The politicization of energy in South Korea cannot be allowed to hold the country’s energy transition policies hostage.
South Korea has launched a massive drive for artificial intelligence. The Lee Jae-myung administration has laid out a vision to position South Korea among the world’s “Top Three AI Powerhouses” and is investing heavily in the infrastructure needed to make this possible. In October, Amazon Web Services announced a $5 billion investment to build large-scale AI data centers in South Korea — an important step that will accelerate the country’s AI ambitions while strengthening data sovereignty. That same month, NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang committed to supplying more than 260,000 GPUs, a critical boost that will not only power next-generation data centers but also expand South Korea’s computing capacity for everything from advanced machine learning to autonomous systems.
Yet one fundamental question remains unresolved: where will the energy come from to power it? AI data centers and advanced compute infrastructure require vast, uninterruptible power. South Korea’s electricity demand is projected to climb by over 31 GW by 2038, equal to building more than 30 additional nuclear reactors to meet the load. This demand must be met even as South Korea undertakes the equally daunting task of eliminating carbon emissions by 2050.
Yet as the country confronts this critical challenge, South Korea’s energy debate has become highly politicized. Progressives have tended to adopt a strong anti-nuclear position, while conservatives have been skeptical of renewable energy. Both approach energy policy less as a problem of infrastructure planning and more as a domain of political identity and partisan contestation.
Today’s progressive government is prioritizing renewable energy while scaling back its support for nuclear power. President Lee Jae-myung stated in September 2025 that “nuclear energy cannot meet rapidly rising electricity demand,” arguing that new nuclear plants take too long to build and that small modular reactors (SMRs), while faster to deploy, are not yet commercially viable. He has instead pledged to accelerate investment in renewable energy, particularly solar and wind. The administration has signaled a halt to new nuclear plant construction and postponed a decision on extending the operation of Kori-2, a 40-year-old reactor seeking approval for an additional 40–60 years of operation.
Although Lee has not embraced a full nuclear phase-out as former President Moon Jae-in did, his administration reflects a deeply rooted anti-nuclear current within South Korea’s progressive camp. This outlook is captured in remarks by Energy Minister Kim Seong-hwan, who stated, “It is an objective fact that nuclear power plants carry risks,” adding, “Even if they are 99.99 percent safe, it is appropriate to emphasize the dangers of nuclear power because of that remaining 0.01 percent.”
Several factors help explain this trend. One is the legacy of past corruption scandals surrounding South Korea’s powerful nuclear industry, which severely undermined public trust. In May 2013, two reactors — Shin-Kori Unit 2 and Shin-Wolsong Unit 1 — were forced offline following a major scandal involving falsified nuclear plant components. The controversy was widely attributed to the influence of what the progressives called the “nuclear mafia” — a tightly connected network of nuclear elites linked by shared academic and personal ties—dominating key posts and lucrative contracts across industry, academia, and regulatory institutions. Another driver is the broader global current of anti-nuclear sentiment among environmental advocates, rooted in concerns over radiological risk and long-term safety.
While these are legitimate concerns, they are not, on their own, sufficient reasons to abandon nuclear energy altogether. Corruption in the nuclear industry is a sociopolitical failure — not an inherent flaw in nuclear technology — and can be addressed through stronger regulations, oversight, and institutional reform. Nuclear accidents are possible, but the environmental risks should be assessed objectively and weighed against those of other energy sources. As Germany’s experience has shown, phasing out nuclear power can lead to greater reliance on fossil fuels and higher emissions. Also, safety concerns could serve as a catalyst for accelerating the development and deployment of SMRs, which offer significant safety enhancements over conventional reactors. Dismissing nuclear energy outright on the basis of problems that can be mitigated risks prioritizing perception over evidence, rather than grounded, objective assessment.
By contrast, conservative leaders have strongly backed nuclear power while adopting a far more skeptical stance on renewables. President Yoon Suk Yeol reversed the Moon administration’s nuclear phase-out policy and approved the construction of two new nuclear reactors. His government has also sharply reduced financial support for renewable energy, nearly halving low-interest loan programs for solar and wind projects compared to two years earlier — prompting concern that the pace of renewable deployment could slow significantly. In response to alleged violations and a few corruption cases involving solar developers during the previous administration, Yoon has repeatedly framed the solar sector — and at times renewable energy policy more broadly — as an “interest cartel corruption scheme,” a narrative critics argue risks discrediting the industry as a whole.
Some conservative figures have gone further, framing support for renewable energy as de facto support for China. In attacking Moon’s renewable energy agenda, conservatives promoted a narrative that portrayed progressives as “using renewable projects to import Chinese components and siphon off public subsidies through a cartel.” During the 2022 presidential race, several conservatives attacked Lee Jae-myung’s solar expansion pledge as a giveaway to Chinese manufacturers. People Power Party leader Lee Jun-seok mocked Lee Jae-myung’s proposal to install solar-powered shade canopies at highway rest stops, writing on social media, “At a time like this, is it really necessary to make a campaign promise that benefits Chinese solar panel companies?”
This is a flawed argument. By the same logic, supporting electric vehicles would also have to be labeled “pro-China,” given that many critical EV components are sourced from China — an absurd conclusion few would entertain. Rather than pushing to localize supply chains and strengthen industrial competitiveness, rejecting solar power on this basis reveals a position shaped more by ideology than by serious economic strategy.
This partisan divide is not limited to politicians — it is also evident in the media. An analysis of 580 editorials published in six major South Korean newspapers between May 2017 and March 2022 found that all three conservative outlets took a strongly pro-nuclear stance, opposing nuclear phase-out in 98 percent of their editorials, while the three progressive and centrist outlets supported nuclear phase-out in 80 percent of theirs. This same partisan cleavage continues to define the politics of renewable energy in South Korea.
In reality, both nuclear and renewable energy come with significant constraints. Solar and wind are increasingly cost-competitive but still remain expensive and intermittent. Grid-scale storage remains far from mature. South Korea, with limited land, inconsistent sun exposure, weak wind resources, and — critically — no grid interconnections with neighboring states, cannot balance supply by importing electricity like Germany or France.
Nuclear power is reliable and ultimately cost-efficient, but reactors require staggering upfront investment and long construction timelines. SMRs promise flexibility and safety but are not yet fully developed, and it would take a while to be deployable at scale. And while nuclear accidents are low-probability events, they carry a high-impact risk, and thus remain a reality no policymaker can responsibly ignore.
Despite these limitations, governments and tech companies around the world are turning to both nuclear and renewable energy to power the AI race. At the 2023 Conference of the Parties (COP28), 22 countries pledged to triple global nuclear energy capacity by 2050. Amazon and Google are investing in the development of SMRs to supply electricity to their data centers. Meta, by contrast, is doubling down on renewables, having recently signed major solar and wind power agreements to support its data center operations. Some countries, including Germany, are leveraging AI to accelerate renewable energy integration into their national power grids.
Debates over South Korea’s energy policy should focus on these fundamentals—not on distractions that obscure the core challenge. Ultimately, energy is just energy. The real questions are straightforward: Can it power AI at scale? Can South Korea afford it? Which energy sources best align with the country’s needs? Can technological advances help overcome the limitations of those sources? And can all of this be achieved safely and sustainably?
South Korea’s AI ambitions — critical to its future competitiveness — are too important to be hijacked by political quibbles.
About the Author: Lami Kim
Dr. Lami Kim is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, a US Department of Defense Institute based in Hawaii. Until recently, she served as an Associate Professor and Director of the Asian Studies Program in the Department of National Security and Strategy at the US Army War College. Prior to that, she served as a research fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, the Wilson Center, Pacific Forum, and the Stimson Center. She holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a master’s degree from Harvard University.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Department of War (formerly the US Department of Defense) or the US Government.
Image: Shutterstock/ivosar
