conversion or re-enrichment, relying on Russian facilities. Instead, France relies significantly on Russia’s Seversk facility for re-enrichment under contracts signed in 2020, despite geopolitical tensions. While the United States and Europe pride themselves on diversified uranium procurement, their nuclear fuel sustainability fundamentally relies on Russian technology for RepU recycling.
For the United States, the stakes are existential. America’s nuclear fleet, the world’s largest with 94 reactors, operates on a “once-through” cycle of fuel in and waste out. Reprocessing was abandoned amid proliferation fears, leaving vast spent fuel pools and dry casks over 80,000 tons and counting. Partnerships like Orano aim to revive reprocessing, but scale remains elusive.
If America embraces closed fuel cycles for efficiency and waste reduction, it risks echoing France’s trap. Russia’s dominant position in RepU re-enrichment creates strategic leverage, which could be used for political or economic concessions, though direct evidence of that is limited.
Limited Recycling Options and Rising Nuclear Fuel Risks
France attempts to reuse some RepU by manufacturing MOX fuel (mixing plutonium with uranium extracted during reprocessing) to fuel reactors. However, once MOX fuel is used, further recycling is prohibitively difficult due to technical, economic, and regulatory constraints.
This leaves residual uranium and plutonium in spent nuclear fuel, classifying it eventually as high-level radioactive waste. Moreover, a significant portion of France’s RepU is sent to Russia, but some RepU is used domestically for MOX fuel fabrication or remains as waste.
Another portion is directed to MOX fabrication, and the remainder remains in spent fuel waste. After Russian re-enrichment, a group of highly radioactive isotopes (minor actinides) returns to France, requiring careful management and disposal.
Why the United States and the West Remain Strategically Exposed
The United States abandoned commercial reprocessing in 1977, the UK shut down its Sellafield facility, and Japan’s Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant has faced delays and limited operational status but is not fully abandoned. No Western nation currently operates reprocessing and RepU enrichment at scale. Russia, by contrast, pursued a full-cycle doctrine from mining to MOX fabrication, sustained by state investment and an export strategy that treats nuclear power as a geopolitical instrument.
Russia’s integrated state-controlled nuclear fuel cycle, which links mining, reprocessing, enrichment, and reactor supply, reflects a deliberate long-term strategy to dominate nuclear fuel production. Rosatom packages reactor sales with fuel cycle services to emerging markets, embedding durable fuel dependencies within them. Failure to develop indigenous RepU reprocessing and enrichment capacity leaves the West vulnerable to supply disruptions. If storage saturates, RepU could be reclassified as waste, undermining resource efficiency and supply chain security.
The Geopolitical Stakes: Recycling as the New Energy Battleground
In an energy future focused on resource efficiency and circularity, control over recycling chemistry and isotopic recovery translates directly into geopolitical leverage. Currently, that control lies with Russia, France, and arguably Japan if Rokkasho ever becomes operational. The United States is advancing plans for recycling technologies and collaborating with firms like Orano, though commercial maturity is distant. Meanwhile, China is developing a reprocessing capacity inspired by French technologies and targeting operational scale augmentation by 2030.
What the United States Must Do: Bold Investments in Nuclear Fuel Autonomy
To regain strategic autonomy, the United States must invest aggressively in developing domestic RepU recycling and enrichment technologies, scaling pilot projects into industrial operations. This entails advancing chemical conversion technologies, isotopic enrichment, and fuel fabrication while enhancing regulatory frameworks.
Such efforts must be coupled with international partnerships aligned with allied interests to diversify and secure nuclear fuel supply chains, breaking Russia’s chokehold and safeguarding America’s energy security in an increasingly fraught geopolitical environment.
Energy geopolitics is entering a new phase where nuclear fuel recycling, once a niche technical matter, is morphing into a strategic imperative. Russia’s exclusive hold on RepU re-enrichment represents a hidden vulnerability for the West that demands urgent policy focus and investment. Failing to build resilient RepU infrastructure risks ceding control over critical nuclear fuel cycles and, by extension, parts of the global energy future to rival powers. America’s national interest depends on confronting this challenge head-on before it becomes an insurmountable dependence.
The Clock Is Ticking On Nuclear Fuel
France’s RepU stockpile will reach saturation within years. The United States’ advanced reactors will soon demand fuel that cannot be sourced from existing Western capacity. China’s reprocessing plant will emerge as a competitor, potentially reshaping the global balance of nuclear power.
If Washington fails to act, a single plant in Siberia built decades ago, maintained through state-backed continuity, and operated under Russia’s geopolitical strategy, will remain a bottleneck the West cannot bypass. In nuclear geopolitics, the future belongs not only to those who can generate power but also to those who can recycle it. Right now, that list begins and ends with Russia.
Geopolitically, this fits Russia’s playbook. Rosatom, a state behemoth, views nuclear power as a full-cycle empire from mining, enrichment, and reactors to reprocessing. All are bundled together, allowing Russia to export lifelong dependencies. In a multipolar world, where China surges as a nuclear exporter, the West’s lag cedes influence to it. Beijing’s reprocessing ambitions, drawing on French tech, have positioned it as a rival gatekeeper. By 2030, a Sino-Russian duopoly could dominate recycled fuels, sidelining US firms like Westinghouse. Imagine a scenario where American allies, from Japan to South Korea, turn eastward for RepU services, eroding Washington’s Indo-Pacific pivot.
Washington must act with realist vigor. First, it should accelerate domestic reprocessing and fund pilots of nuclear reprocessing on a commercial scale, perhaps via public-private ventures. The Department of Energy’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program could expand to RepU tech. Second, the United States should foster alliances. Partner with France to build a Western RepU hub leveraging Orano’s expertise and new SMR technologies. Third, the United States should diversify geopolitically. Failing to act risks ceding control of critical nuclear fuel cycles to Russia and China, with broader implications for geopolitical influence and energy security.
As nuclear energy resurges amid climate and geopolitical challenges, ensuring autonomous nuclear fuel supply chains remains a strategic imperative.
About the Author: Stella Kim
Stella (SuHee) Kim is an investment and nuclear strategy expert with over a decade of experience bridging global finance and deep-tech, with a particular focus on small modular reactors (SMRs). She is the CEO of Pandia Bridge, a Singapore-based advisory firm that connects global investors and leading Korean conglomerates with top SMR developers, including NuScale Power, to facilitate cross-border investments and strategic partnerships. Her work centers on the intersection of energy security, technology innovation, and strategic finance on a global scale. She holds a BA from Ajou University in South Korea and participated in a study abroad program at the Luleå University of Technology in Sweden.
Image: Shutterstock/muph
