The problem of pro-Iran militias operating on Iraqi soil has been turbocharged by the fall of the Assad regime in neighboring Syria.
When former Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki resigned his office in disgrace in 2014 amid the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), he left behind a legacy marred by sectarianism, widespread allegations of corruption, and power grabs for politically favored allies. These dynamics divided Iraq, alienated the country’s Sunni minority, set the stage for ISIS’ campaign of terror, and firmly entrenched Baghdad as a lesser power within Iran’s sphere of influence. In a better world, these dubious accomplishments would have marked the end of Maliki’s career. Instead, with his recent re-nomination for prime minister by the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF), Baghdad’s most powerful political bloc, he is en route to regain power.
Maliki’s likely return to the prime ministership comes amid an altered security environment shaped by regional militia networks and a shifting regional security order. As Iraq edges closer to another Iran-aligned government, the discreet arrival of foreign proxies exposes a deeper problem: Baghdad’s shrunken capacity to assert sovereignty without provoking either Washington or Tehran.
Even if Maliki Loses, Iran Still Wins
The collapse of the Iran-backed Assad regime in Syria and the prospect of potential renewed conflict in Iran are among the most consequential shifts in the regional order—all taking place as Iraq faces pressure from the United States to demobilize militias backed by Iran and integrate them into state institutions. The outgoing premier, Mohamed Shia al-Sudani, sought to balance relations with both Washington and Tehran, recognizing the pertinent role the US dollar plays in the Iraqi economy, as well as that of Iran-backed factions in his rise to power. That balancing act, however, appears to have frayed, with Iranian actors increasingly viewing Sudani as an obstacle to their priorities rather than an asset.
Maliki, by contrast, is seen as a figure likely to further consolidate Iran’s influence. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, commenting on al-Maliki’s nomination, warned: “A government controlled by Iran cannot successfully put Iraq’s own interests first, keep Iraq out of regional conflicts, or advance the mutually beneficial partnership between the United States and Iraq.” Al-Maliki backed a controversial bill in the Iraqi parliament in 2025—eventually withdrawn under US pressure—that would have solidified the Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) militia organization as an independent, parallel military structure distinct from the Iraqi Army.
Despite the former premier’s nomination, his return is far from certain. Analysts have speculated that his nomination is a “tactical gambit” designed to stir international and domestic outcry, lessening opposition to a second term for Sudani or for a weaker “consensus” candidate. Regardless of the outcome, though, the next prime minister is unlikely to confront Iran’s leverage and instead opt for managed stagnation, where political willpower is forsaken for a militia-led status quo.
Iran-Aligned Foreign Fighters Are Piling into Iraq
While US pressure has largely focused on Iraqi militias, reports emerged last year suggesting that fighters from smaller, foreign militias—chiefly the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun brigades, two pro-Iranian militias recruited from Afghanistan and Pakistan—had entered Iraq after years of defending the regime of Bashar al-Assad in neighboring Syria. Public details remain scarce, but the reports highlight a less implicit dimension of Baghdad’s efforts, or lack thereof, to define the boundaries of state sovereignty and stem militant integration efforts.
After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024, the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun brigades, alongside troves of other Iran-aligned factions, crossed into Iraq through Anbar and Ninawa, and settled across various bases in majority-Sunni areas—including Camp Ashraf in Diyala, Martyrs Camp in Salah ad-Din, Bashir base in Kirkuk, and other locations manned by PMF militias. The IRGC has been deploying members of these groups into Iraq as unarmed pilgrims, visiting shrines before being integrated into PMF bases. An Iraqi news outlet reported that Iran had asked its allies to “be patient” in sending them back to their countries, as they await “new developments or orders from Tehran.” Available information indicates their numbers in Iraq are limited, estimated to be in the hundreds rather than the thousands. Both factions were sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2019 for providing “material support for the IRGC-QF” in Syria.
The Iraqi government has officially denied the presence of the militias; however, Iraqi MP Adnan al-Zurfi accused authorities of harboring the factions. Even within al-Maliki’s political camp, concerns have surfaced. A senior figure in Maliki’s “State of Law Coalition,” Abdul Rahman al-Jazairi, described their presence as “dangerous” and a “strategic mistake” that has the potential to drag Iraq into “a military confrontation it cannot afford.”
Amid the pressure to disarm and integrate Iraqi militias into the regular armed forces, the foreign fighters pose a threat to the state’s sovereignty and ability to control its territory in favor of foreign agendas. Because they fall outside the formal Iraqi security and legal framework, they are essentially insulated from both nationalist demands and Western pressures for integration. Their presence is less a tactical security threat than a political one, highlighting the extent to which Iraqi territory can be used to serve agendas that lie beyond Baghdad’s own interests or authority.
In this sense, the presence of the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun brigades inside Iraq risks branding the country as a transit hub for foreign fighters to be redeployed at Tehran’s discretion—either internally within Iran or to other proxy networks across the region. Unconfirmed reports published by Iranian opposition media claimed that allied proxy forces, including the PMF, Fatemiyoun, and Zaynabiyoun brigades, played a major role in the massacre of Iranian demonstrators during the recent anti-government protests in early January. Despite the lack of corroborated reports of their involvement during the latest wave of protests, previous reporting indicates that elements of Iraqi and Afghan militias were deployed to flood-stricken areas in 2019 to help maintain order.
The apparently low number and limited visibility of the foreign fighters mean they do not yet register as an immediate security threat—a fact that makes them easier to tolerate, deny, or ignore in Baghdad. However, this same invisibility fails to negate their strategic threat to Iraq’s autonomy.
Baghdad’s Iran Ties Could Bring Retaliation from America
What may complicate the matter further for the next Iraqi prime minister is the country’s reliance on the US for aid, its own oil revenue, and military assistance. Iraq was allocated $31 billion in direct aid from Washington in 2025, excluding the cost of US military deployment that has helped to keep the Islamic State from regaining strength. America holds Iraq’s oil earnings in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under a Central Bank of Iraq account, giving it de facto control of Iraq’s revenue dollars since 2003. It has recently threatened to curtail the flow of critical revenue and aid if Iranian-backed groups were to be included in the next government.
The Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun brigades in Iraq risk further inflaming the fragile balancing act Baghdad is playing between Washington and Tehran. If the Trump administration, which has vowed to impose maximum pressure on Iran, deems Baghdad a direct arm of Tehran, it could impose sanctions, restrict dollars and oil revenue, curb intelligence sharing, or even conduct limited strikes on militia positions. It not only places Iraq in a compromising position, but does so for Iran as well. Baghdad’s relative goodwill with Washington benefits Tehran due to its role as a source of US dollars through trade and a means for skirting sanctions.
Iraq has become Iran’s most significant financial and security asset after Lebanon’s Hezbollah was weakened by Israel. Tehran has used its neighbor, often deemed its economic “lifeline,” as a conduit to skirt Washington’s sanctions. A 2024 Reuters report found that an Iraqi oil smuggling network generates at least $1 billion annually for Iran and its proxies. The US Treasury sanctioned five banks and three payment services firms in late 2025 over dealings with Iran.
Neither Iraq nor Iran can afford a crackdown by the United States—one that would be especially costly if the former were to drift further away into the latter’s sphere of influence.
Beyond the financial backlash, Iraq would be at risk of reignited sectarian tensions over the foreign militias stationed in majority-Sunni provinces. They could, in theory, be used to reinforce Shia presence in the areas or as a justification for use in case of an Islamic State resurgence. More of an immediate threat, however, is the potential for intra-Shia fault lines. The 2019 Tishreen (October) movement exposed the extent to which large parts of Iraqi society reject a system built on ethno-sectarism and armed factions, framing the Iran-backed militias and political parties as two sides of the same coin. The influential Shia cleric and political figure Muqtada al-Sadr has repeatedly called for the dismantling of militias and has challenged their rule after the 2021 election, causing a political deadlock and armed clashes. As one report said, “Today’s Shias are not the Shias of yesterday.” In the context of PMF integration and the handling of foreign fighters, the government’s inability to draw a line between national and foreign proxy interests has the potential to fuel divisions, driven by a generation that views foreign influence as a reason for Iraq’s stagnation.
The next prime minister, most likely Maliki, will face a flurry of challenges in the face of competing external and domestic pressures in a region with escalating tensions. The inability to balance the varying interests, not least of which is state sovereignty, risks placing Iraq under further financial strain, a weakened security environment, and internal fragmentation.
About the Author: Sammar Khader
Sammar Khader is an independent analyst and journalist focused on the geopolitics and security of the Middle East. She has a particular interest in inter-militia dynamics, extremist modes of operation, and governance in conflict-affected settings. She has written for local and international outlets and previously served as a senior researcher on the Levant desk of a Dubai-based risk advisory.
