The United States still has the ability to keep the Russia-India relationship from expanding.
Russian president Vladimir Putin arrives in New Delhi on December 4 for two days of talks in the 23rd annual India-Russia Summit. He will be greeted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a bear hug, and Russia will be hailed as India’s “best friend” or some equivalent verbiage. But this will be nothing new. When he first became prime minister in 2014, Modi remarked at a BRICS meeting with Putin that “Every child in India knows that Russia is our best friend.” Modi has continued to use various verbal formulations of this supposed superlative Russian relationship with India whenever he has met with Putin, and this meeting will be no different.
Modi’s “best friend” view of Russia has strong popular and, therefore, political support in India. According to a 2023 Pew Research Center study, “Indians stand out on overall favorability of Russia as the only place among the 24 countries surveyed this year where majorities say they have a favorable opinion of Russia and have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin.” A recent report from the Center for Naval Analysis indicates that, in some aspects, Russia-India relations have actually improved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
In spite of President Donald Trump’s up-and-down relationship with Putin, Russia remains, at best, a strategic competitor of the United States. Further, Trump’s recent treatment of India is likely to have strengthened, not weakened, India-Russia ties. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s renewed confrontation with a liberal world order show that a “best friend” deference to Putin’s Russia constitutes a significant challenge to closer cooperation between the world’s two largest democracies.
If this challenge is to be overcome, it is important to appreciate that the close India-Russia relationship is rooted in fundamental Indian foreign policy values of independence, non-interference, and Indian greatness rather than the oft-cited factors of Cold War history, arms sales, and oil. These values presently take precedence not only over the oft-cited factors but also over other such Indian values of democracy, rule of law, and peace. If the United States and India are to return to the path toward closer cooperation, it is incumbent on both to re-examine these values and factors as they affect their relationship.
After two centuries of British imperial rule, the major preoccupation of independent India’s foreign policy was securing and maintaining independence. This fixation was not only on freedom from the former colonial power but also on freedom from any outside power that might dominate India. Since the United States was the leading nation left standing at the time of Indian independence and a chief ally of Britain, it was quite natural that India’s chief concern would be domination by the United States. The instinct for independence was so strong that, on occasion, India was inclined to take policy stands not in its own interests but to demonstrate its independence. Although India is now a powerful nation in no danger of foreign domination, the instinct for independence from the United States and the democratic world order, often referred to as “the West,” remains.
A concomitant value to India’s absolute stance on independence has been an insistence on non-interference. This is not limited to strategic or economic matters but extends to criticism from other nations. Particularly upsetting to Indian policymakers has been foreign criticism of the quality or functioning of its governance. Criticisms concerning Indian treatment of minorities are also particularly galling, as are comments on economic weaknesses.
Underlying the values of absolute independence and non-interference is a belief in Indian greatness, and a concomitant drive for a world order defined by “multipolarity” with India as one of the poles. Fueled by the experience of imperialism, Indian foreign policy has a strong streak of grievance and balks at what it perceives as disrespect to its great power status. Although self-confidence has grown over the years as Indian achievements have become more evident, there is still concern that India is not given pride of place on the international stage. Some Indian actions, such as its nuclear weapons program, seem driven as much by demonstrating “greatness” as by hard strategic considerations.
Each of these values points India toward a “best friend” relationship with Russia. This relationship is a strong demonstration of independence from previous colonial masters and the West. Russia’s non-interference is demonstrated by its lack of criticism of India’s governance and its refusal to impose conditions on Indian arms purchases. Russian “best friend” status furthers India’s sense of “greatness” by aligning with India’s multipolar preferences. Treating Russia as a “best friend” enhances Russia’s status as a “pole” of the world order. Having Russia as a “best friend” also seems to imply Indian equality with Russia and establishes India as another “pole” in world affairs alongside other great nations.
The actual history of Russo-Indian relations is mixed. Russia sided with China when China invaded India in 1962. Still, this national memory was largely erased when Russia sided with India in the 1971 war with Pakistan and was especially critical of the United States for sending an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal during the conflict. Russia lauded India for refusing to side with the Western democracies through its policy of “non-alignment.” Lessening the importance of this history is the fact that the Cold War has been over for more than 30 years. During that period, India’s strategic and economic interests changed dramatically.
More importantly, the Soviet Union was willing to sell arms to India when the West was not. This has resulted in the Indian military having a legacy dependence on Russian arms and defense technology, often sold without conditions. However, the Indian defense establishment has become increasingly concerned about over-dependence on Russia. Russian arms sales to India have declined, and India has increasingly looked to the West for advanced defense technology, which, in many cases, is superior to that offered by Russia.
Cheap oil is often cited as a third factor in supporting India’s “best friend” assessment of Russia. While oil at below market prices may be buttressing the relationship at present, the “best friend” assessment was established long before cheap oil from Russia became available after the start of the Ukraine War and the onset of Western sanctions in early 2022. However important cheaper oil may have been to the fortunes of some Indian refineries, the overall impact on India’s economy has been small. There is plenty of oil available on international markets, and the cost savings from Russian oil pale in comparison to the size of the Indian economy.
At this point, the Trump administration’s policies and actions seem to reinforce each of the values that have driven India toward Russia. The heavy-handed “my way or the highway” approach on tariffs, sanctions, visas, and Pakistan shows little respect for Indian values of independence and non-interference, much less respect for India as a great power. The United States has meaningful ways to turn each of the factors of history, arms, and oil to its advantage, as well as the values of democracy, the rule of law, and peace. Still, these cannot be effective so long as the Trump administration deals with India on a transactional basis rather than the relationship-building policies that have characterized US-India interaction for the last three decades.
About the Author: Raymond Vickery
Raymond Vickery is a senior associate (non-resident) for the Chair on India and India Emerging Asia Economies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He is a former US assistant secretary of commerce.
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