Despite speculation, Russia’s depleted military, logistical limits, and diplomatic priorities make a Central Asia invasion highly unlikely, especially as the region maintains strategic balance between Russia, China, and the West.
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drags into its third year, analysts have speculated whether Vladimir Putin might turn his sights elsewhere. While most concern has focused on Europe, some have pointed to Central Asia, a part of Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, as a possible next target. Despite Central Asia’s rising geopolitical importance, however, a Russian military incursion into the region remains unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Russia Could Not Handle a War with Ukraine and Central Asia
When assessing Russia’s ability to mount a future offensive in Central Asia, it is essential to understand the current state of Russia’s military after three years of war. In its pursuit to subjugate Ukraine, while only managing to capture a fifth of Ukraine’s territory, Russia will soon suffer its millionth casualty.
This high casualty rate is the result of Russia’s “meat grinder” approach, which involves sending troops in large waves to overwhelm opposing forces. While this method has seen some marginal successes, Russia has been forced to change its practices by using small, dispersed detachments, due to its significant loss of junior officers.
In addition to battleground losses in Ukraine, Russia is experiencing extreme demographic challenges. During the first three months of 2025, Russian women gave birth to fewer than 294,000 babies, which is the lowest quarterly figure for Russia in 225 years. No recruiting tactic will be able to make up for this societal crisis.
Aside from workforce issues, the vast distances and rugged terrain of Central Asia pose far greater problems for the Russian military than it has faced in Ukraine. Central Asia is approximately six times larger than Ukraine in terms of land area, totaling around 4 million square kilometers, compared to Ukraine’s 600,000 square kilometers. Even attempting to conquer Kazakhstan, the world’s ninth-largest country, alone would be a massive undertaking. The logistics of launching a full-scale invasion would pose significant challenges to the Russian military, whose supply lines have been shown to have vulnerabilities in Ukraine.
Although Russia maintains three military bases in Central Asia, specifically in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, its military presence there is aimed at keeping its historic influence and reducing threats of terrorism, rather than preparing for a future invasion, as Russian military bases in Central Asia currently do not play a significantly active role in Moscow’s geostrategic activities.
In terms of deploying troops, Russia has railway access to Kazakhstan, which could be a viable means of transportation; however, it lacks such infrastructure with other Central Asian countries, leaving Kazakhstan as its only direct entry point.
Does Russia Want to Invade Central Asia?
Along with analyzing the state of the Russian military, it is even more critical to understand whether Russia has any ambitions to launch a military campaign. Aside from a provocative social media post by former Russian President and now Deputy Chair of the Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2022, which has since been deleted, Russia’s security establishment has issued no public threats against Central Asia.
Russia has historically served as Central Asia’s security guarantor, citing threats from transnational terrorist groups. Rather than Russia designating Central Asia as a potential target of aggression, in its latest National Security Strategy and Foreign Policy Concept documents, Moscow views Central Asia as part of its near abroad, playing an integral role in multilateral groups, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).
Deepening integration and strategic cooperation are at the center of Russia’s stated strategy toward the region.
At a 2024 SCO meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, Vladimir Putin, along with Chinese President Xi Jinping, urged their allies and partners, including the Central Asian countries, to “resist malign external influence.”
Recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to Kazakhstan, the largest country in Central Asia in terms of area and economy, as a “reliable ally and neighbor.” Instead of employing aggressive rhetoric, Russia views Central Asia as a buffer and partner in maintaining its influence and security in what it refers to as its “near abroad.”
Central Asia Balances Its Alliances with Russia, China, and the West
In addition to Russia’s internal constraints and the absence of outward aggression toward Central Asia, the region has skillfully balanced competing powers, thereby avoiding domination by a single power. While Russia has historically been the security guarantor of Central Asia, China has made significant economic inroads in the region.
By the end of 2023, China had surpassed Russia to become the largest trading partner for Central Asian countries, prompting some to wonder whether Russia’s influence in Central Asia is waning amid its war in Ukraine. However, Russia maintains a considerable amount of influence over Central Asia, considering that Russia’s Lukoil and Gazprom are the chief foreign operators working in Uzbekistan’s main gas fields, and Moscow controls 25 percent of Kazakhstan’s uranium production.
Meanwhile, the United States and Europe have taken steps to recognize Central Asia’s geopolitical importance after the start of the Ukraine war. In September 2023, President Biden hosted the first-ever C5+1 Presidential Summit with the leaders of the Central Asian nations at the United Nations General Assembly in New York.
The Trump administration has expressed its interest in continuing to utilize the C5+1 framework to “continue cooperation, including through the C5+1 diplomatic platform, in support of a more peaceful and prosperous Central Asia.”
Regarding Europe, the first summit between the leaders of the European Union (EU) and the five Central Asian countries took place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in April 2025. As Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner, the EU seeks to enhance its cooperation with the Central Asian countries on critical minerals, security issues, and trade routes.
By hedging between Russia, China, and the West, Central Asian states have reduced their vulnerability to an unprovoked invasion by Russia. Although hedging is not an absolute guaranteed safeguard against a Russian invasion, China, Russia’s most valuable partner, would likely loudly protest such aggression in a region where it maintains assets of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Jeopardizing that relationship with Beijing is one of the main reasons why a Russian invasion of Central Asia is not currently appealing to Moscow.
Russia’s brutal invasion of its neighbor, Ukraine, has rightfully caused analysts to speculate about Russia’s potential for subsequent aggression in its sphere of influence. Yet, Russia’s current military constraints, lack of political will, and the complex geopolitical landscape in Central Asia serve as means to dissuade Moscow from military adventurism in the Central Asian region. As a result, for now, the likelihood of a large-scale Russian military incursion into Central Asia remains dubious.
About the Author: Alex Little
Alex Little is an MS graduate of the Georgia Institute of Technology and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs. Alex cumulatively spent over two years living in Russia to study the language. He is currently the Grand Strategy intern at the Quincy Institute.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/Gevorg Ghazaryan.
