The Hwasong-18 fundamentally upends the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula in North Korea’s favor.
There’s talk that President Donald Trump is prepared to resume the historic diplomacy with North Korea’s ruler, Kim Jong-un, that he had initiated during his first term.
The only problem facing Trump is that the geopolitical situation is much different than it was in his first term, with North Korea now the logistical hub of Russia’s war against Ukraine (and as a primary partner for China in the region). Meanwhile, with the rise of the left-wing government of Lee Jae-myung in South Korea—who seeks stability with Pyongyang and distance from Washington—North Korea has lost a major thorn in its side.
As for North Korea itself, its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities are lightyears beyond what they were in Trump’s first term. In other words, there is little incentive for Pyongyang to negotiate.
How Did North Korea Build a Top-Tier ICBM?
When one talks about North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and its threat to its neighbors—and increasingly to the United States—it is hard to imagine why Pyongyang would seek negotiations with America in the first place.
North Korea’s development of the Hwasong–18 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) represents a pivotal advancement in its military arsenal, underscoring the regime’s relentless pursuit of nuclear capabilities. First tested in April 2023, this solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM has been launched successfully multiple times, including in July and December 2023.
Unlike its liquid-fueled predecessors, the Hwasong-18’s design enhances survivability and launch readiness, posing a heightened threat to global security. Boasting formidable technical specifications that elevate North Korea’s strike potential, this three-stage missile launched from a transporter-erector launcher (TEL) vehicle, has an estimated range of around 15,000 kilometers (or 9,321 miles). When fired on a standard trajectory, this allows the Hwasong-18 to reliably reach any point in the continental United States from North Korean territory.
In lofted tests, the Hwasong-18 has achieved altitudes exceeding 6,000 kilometers (3,728 miles) with a flight time of more than an hour, demonstrating reliability and payload capacity. The solid-fuel propulsion is a critical upgrade: pre-loaded propellants eliminate the need for lengthy fueling processes, reducing launch preparation from hours to minutes and making preemptive strikes against it far more challenging.
It can potentially carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and decoys (because by at least 2013, we know that North Korea achieved vaunted miniaturization of their nuclear weapons capacity), complicating missile defenses by overwhelming interceptors.
While clearly inspired by Russian designs such as the Topol-M missile, evidence suggests that the Hwasong-18 was largely developed indigenously rather than copied from abroad. The missile’s features position it as North Korea’s most advanced ICBM to date, surpassing its liquid-fueled systems like the Hwasong-17.
Why the Hwasong-18 Missile Is So Dangerous
The missile constitutes a profound threat to the United States and its allies, primarily due to its ability to deliver nuclear warheads across vast distances with minimal warning. For the United States, it directly endangers the mainland, enabling Pyongyang to hold American cities hostage in a crisis and potentially deterring US intervention in regional conflicts. The solid-fuel advantage heightens vulnerability, as mobile launchers are harder to track via satellite, reducing the window for countermeasures.
Allies like South Korea and Japan face amplified risks, too. Shorter-range variants of the missile, or even tactical adaptations, could target bases in Seoul or Tokyo, where US forces are stationed. The threat extends beyond kinetic warfare: it fosters psychological deterrence, forces US allies to second-guess escalatory responses, and could potentially fracture alliances if US extended deterrence appears unreliable.
North Korea’s nuclear warfare doctrine, formalized in a 2022 law on nuclear forces policy, emphasizes preemptive and offensive use to safeguard the regime. While pledging not to transfer nuclear technology, it authorizes nuclear strikes if the leadership, command structure, or state sovereignty is perceived as threatened—even by non-nuclear means. This aggressive stance flatly rejects no-first-use commitments, allowing for early escalation from conventional to nuclear warfare to neutralize superior allied forces.
The Hwasong-18 Is Vital to North Korea’s Nuclear Strategy
Under Kim Jong-un, the doctrine has shifted toward assured retaliation and preemption, leveraging weapons like the Hwasong-18 for credible second-strike capabilities. It aims to deter invasion by imposing unacceptable costs, while constitutional amendments in 2023 enshrined nuclear development as a core state policy.
The Hwasong-18 fundamentally upends the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula in North Korea’s favor. Historically, South Korea and US forces held conventional superiority, but this ICBM provides Pyongyang with a survivable nuclear deterrent that inhibits preemptive allied actions. The Hwasong-18’s mobility and quick-launch features erode the allies’ intelligence advantages, complicating decapitation strategies and shifting the strategic calculus toward mutual vulnerability.
Because of this weapon, the last several years of smart geopolitical moves by North Korea since the end of Trump’s first term, and the recent political upheaval in South Korea, the strategic balance has shifted decisively in North Korea’s favor on the peninsula. The Hwasong-18 plays a key role in that shift.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / mwreck.
