The obsession with Ukraine’s resources, rather than battlefield conditions, has been a problem for both sides throughout the war.
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is one of the most important strategic assets in the entire Russian Federation. It protects Russia’s naval base at Sevastopol on the Crimea Peninsula and allows for Russian power projection into the vital Black Sea. Indeed, without Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet stationed there, Turkey—which controls the entrance to the Black Sea—would have free range there, with ominous consequences for the surrounding littoral states.
At the start of the Ukraine War in 2022, the Russian cruiser Moskva (“Moscow”), which was billed as one of Russia’s most advanced warships, was sunk by Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship ballistic missiles. It was a humiliating blow to the Russians—and an early portent of how difficult the war would be for the Russians.
Dmitry Shkrebets is the father of Yegor Shkrebets, a young sailor who perished aboard the Moskva when it was consumed with smoke and fire after being struck by Neptune anti-ship ballistic missiles. Dissatisfied with the official accounts of how his young son who died aboard the Moskva, Dmitry Shkrebets went about organizing his own investigation into the sinking of the iconic Russian Black Sea flagship—and in late April, published a lengthy dossier based on his findings.
The Shkrebets Dossier Sheds New Light on the Moskva Disaster
Shkrebets’ dossier is not merely a recollection of his own son’s accounts. It is a professional report, independently investigated by the gold star father, that included detailed recounts from sailors who survived the sinking. Moreover, it reveals details about the ship’s operation—both in the leadup to and following the missile strike—that paint a damning picture of the Russian Navy’s operations.
According to Shkrebets, around 100 experienced sailors were redeployed off the Moskva right before the war erupted. The experienced sailors were replaced by eighty-three poorly trained conscripts, including the young Yegor Shkrebets. Dmitry Shkrebets observed that those trainees—which is what the 83 conscripts were classified as, given their level of inexperience with the Moskva—were forbidden from being deployed to a warzone.
Yet, they were sent nonetheless. In fact, the Moskva was present for the capture of Snake Island in the opening hours of the war—during which the island’s defenders’ profane answer to the Moskva’s request for their surrender led to world headlines, as well as to false reporting that those defenders had been killed.
Shkrebets’ report goes on to assess the reporting in the ship’s onboard logbook. There were apparently multiple incidents of Ukrainian aircraft and artillery coming dangerously close to the warship, which was not supposed to be operating in hostile waters due to the inexperience of her crew. The assessment further illustrated that the crew had not even effectively prepared themselves to identify and defend against enemy cruise missiles.
To make matters worse, in the weeks leading up to the successful strike, the captain’s technical report indicated that there were regular glitches with the Moskva’s radar and onboard missile defense systems. It goes on to record a series of alarming close calls with Ukrainian rocket artillery and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Given this history of near-misses, the Ukrainians were bound to land a strike sooner or later.
The Moskva’s Final Mission
On April 10, 2022, the Moskva was ordered to “guard and defend” a major natural gas deposit that was well within the range of Ukrainian cruise missiles. That field, near Ukraine’s port city of Odessa, had four Ukrainian drilling platforms that had been captured by the Russians during their 2014 annexation of Crimea. Following the sinking, two of those four were eventually moved to another field entirely.
Shkrebets describes the deployment order as “ridiculous madness,” observing that Russia already had ample natural gas supplies in far less dangerous environments. In his telling: “500 sailors were sent to guard an unnecessary resource for the country, which, due to many factors, cannot be protected … If [Ukraine] decided to destroy [the mining platforms], they will destroy it together with [the Moskva].”
In short, the Russian ship’s sailors were sent into a very dangerous situation all to secure a natural gas field that was, in the grand scheme of things, totally unnecessary. Indeed, the obsession with Ukraine’s resources rather than battlefield conditions has been a problem for both sides throughout the war. Notably, the Trump administration, once set on pulling out of Ukraine completely, has now found itself further ensnared by the promise of greater access to Ukraine’s minerals—which are overwhelmingly to be found in Russian-controlled areas.
But the crew of the Moskva was never made aware of the cruise missile threat they were under. They didn’t even see the missile that ultimately sank their warship until it was a mere 2.5 miles away. What’s more, when the ship was fatally attacked by Ukraine, multiple compartments had been blocked, forcing at least 35 people on the lower decks to climb out through portholes—where five of the sailors subsequently drowned.
Meanwhile, the crewmembers lucky enough to survive the initial attack found that many of the life rafts on the ship were in unsafe condition, and were likely to flood once placed in the water.
And due to their combined inexperience, the conscripts suffered the most during the disaster—including young Yengor.
Around 30 percent of the conscripts onboard, contrary to naval regulations—which were likely never taught to those conscripts—did not have gas masks on during the evacuation of the warship. The older and more experienced crewmembers did have them, allowing for them to effectively navigate through the smoke-filled corridors of the sinking Moskva and make it to safety outside. But in many cases, the boxes where the gas masks were stored were empty—despite having seals from the manufacturer indicating that they had not been tampered with since their delivery to the ship. What followed was a cavalcade of disastrous confusion. No one onboard was ready, and the level of destruction was more severe than what anyone was prepared for.
The Moskva Sinking Was a Humiliation for Russia—and a Wakeup Call
Ultimately, the ship was sunk. But it took hours, and more than 200 crewmembers died as a result of the travesty at sea.
The sinking of the Moskva reflects both the arrogance and ignorance of the early phases of Russian war planning. President Vladimir Putin clearly believed that the “Special Military Operation” would be a cakewalk and acted accordingly. He was unprepared for the initial burst of defenses deployed against his invasion. The Moskva was one of the biggest victims of that early stage of Russian ineptitude.
The Russians adapted to the conflict. Today, the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet are far better trained than the conscripts of 2022. On land, Moscow’s troops are winning on all fronts because of the adaptations Moscow’s military made in response to events like the sinking of the Moskva. But in the early days of the war, young men like Yengor Shkrebets paid for that arrogance and ignorance on the part of Russia’s leaders with their lives.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock.
