Moscow’s hybrid war strategy in the Caucasus is beginning to crumble, as countries in the region have begun to find their voice.
Russia is unhappy with its neighbors and expressing displeasure with increasing energy costs. Seeking to secure a measure of independence from their big neighbor to the north, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus are forming new relationships and alliances that Moscow has no control over. Baku and Astana, with the region’s largest economies, are the latest victims to feel the brunt of Moscow’s retaliatory hybrid pressure.
Russia’s most recent moves draw from a tried-and-true playbook of coercion that seeks to disrupt Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sectors — the lifeblood of their economies. Using guided drones, Russia twice struck and destroyed the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan’s (SOCAR) oil terminal in Odessa, contaminated pipeline crude shipments, and coerced Kazakhstan back to oil transfer dependence on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).
What is striking is not Moscow’s aggression but the mounting resilience and pushback by the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Since independence in 1991, Russia has leveraged geography, infrastructure, and legacies to keep its neighbors tethered to Russia’s transit architecture, markets, and political direction. Now, however, Baku, Astana, Tashkent, and the other capitals are charting new courses that seek to counter Moscow’s leverage. While Russia may have innovated its hybrid tactics, its former dependencies no longer see themselves as hostages.
Russia Ups the Pressure
Energy remains perhaps Russia’s most potent lever of influence in the post-Soviet space. By targeting Azerbaijan’s oil depots and the facilities that support Ukraine and supply Europe, Moscow sent a clear threat to Baku’s growing economy and expanding energy and transit footprint. The alleged contamination of Azerbaijani oil shipments mirrors earlier Russian efforts to sabotage the integrity of rival energy corridors. Forcing Kazakhstan to reroute its crude back into the CPC system underlines how Moscow uses legacy infrastructure chokepoints to constrain its neighbors’ strategic options.
Kazakhstan’s case is illustrative. For years, Astana sought to diversify exports via Azerbaijan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to Türkiye. In response, several times, Russia throttled the CPC pipeline, which transits ninety percent of Kazakhstan’s oil and comprises a significant portion of the country’s GDP. When Russia poisoned Azerbaijan’s pipeline, Kazakhstan was en passant forced into halting trans-Caspian oil shipments, in a blunt reminder of how Moscow manipulates access that was not lost on Astana. Yet the language since used by Kazakhstan’s President Tokayev speaks to both resentment at Russia and states a resolve to break from the old dependency cycle and resume pumping oil through Azerbaijan.
Hybrid Aggression
Moscow’s tactics extend beyond hydrocarbons. Armenia has faced a torrent of Russian disinformation aimed at undermining Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan after his government’s pivot away from Moscow. The corruption scandals amplified by Russian media channels are not accidental but tools of hybrid warfare, designed to delegitimize a government that dares to seek sovereignty.
Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia, too, have felt Moscow’s retaliatory sting. Central Asian migrant workers in Russia are facing rising hostility and violence, fueled in part by Kremlin-linked narratives. This form of coercion involving weaponizing the migrant diaspora pressures Central Asian capitals by threatening social instability at home, as remittances shrink and migrants return under duress. Tashkent, with more migrant laborers in Russia, has sought to both bring migrants home as well as find other host countries. These methods are neither new nor subtle, but they are increasingly counterproductive reminders, pushing states to seek alternatives.
The Regional Response
What is changing is the resilience of the region. Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine sparked widespread concern in former Soviet capitals, but the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and the threat of secondary sanctions have incentivized states to diversify away from doing business with Moscow. Central Asian states, long adept at balancing “multi-vector” foreign policies, have found collective strength in resisting Moscow’s attempts to dominate.
Presidents Tokayev of Kazakhstan and Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan have been outspoken in their efforts to coordinate policies with neighbors as well as to deepen ties with the EU, China, the United States, and other partners and investors. Rather than quietly abiding Russian pressure, Central Asia in particular has actively sought to leverage partnerships as a hedge against coercion.
Emblematic of this trend was the creation of the Middle Corridor, an east-west trade route that connects Central Asia across the Caspian through the South Caucasus to Europe that avoids transit connectivity through Russia. Initially conceived as a sanction-bypassing mechanism, it has evolved into a strategic project of regional emancipation and unification. By shifting trade routes south and west, Central Asia and the South Caucasus have loosened Moscow’s grip on their economies and enhanced ties with Europe and Asia simultaneously.
Importantly, the recent steps toward reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan have opened the possibility of extending this corridor further. A linked Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey route would not only cement their economic sovereignty and contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation but also reshape regional connectivity and greatly diminish Russia’s historical centrality.
Moscow’s Shrinking Toolkit
Moscow’s methods today have changed little from the 1990s and 2000s: pipeline sabotage, trade blockades, disinformation, and diaspora manipulation. Back then, these tools generally yielded compliance. But now the geopolitical environment has shifted. Infrastructure like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, new port facilities on the Caspian Sea, and investments in rail and road links have created alternatives that did not exist two decades ago.
Central Asia is also increasingly acting as a bloc. Leaders have recognized that unity increases their leverage against Moscow’s divide-and-rule tactics. While the government in Georgia still cleaves to Moscow, the fledgling reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan appears likely to act in complementary ways that diverge from Russian policy.
Russia’s credibility is also heavily tarnished. The war in Ukraine, its weaponization of energy against Europe, and its erratic behavior toward allies have stripped Russia of any appearance of reliability. Former partners no longer mistake dependence for security.
The evolving dynamic between Armenia and Azerbaijan underscores Russia’s waning influence. For years, Moscow thrived on provoking regional animosity, often acting as a dissembling mediator that effectively prolonged the conflict. But with the emerging peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku, both states are seeing new opportunities in connectivity and trade that bypass Russia. For Azerbaijan, deepening links westward complement its energy and trade ambitions as a crossroads cornerstone. For Armenia, opening trade routes reduces its isolation, ends a crippling frozen conflict, and creates room for integration beyond Moscow’s shadow.
Policy and the Future
For policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo, the shift underway represents an opportunity. The Middle Corridor, once a technical trade route, is becoming the backbone of Eurasian resilience, creating access that obviates engagement with Moscow. Supporting its development through financing, infrastructure guarantees, and political backing can further accelerate the decoupling of the region from Russia’s coercive clutch.
Moreover, the new assertiveness of South Caucasus and Central Asian leaders has highlighted the need for nuanced engagement. These states are not choosing to participate in a zero-sum game between Moscow, Beijing, and the West—they are choosing autonomy. External partners that respect this balancing act, while offering long-term and concrete benefits, will gain durable influence.
Russia’s recent sabotage of Azerbaijani pipelines, its coercion of Kazakhstan, and its disinformation campaigns in Armenia and Central Asia fit a pattern as old as the post-Soviet space itself. Hybrid pressure, infrastructure control, and political meddling remain Moscow’s trademarks. But regional pushback is growing stronger. For the first time since independence, the states of the Middle Corridor region are systematically and collectively developing the means to resist. Absent Russian engagement, they are building corridors, forging partnerships, reconciling rivalries, and pursuing sovereignty not as aspiration but as practice.
Moscow still wields dangerous tools, and the risks of escalation remain. Yet the balance is shifting. The more Russia seeks to tighten its grip, the more its neighbors seek escape routes. In this contest, the future of Eurasia will be determined not by the persistence of Russian coercion, but by the durability of the region’s resistance.
About the Author: Eric Rudenshiold
Dr. Eric Rudenshiold is a Senior Fellow at the Caspian Policy Center, a former National Security Council Director for Presidents Trump and Biden, and an adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies. He holds a BA from Drake University and an MA and Ph.D. from the University of Virginia.
Image: Shutterstock/AS project
