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How U.S. Energy Dominance Could Overtake China’s Influence in the Middle East—and Beyond

Energy dominance could allow the United States to overtake China around the world through the use of soft power.

The war in Gaza—like the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Western-led conflict in Libya, and other Middle Eastern proxy battles—has laid bare the limits of Chinese and Iranian influence and underscored the region’s growing interdependence on external powerhouses. A recent analysis highlights how Tehran’s prolonged military engagements, further constrained by economic sanctions and logistical shortfalls, are, more often than not, manageable by US and Western-aligned forces.

But amid this geopolitical flux, a subtler yet far more enduring shift is in progress: the ascendancy of US energy as power, both as hard leverage and as “soft power“— the ability to shape preferences and agendas without resorting to force.

LNG Diplomacy

Following the shale gas revolution, the United States is not merely producing record volumes of natural gas; it now leads the world in exports across the Americas, Europe, and increasingly Asia. Modern liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure enables its rapid deployment to areas affected by crises, from Europe’s Ukraine war scramble to emergency supply shortfalls resulting from Middle Eastern instability.

Low US prices—nearly a third of European rates—combined with unmatched logistical flexibility, provide Washington with a lever to influence regional energy security. Moreover, if the Gulf Arab states seek to shore up demand and price stability, they are far more likely to court US gas firms than Chinese ones—given Washington’s geopolitical clout and the mandate to support its own energy champion. The Gulf states’ energy diplomacy has long depended on keeping Western markets tied to their hydrocarbon exports. The rise of US gas exports has reassigned the energy strings: Riyadh and Doha must appeal to Washington as much as they do to East Asia.

To capitalize on this advantage, US policymakers should enact targeted financing plans to support joint ventures regarding nuclear and gas infrastructure in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt—countries wary of Chinese or Russian entanglements. Conditions could include possible nuclear tech transfers, nonproliferation clauses, and joint R&D provisions. These initiatives would not only bolster America’s energy influence but also serve as strategic anchors in a volatile region increasingly courted by Beijing.

The United States remains the world’s top nuclear power generator, wielding strength in advanced reactor design, regulatory frameworks, and technological know-how. This is a quiet force projection. President Trump’s renewed push to quadruple nuclear capacity in America via streamlined licensing, public-private investment, and the placement of new reactors on federal lands will do more than green the domestic grid. It will turbocharge US influence globally.

Nuclear diplomacy—already in motion via US-UAE “gold standard” Section 123 civilian cooperation—has strategic value. Proposed reactor partnerships, like a U.S.–Saudi initiative, would tie host nations to American supply chains, training, fuel services, and stringent oversight. This cements America’s influence in ways fossil fuel trade cannot. Cairo, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and even Ankara have incentives to align with US standards rather than depend on Russian or Chinese reactors, which may compromise their political alignment or omit rigorous nonproliferation safeguards.

Energy as Soft Power

Energy as soft power in Asia and the Middle East remains a Chinese Achilles’ heel, exposing Beijing’s vulnerabilities in securing trust, transparency, and long-term strategic influence across the region. China, despite its Belt & Road ambitions, lags behind technologically in reactor construction and nuclear safety. Its state-backed companies can build at scale but often deliver delayed, black-box solutions with subsidy-backed economics—hardly transparent or dependable in Western capitals. Similarly, Chinese LNG exporters lack the entrenched global relationships, legal protections, and strategic cachet that American or Qatari suppliers offer.

As Gulf states lean into nuclear power and everyone plays nice with Gulf-headquartered sovereign wealth funds and centralized petro-diplomacy, the United States maintains the strategic advantage. It can leverage energy partnerships that weave consumer protection, environmental standards, and defense ties into one cohesive package—one the Chinese Communist Party simply cannot match.

Taiwan’s Nuclear Retreat

Taiwan’s nuclear retreat is a cautionary tale of energy vulnerability traded for political expediency. Against this backdrop of energy-driven soft power, consider Taiwan’s recent decision to close its last nuclear reactor in May 2025. By doing so, Taipei shifted its reliance onto expensive imported LNG—import dependence now covers ninety-eight percent of its energy needs. The policy has met strong criticism.

Each shutdown is projected to add roughly US $500 million annually in LNG costs, with total added expenditures possibly nearing US $2 billion by 2030. Worse still, Taiwan holds just eleven days’ worth of gas supply in storage—a vulnerability China could exploit. Taiwan’s tech powerhouses, especially TSMC, are already fretting over rising energy prices and continuity risks.

Let me weigh in on Taiwan’s decision to close its most reliable source of power by stating it is the dumbest, most dangerous idea since the Japanese thought they could beat the United States in World War II. This may seem theatrical, and yet the strategic folly is undeniable. Japan, then a far smaller economy, miscalculated US tech and industrial superiority. Today, Taiwan, which is smaller yet more tech-critical, is betting its growth and resilience on an energy strategy that leaves it exposed, without the diversification prowess nuclear energy would provide.

Conclusion

The strategic lessons and policy prescriptions are obvious. US policymakers should prioritize targeted export-credit financing to support joint ventures in nuclear and natural gas infrastructure across key strategic partners such as Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. These nations are increasingly cautious of Chinese or Russian entanglements, making them ideal candidates for US-backed projects conditioned on nuclear power technology transfers, nonproliferation commitments, and joint research and development.

With regard to Gulf leadership, the imperative is to diversify energy partnerships through US-supported reactor and gas deals, which serve as a hedge against volatile LNG demand from China and Europe while strengthening domestic energy security. Such moves also provide an opportunity to distance themselves from Beijing’s politically charged and often opaque state-led investments.

Meanwhile, Taiwan must seriously reconsider its nuclear phase-out. Embracing small modular reactors (SMRs)—where politically viable—could reinstate much-needed energy resilience and autonomy. In the short term, Taipei should accelerate the buildout of energy storage, diversify its LNG import sources through bilateral US supply agreements, and evaluate extending the operational life of existing reactors.

The strategic impact of US energy engagement in the Middle East extends far beyond the region and will directly influence the geopolitical landscape in Asia. A strong American footprint in Gulf energy markets, particularly through liquefied natural gas (LNG) and civil nuclear exports, will help anchor key Iran-adjacent states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar more firmly within the US-led order, reducing their reliance on Chinese partnerships.

These energy deals are rarely isolated transactions. They often bring with them US-led financing, military cooperation, and digital infrastructure initiatives, thereby expanding Washington’s soft power toolkit. By selectively enabling energy partnerships, the U.S. can support allied nations while also applying subtle diplomatic pressure on those uncertain about China’s strategic intent, creating a lever of influence unmatched by Beijing’s more transactional and opaque energy outreach.

China’s quest for influence in the Middle East and Asia is formidable, propelled by a torrent of infrastructure and finance. Yet, the tools that empower China elsewhere—soft or hard power —are being neutralized by America’s energy abundance. Natural gas exports provide flexible economic and strategic ties; nuclear diplomacy rewrites the rules of power projection.

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s plunge into LNG dependency is more than a policy misstep. It reveals how critical energy policy can become geopolitical leverage, for good or for ill. Much like Japan underestimated US industrial supremacy, Taiwan may have underestimated the leverage inherent in energy autonomy.

In the long game, energy isn’t just power—it is power.

About the Author: Todd Royal

Todd Royal works on global value chain analysis, energy-focused economic development research, and qualitative specialization within the nuclear, renewables, and workforce development sectors. He currently serves as the Program Manager for Research Development and is the host and moderator of the Southeast Nuclear Council’s monthly Nuclear Perspectives webinar series for E4 Carolinas, an energy advocacy firm based in Charlotte, NC. Todd has co-authored three books on energy and has been published globally on energy, geopolitics, foreign policy, national security, and California politics. Todd received his M.P.P. from the School of Public of Policy at Pepperdine University in Malibu, CA and a B.S. in Economics from Texas Christian University in Fort Worth, TX. He lives in Dallas/Fort Worth, TX area with his wife and two children.

Image: Shutterstock/dizain

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