In July, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two senior Taliban leaders, including Haibatullah Akhundzada, on charges of crimes against humanity related to gender persecution. The decision was significant, underscoring the Court’s willingness to pursue accountability in Afghanistan despite the Taliban’s control of state institutions. Yet, this focus on gender persecution represents only part of the broader landscape of atrocity crimes unfolding in the country.
A new report by the New Lines Institute provides detailed legal analysis suggesting that the Taliban, together with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), may be committing genocide against Afghanistan’s Hazara community. The report concludes that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the campaign of violence directed at the Hazara satisfies both the actus reus and mens rea elements of the crime of genocide as defined under the 1948 Genocide Convention.
The evidence documents killings of Hazara civilians in repeated attacks on mosques, schools, marketplaces, and passenger transport. Hazara children have been massacred in classrooms, commuters executed on public buses, and worshippers slaughtered in mosques. Beyond killings, the community has been subjected to serious bodily and mental harm through abductions, torture, and widespread sexual violence. There are also clear indications of deliberate efforts to impose conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s destruction, including forced displacement, denial of access to health care, and restrictions on religious practice.
The evidence also points to the existence of dolus specialis, or genocidal intent. The systematic nature of the targeting, the destruction of Hazara cultural and religious sites, and the repeated use of rhetoric portraying the Hazara as infidels or outsiders all indicate an intention to erase the community as such. Importantly, this violence cannot be viewed in isolation. It fits into a much longer historical trajectory of Hazara persecution dating back to the nineteenth century.
The History of the Hazara in Afghanistan
The Hazara have long occupied a precarious position in Afghanistan. In the 1890s, Amir Abdur Rahman Khan launched a campaign of extermination and forced displacement that killed an estimated 60 percent of the Hazara population. Many survivors were enslaved, and their lands confiscated. This period established a pattern of systemic discrimination and vulnerability that has endured into the modern era.
During the civil war of the 1990s, Hazaras again bore the brunt of targeted killings. The Taliban massacres in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998 left thousands of Hazara men and boys dead, with bodies left to rot in the streets. These atrocities occurred in parallel with systematic attempts to marginalize Hazara religious and political life, branding them as second-class citizens within their own country.
Today’s violence, therefore, continues a historical pattern. What distinguishes the present is that it is occurring under conditions of complete Taliban control. This places the Taliban in a position of state responsibility under international law for acts carried out on Afghan territory, whether by their own forces or by ISKP.
Taliban State Responsibility and the ICC
Although ISKP has claimed responsibility for many of the most visible mass casualty attacks, the Taliban’s role is central. They are directly implicated in certain acts and have consistently failed to prevent or punish atrocities committed by ISKP. Under Article I of the Genocide Convention, this amounts to a failure to uphold the state’s obligation to prevent genocide. By exercising effective control of the state, the Taliban cannot disclaim responsibility.
The ICC’s ongoing investigation into Afghanistan now includes charges related to gender persecution, marking an important legal development. However, the exclusion of the Hazara genocide risks creating the perception of a hierarchy of crimes, where some categories of victims are prioritized over others. International criminal justice must be universal in its application. The challenge for the ICC is not the absence of evidence but the political and resource constraints that often dictate which cases move forward. Without sufficient political pressure from member states, there is a risk that Hazara atrocities will remain underinvestigated.
Genocide and the Taliban Normalization Debate
While these legal debates unfold, a parallel policy discussion is underway among governments about whether to normalize relations with the Taliban. Advocates of engagement argue that recognition would create pathways for cooperation on counterterrorism, provide leverage to moderate Taliban behavior, and stabilize a region otherwise at risk of further fragmentation and instability. Humanitarian concerns are also cited, with some suggesting that recognition could help address Afghanistan’s severe economic crisis by opening channels of aid.
Yet there are significant risks to normalization under current conditions. Extending recognition to a regime implicated in mass atrocity crimes undermines the credibility of international norms that prohibit genocide and crimes against humanity. It risks signaling to other armed movements that seizing power by force, while perpetrating atrocities, does not preclude eventual international legitimacy. It may also alienate minority groups within Afghanistan, deepening divisions and fueling cycles of resistance and repression.
There is also a practical consideration. Recognition is unlikely to moderate Taliban behavior in the absence of enforceable conditions. Past experience with authoritarian regimes suggests that premature normalization often entrenches abuses rather than alleviating them. Conditioning engagement on verifiable improvements in human rights practices would provide a clearer framework for evaluating the Taliban’s willingness to change.
What Genocide Recognition Means for US Policy
For the United States, the situation presents a serious challenge. On one hand, Afghanistan no longer occupies the same strategic priority it once did. On the other hand, ignoring the atrocities unfolding against the Hazara undermines longstanding US commitments to atrocity prevention and human rights.
Several policy options are available. The United States could begin by formally acknowledging that there is credible evidence of genocide against the Hazara. While recognition is primarily symbolic, it would carry weight in shaping the discourse among allies and within multilateral institutions. Such recognition could also create momentum for further action at the United Nations, particularly within the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly.
The United States could use its position to press for independent United Nations-mandated investigations into atrocities against the Hazara. Support for such mechanisms would help preserve evidence, protect witnesses, and ensure that survivor testimony is not lost or compromised. Washington could also encourage the ICC to expand its ongoing Afghanistan case to include charges of genocide and ethnic or religious persecution.
Targeted sanctions are another tool. Imposing financial and travel restrictions on Taliban and ISKP commanders credibly implicated in atrocities would send a clear signal that accountability carries material consequences. These sanctions could be coordinated with European allies to maximize their impact.
In parallel, the United States could support the Hazara diaspora and civil society groups engaged in documentation and advocacy. Providing resources and technical assistance would strengthen the evidentiary base for future prosecutions while amplifying Hazara voices in international forums. Supporting the preservation of Hazara cultural heritage could also help mitigate the community’s erasure in the face of ongoing violence.
Finally, Washington should avoid premature normalization of relations with the Taliban. Engagement may be necessary for limited, functional issues, such as humanitarian aid delivery, but recognition or full diplomatic normalization should be contingent upon measurable improvements in the treatment of minorities and tangible steps toward accountability for past crimes. This approach would strike a balance between pragmatic concerns and the United States’ obligations under the Genocide Convention and its broader foreign policy principles.
The violence against the Hazara in Afghanistan cannot be dismissed as sporadic terrorism or collateral damage of insurgency. The pattern of attacks, the historical continuity of persecution, and the intent to destroy the community all point toward genocide. The ICC’s arrest warrants for Taliban leaders on charges of gender persecution mark an important step. Still, they also underscore the incomplete nature of international justice when entire communities remain excluded from the scope of accountability.
The debate over normalization with the Taliban further highlights the stakes. Recognition extended under current conditions risks legitimizing a regime implicated in genocide, undermining both international law and the credibility of the states that champion it.
For the United States, the Hazara case is a test of principle as much as it is a policy matter. By integrating atrocity prevention into its approach to Afghanistan, Washington can demonstrate that the norms it upholds in Ukraine, Myanmar, and elsewhere apply with equal force in Central Asia. The alternative, whether silence, inaction, or premature normalization, would leave the Hazara exposed to further destruction while weakening the international system designed to protect them.
The broader question, then, is not simply what is happening to the Hazara, but how the international community chooses to respond to it. The answer will reveal much about the durability of the post-war commitment to prevent and punish genocide, and whether those norms still carry weight in a world where regimes such as the Taliban rule with impunity.
About the Author: Azeem Ibrahim
Dr. Azeem Ibrahim OBE is a Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Senior Director at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, and author of Authoritarian Century: Omens of a Post-Liberal Order (Hurst: 2023).
Image: Solmaz Daryani / Shutterstock.com.
