Irrespective of what one thinks of Israel’s actions from a moral standpoint, the facts are clear from a strategic standpoint. Israel’s massive bombing campaign against Gaza simply isn’t working.
The Israel Defense Force (IDF) is a legendary fighting force in the Middle East. Having withstood multiple, existential wars with their Arab neighbors, securing their ability to thrive in an otherwise hostile part of the world, Israel has relied upon its small but strong military to maintain its status as the region’s only predominantly Jewish democracy.
However, since the start of Israel’s justified response to the ghastly Iran-backed Hamas terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023, the IDF has found itself in an endless cycle of inconclusive, gruesome warfare in the Gaza Strip.
No one really knows how this ends. Israeli leaders insist that it will end with the destruction of Hamas as a terrorist organization. Great. But what are the metrics for achieving this? And how badly degraded is Hamas really?
And with the recent news that Israel is calling up 60,000 more troops to deploy into Gaza and, in the words of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “take over” the Gaza Strip, how can one expect the conflict to ever end? Reports suggest that those 60,000 troops will establish checkpoints with facial recognition software to identify all residents of Gaza. After those residents are entered into an Orwellian database, they will then be allowed access to humanitarian aid. But whether Israel deploys 60,000 or 100,000 IDF troops to permanently occupy Gaza, the idea that they will be able to manage that region while totally destroying Hamas is ridiculous. The IDF is overstretched as-is—and its foray into Gaza was, unfortunately, nowhere near as effective as the Israeli government has proclaimed in public.
Why the Massive Bombings of Gaza?
Irrespective of what one thinks of Israel’s actions from a moral standpoint, the facts are clear from a strategic standpoint. Israel’s massive bombing campaign against Gaza simply isn’t working.
To make matters worse, the continued aerial blitz is now threatening to upend Israel’s strategic place in the region and the world. The Global South is rallying against Jerusalem, aligning—however nominally—with the position of Iran and its allied proxies. Even China and Russia, usually neutral on matters of Israel, seem to be drifting toward Iran’s side of the fight. This is to say nothing of Turkey, which is clearly making bold moves to reorder the Middle East in its own image.
In the run-up to Israel moving against Hamas in Gaza for its terrorist attack on October 7, 2023, the talk among Israeli military leaders and defense experts around the world was how the IDF would pursue a door-to-door, counterterrorism campaign. In this view, the attack on Hamas in the Gaza Strip would be akin to the Second Battle of Fallujah in 2004—in which United States Marines freed that city from the clutches of al-Qaeda in Iraq who’d taken it hostage. They did this not only by hunting down the jihadists, but by taking pains to ensure the safety of the civilian population.
Before the 10/7 Hamas attacks on Israel, a survey was conducted that determined 67 percent of all Palestinians living in Gaza had “little or no trust” in Hamas, the ruling faction of the Gaza Strip. In the wake of Israel’s massive wave of attacks directed against Hamas in Gaza, though, 70 percent of Palestinian Arabs polled in Gaza said they supported Hamas.
Why? Because the Israeli strategy fell apart almost as soon as they made contact with Hamas in Gaza, as war plans so often do.
The door-to-door campaign did not work. In fact, it had scarcely been tried before the Israelis began resorting to mass bombings. This negated the key element required for a successful Fallujah-style attack: it jeopardized the civilian population, turning them irrevocably against the Israelis and ensuring a steady stream of new fighters for Hamas to replace their battlefield losses.
For all the talk about the “surgical” nature of Israel’s airstrikes, the fact of the matter is Gaza is flattened. Israel’s reputation on the world stage has been dragged through the mud; it risks becoming a pariah because many observers believe that Israel wants to ethnically cleanse Gaza. A nation that should have been the recipient of the world’s sympathy after an unprovoked and gruesome terrorist attack is now at risk of the world’s undying enmity.
It should not be this way. Part of the reason it is now this way is due to the failure of Israeli war policies.
And Israel has failed to achieve its stated strategic objectives. In the opening days of the war, Jerusalem made it clear that it wanted to destroy Hamas and return the hostages. Hamas has been damaged, perhaps even devastated, by the war. But the tactics the Israelis have used have likely harmed whatever endgame Israeli leaders had conceived of. Worse still, the hostages have not yet all been returned.
Yet, the Israelis keep blasting away, as though all these things are happening in a vacuum.
The IDF Needs a New Way of Doing Things
Israel has experienced what every modern, Western military is being made to endure. The way of warfare that the West has become accustomed to is in dire need of change, whether it be Israel’s inability to fight a Fallujah-style campaign or it be America’s incapacity to annihilate the Houthi rebels from the air.
All Western militaries are clearly in a rut. They are stuck in the way we operated to win the conflicts of the twentieth century. The enemies of the West have adapted to that old style of fighting; they have started pooling their resources together, in ways that planners in Washington and Jerusalem are simply unable to understand.
These enemies no longer fear Israeli or even American military reprisals. Given the poor performance of the Israeli military in doing a Fallujah-style campaign with minimal losses of life, Jerusalem should basically pull its forces back and retool them. No one wants to do that right now. But if Israel continues employing the same tactics it has always employed, it will surely lose.
Israel won’t just lose in Gaza, though. With its defensive perimeter overstretched, the Netanyahu government risks exhausting the Israeli military so much that it becomes susceptible to Iranian—and possibly even Turkish—attacks. Israel is running out of time to adapt to the new environment before the environment slaps back. And such a slap may be the end of the Israeli national project.
Most counterinsurgencies end in negotiated settlements. By all indications, Hamas, a jihadist terror group, has no intention of negotiating a permanent end to the war. So negotiations will not work. Neither will an open-ended bombing campaign against the rubble of Gaza. Neither will an open-ended occupation of the territory. Establishing a defensive line separating itself from Gaza is probably the first step toward real defense for Israel. More steps will be needed.
But one thing is clear: invading, occupying, and terrorizing the shattered Palestinian population of Gaza will do nothing to bring long-term peace or security. Israel needs a new strategy.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / ImageBank4u.
