Israel’s doctrine of proactive deterrence destabilizes its surroundings to the detriment of long-term security.
Israel’s direct attacks on Iran shows again that it is willing to conduct multiple wars at once on its perceived adversaries. Recently, it has also been at war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it is still currently at war with Hamas in Gaza and the Houthis in Yemen.
This is not to mention repeated strikes on the old military stockpiles of the deposed Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad. Yet, before a country goes to war, no matter what the original provocation, it should have a clear idea of the objectives that the war is intended to fulfill. This strategic thinking appears to be lacking in Israel’s conduct.
In general, throughout Israel’s history, it has achieved considerable tactical military success—at times even brilliance—but without strategic competence. This conclusion should probably be unsurprising, given that since the early 1970s, it has been a client state of the United States, whose national security policy exhibits the same qualities and deficiencies.
Also, both countries have overinvested in technologically and operationally superior militaries at the expense of other tools of statecraft—diplomacy, economic engagement, cultural expansion, and, above all else, strategic vision. And as the old cliché goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
It is also no shock that after a dramatically successful attack by an adversary, both countries responded with flailing incoherence. President George W Bush responded to Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks by declaring a “global war on terrorism” (GWOT). This helped build the case (along with suspect intelligence) to invade a country that had nothing to do with the 9/11 strikes—Iraq. Such an inchoate policy fueled more terrorism, worldwide condemnation of America, and two failed military interventions.
Similarly, even after President Joe Biden warned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to repeat the disastrous escalatory mistakes of the American GWOT, his government has proceeded to conduct a multiple-front war on Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran.
Israel’s supporters will argue that as a besieged nation surrounded by enemies, Israel needs to be proactive (aggressive) to achieve deterrence—and that has been Israel’s modus operandi for decades. But what has been achieved? Israel, like the United States, experiences seemingly perpetual wars while transforming into a garrison state at home.
Yet Israel’s boosters, after Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, like the American neoconservatives after 9/11, thirsted for revenge and more. The leaders of both countries should have conducted measured retaliation for the attacks by using their militaries to capture or kill the respective leaders of Al Qaeda and Hamas—to satiate the understandable public desire for action—and left it there. Instead, both countries escalated the war geographically and then proceeded to devastate Afghanistan and Iraq in the case of the United States and Gaza in the case of Israel.
In both cases, the aggressive leaders benefited politically from an expanded war: Bush took out Saddam Hussein and won reelection in 2004. Netanyahu’s perpetual wars keep his hawkish governing coalition together and himself out of jail. With such domestic rewards for escalation abroad, how can leaders be expected to act with restraint and work to identify the causes of the conflicts that beset them?
Israeli air strikes probably won’t destroy all of Iran’s nuclear program. However, by attempting to do so, Israel will give Iran’s hardliners all the justifications they need to race for a nuclear weapon. Similarly, the bombing campaign is unlikely to unseat Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, given the rally-around-the-flag effect that occurs in most countries under military attack. And even if the despotic Khamenei were deposed or killed, the nuclear program would probably continue, given its widespread support in Iran. This is unsurprising, given that a hostile Israel has nuclear weapons and has just attacked the country.
After the October 7 attack, Netanyahu should have conducted a more limited military response and then used the crisis to seek to solve the underlying cause of the attack by negotiating a solution that offered a viable Palestinian state. That he didn’t demonstrates Israel’s continuing strategic myopia.
About the Author: Ivan Eland
Ivan R. Eland is a Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute’s Center on Peace & Liberty. He is the author of War and the Rogue Presidency. He tweets at @Ivan_Eland.
Image: Davidi Vardi / Shutterstock.com.
