Russia has plans for two new aircraft carriers. It can’t afford to build the first, and it would be foolish to build the second.
Many people are familiar with Russia’s shambolic Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. The largely inoperable carrier is a relic of the final decade of the Soviet Union—and has defined the unrealized ambitions of Soviet and now, Russian naval strategists.
But the Russian yearning to be an aircraft carrier power like their American rivals remains strong. For a decade, in fact, the Russians have advertised their plan to build a new generation of aircraft carriers. But these aircraft carrier dreams are likely to collide with reality long before the ships leave the drawing board.
Russia’s Competing Aircraft Carrier Proposals
Back in 2020, the Barents Observer, a publication specializing in Russian military news, identified two competing programs as being the keys to understanding post-Soviet Russian aircraft carrier ambitions.
Project 11430E, the Lamantin, and its larger rival Project 23000 Shtorm, are the two main projects. In both instances, though, the Russians are at a significant disadvantage compared with their Western counterparts.
The Shtorm is the better of the two proposed aircraft carriers. But it is almost certain that the Russians lack the capacity to build this ship, given their concentration on producing systems relevant to winning the ongoing Ukraine War.
The Lamantin, meanwhile, has been dubbed by its supporters as being a smaller and cheaper—and therefore more realistic—new aircraft carrier design for the Russian Navy. Almost all acknowledge that the Lamantin is a compromise between the antiquity of the Admiral Kuznetsov and the high cost of the more complex, larger Shtorm. But the detractors of the Lamantin rightly point out that it still relies disproportionately on outdated systems for its operation. In short, even if Moscow funded the Lamantin, it is likely that the Russian Navy would find itself in precisely the same position it is in with the aging Admiral Kuznetsov.
For instance, as it is currently designed, the Lamantin relies on an antiquated STOBAR launch system for its aircraft. This system, in place on the Admiral Kuznetsov, requires the carrier to launch its planes via a ski-jump ramp on the front of the carrier—drastically cutting down their available takeoff weight, and consequently their range and effectiveness. Western systems overwhelmingly use the catapult-assisted CATOBAR system, launching planes via steam or electromagnetic catapults.
As Military Watch Magazine highlights, the Lamantin’s proposed STOBAR system was “an unusual choice not only because of the limitations it would impose on the takeoff weights of carrier based aircraft […] but also because Russia has been actively developing an electromagnetic launch system since at least 2018.” If the catapult system has been designed, why not use it?
The Shtorm is designed by the Krylov State Center. Back in 2019, when a model of the proposed carrier was first displayed at the St. Petersburg Military Exhibition, it was assumed that it’d take up to 12 years to develop the Shtorm. Now, with the Russians devoting all of their resources to the Ukraine conflict—a predominantly land and air war—the prospects that the gargantuan flat top will ever be built is slim.
The Shtorm would likely be powered either by RITM-200 or RITM-400 model nuclear reactors and would enjoy a top speed of around 30 knots (34 miles per hour). Because the Russians have prioritized their Arctic dominance strategy since 2008, Shtorm is designed with a unique ice-class hull—a capability not found on American carriers. The Russian Navy intends to place a robust airwing of around 70 to 90 aircraft on the Shtorm, which would likely include navalized versions of the MiG-29K and possibly the Su-57. Helicopters like the Ka-27 would be deployed for anti-submarine warfare missions, alongside early warning aircraft like the Yak-44.
The Shtorm’s flight deck would have a ramp along with an electromagnetic catapult. What’s more, the carrier would be able to defend itself with advanced systems, like the S-500 Prometheus air defense missile system, capable of engaging multiple targets at ranges of 372 miles. Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS) and anti-torpedo defenses would be used by the Shtorm as well.
By Focusing On Carriers, Moscow Misses the Mark
But Russia’s grand ambitions for becoming a dominant aircraft carrier power—much like its ambitions to become a major naval power throughout history—will likely never materialize. While the Russian defense industrial base is far more impressive today than the Western defense industrial base, Moscow will be unable to achieve success at longer-range, complex programs such as building a new aircraft carrier for the Russian Navy as long as it is embroiled in Ukraine.
One of Russia’s advantages over the West has been its ability to develop comparable weapons, such as artillery systems, at far lower cost due to efficient supply chains and economies of scale. This has helped it dominate its Western neighbors in armaments production, even though its overall spending is far lower. But there is no escaping the math on the construction of a new aircraft carrier: developing the Shtorm would cost nearly $20 billion, factoring in both the carrier’s construction and its aircraft development costs. Russia doesn’t have this kind of money to spend. And the Lamantin, while smaller and cheaper than the Shtorm, will not do much in the way of enhancing Russian naval power—especially because of its reliance on older systems.
Russia has always been a predominantly land-based power. Nothing will change that in the near future. The one area of naval power that Russia dominates is in the area of submarines. If it wants naval strength, Moscow should focus its efforts on these—and stop wasting its time on carriers.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / TebNad.
