Italy—a notoriously low NATO spender—had initially sought to classify the Strait of Messina Bridge, which would link its “boot” with the island of Sicily, as a military expense.
Last month, NATO provided clarifications on what constitutes “defense expenditures,” as the international military alliance has called upon its members to meet spending goals based on their respective gross domestic product (GDP). As the Heritage Foundation’s Wilson Beaver and Adam Kurzweil recently explained for The National Interest, NATO is divided as to how its members are addressing the spending commitments.
One group of nations—typically those in Eastern Europe—have enthusiastically embraced the spending goals, fearing the growing threat from neighboring Russia. Another block of nations will meet the goals in a timely but less robust fashion. A third group may struggle to reach the 5 percent of GDP threshold laid out by NATO. Finally, there is Spain, which has received an exemption from the spending benchmark, citing concerns about its domestic issues.
It is more than just the spending that should be seen as a concern. It is what the money is being spent on that has raised red flags with NATO leadership. US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said in an interview with Bloomberg this week that there is a concern that some members may resort to creative accounting in reaching the 5 percent benchmark—paying for fundamentally domestic, non-military projects, then claiming that the money was part of their defense spending.
Is a New Bridge “Defense Spending”? Italy Thinks So
Italy had initially sought to classify the Strait of Messina Bridge, which would link Italy’s “boot” with the island of Sicily, as a military expense. The €13.8 billion project, approved by the Italian government in August, will be the longest suspension bridge in the world if it is completed.
Ideas for a bridge linking Sicily to southern Italy have circulated for decades. The current plan was first unveiled in the 1990s, only to be canceled in 2006. It was then revived three years later, then canceled again in 2013 amid the Eurozone crisis.
Construction of the 3.6 km (2.2 mile) dual railway and automotive bridge is now set to begin later this year or early in 2026, with completion expected by 2032. Soon after NATO agreed to push defense spending among alliance members to five percent, Rome sought to position the project as “a strategic logistics corridor for rapid troop and equipment deployment to NATO’s southern flank.”
NATO’s bylaws do allow for 1.5 percent of the GDP benchmark to be spent on strategic infrastructure programs. Still, the Strait of Messina Bridge was described as an example of “opportunistic accounting.” When asked about the project, Whitaker acknowledged that he was “following this very closely.”
Rome has since stated that the bridge is “already financed” with state resources, and defense funds are not earmarked for the project. The Italian government has also faced pushback over the construction of the bridge, with opposition lawmakers suggesting money could be better spent on other critical infrastructure.
NATO Has Rules About What “Defense Spending” Is
NATO has already established guidelines on how funds can be allocated towards domestic programs.
“They will account for up to 1.5% of GDP annually to inter alia protect critical infrastructure, defend networks, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, innovate, and strengthen the defence industrial base,” an August statement from the alliance explained.
Beyond direct military hardware acquisitions, defense spending can include “retirement pensions made directly by the government to retired military and civilian employees of military departments,” as well as “expenditures for the military component of mixed civilian-military activities… but only when the military component can be specifically accounted for or estimated.”
That included airfields, meteorological services, aids to navigation, bridges, roads, and ports, and even cybersecurity and energy pipeline projects. Experts have warned that the “defense and security-related investment” segments are overly vague and could even be open to national interpretation.
Yet a look at a map could help clarify what is justified and what is not. A bridge linking Poland and Lithuania might reasonably be described as “defense spending,” given the bridge’s likely utility in a future military conflict in Eastern Europe. But Italy’s bridge would be pushing this to the extreme—especially since Sicily was last invaded during the Second World War, and not by the Soviet Union.
“With diverse traditions of civil preparedness across member states, this risks creative accounting and opportunistic prioritisation, while hampering cooperation,” analysts at Germany’s Bertelsmann Stiftung think tank told EuroNews in June.
“If the 1.5% target fails to deliver measurable improvements in European resilience, it could backfire and strain transatlantic trust,” the analysts warned. “NATO should establish a structured capability planning process mirroring its defence capability planning process, with clear alliance-wide objectives.”
About the Author: Peter Suciu
Peter Suciu has contributed over 3,200 published pieces to more than four dozen magazines and websites over a 30-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a contributing writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. He is based in Michigan. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: [email protected].
Image: Shutterstock / Alessia Pierdomenico.
