The Israeli strike on Qatar, symbolizing President Trump’s inability to rein in Netanyahu, has shifted the interests of Gulf States as well.
At a New Year’s Eve party held in Tehran in December 1977, President Jimmy Carter gave a speech describing Iran as “an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world.”
Barely a year later, the Shah was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution, turning a pro-American monarchy into a staunch US adversary and deepening Saudi Arabia’s reliance on Washington for security. Decades later, the Biden administration pushed for the Strategic Alliance Agreement, a so-called “grand bargain” in which the United States would offer security guarantees and assist in developing Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program in exchange for Saudi recognition of Israel. For Washington, the deal promised a more stable Middle East; for Riyadh, it was part of Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman’s (MBS) Vision 2030 strategy of recalibrating its foreign policy to focus more on diplomacy, diversify the economy, and keep the United States as its primary security partner while retaining flexibility in other arenas.
There was hope that a second Trump administration could align with these priorities. But Trump’s direct intervention in the June 2025 conflict between Tel Aviv and Tehran, combined with the subsequent Israeli strike on Qatar, has accelerated Riyadh’s reassessment of the reliability and the risks of its partnership with the United States.
The origins of the grand bargain started during the first Trump administration, when the United States brokered a series of bilateral agreements, known as the Abraham Accords, in which the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan agreed to normalize relations with Israel. This initial success encouraged the Trump administration to push hard to get Saudi Arabia to join the Accords, despite the Kingdom’s refusal to establish ties with Israel without the creation of a Palestinian state.
While the October 7 attacks by Hamas and its allies disturbed Saudi Arabia and the conflict threatened to expand into a larger regional war, Riyadh also saw it as an opportunity to repair relations with its closest ally by using the chaos caused by the attack to emphasize its importance to Washington as a stabilizing regional force. Biden had originally vowed to make the crown prince a “pariah” over the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi as well as its overall human rights record, but the attacks forced Biden to revise his position and begin a diplomatic reset of relations with Riyadh, including an initiative to convince the Kingdom to accept the Abraham Accords.
Israel’s heavy-handed response to the attacks also galvanized the Arabs in support of the Palestinians, and a survey conducted by the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs showed an overwhelming majority of Saudi nationals want Arab states to cut all ties with Israel. While MBS was able to manage domestic dissatisfaction with the talks, there is a limit to how much he can ignore public sentiment, which means that the price for Saudi acquiescence to a deal will be much higher. Relations between Tel Aviv and Riyadh have deteriorated significantly as Israel’s conduct in Gaza and vocal opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state hindered negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia to the point that Riyadh gave up on normalizing ties with Tel Aviv and has instead become one of the strongest advocates for the creation of a Palestinian state.
So why was Saudi Arabia so committed to securing a deal with the United States? One answer is that Saudi Arabia simply does not trust them. The Saudis, as well as other Arab states, feel that the United States is looking to pivot away from the Middle East toward other areas of strategic importance, such as East Asia.
While it can be argued that these concerns are overstated, from Riyadh’s perspective, the United States lacks long-term policy consistency. Each new administration often brings shifting priorities, making it difficult for Saudi Arabia to rely on enduring strategic commitments. As a result, Riyadh is increasingly seeking concrete, binding assurances that are less vulnerable to reversal with each change in leadership.
The tradeoff to such a dynamic means that in the eyes of the United States, Riyadh would side with Washington, DC, in its adversarial relationship with Iran and, by extension, Russia and China. As F. Gregory Gause III highlighted in a recent article in Foreign Affairs, “When the United States makes a security commitment to a country, most Americans expect that country to back Washington on the whole range of international issues — economic and political, as well as military.”
Despite American attempts at bringing Saudi Arabia closer to the US’ sphere of influence, Riyadh has centered its foreign policy doctrine on having “zero problems with its neighbors.” This shift in doctrine is one of the primary reasons why the Saudis chose to sign the Chinese-sponsored deal with Iran in 2023, especially as Iran has pursued its own “Neighbors First” strategy — seeking to maintain good relations with its immediate neighbors as a way to mitigate some of the impact of Western pressure. An example of this shift is when Saudi Arabia called on Israel “to respect the sovereignty of the sisterly Islamic Republic of Iran and not to violate its lands.” MBS’ reference to Iran as a “sister republic” is significant since it is a term usually reserved for the “brotherly peoples” of the Arab world.
Saudi Arabia sees China and Russia as central features in Vision 2030, which is the driving force behind Riyadh’s shifting economic and foreign policy to reduce Saudi Arabia’s long-term dependence on oil exports and diversify the economy. This ambitious program, though, requires a huge investment in short- and medium-term capital. Despite Riyadh’s attempts to encourage foreign direct investment and a sizeable sovereign wealth fund, the reality is that it has been shouldering most of the cost, leading to substantial deficits in the Saudi budget. Riyadh’s push for OPEC+ to reduce oil prices by increasing output reflects a multi-pronged strategy.
In the short term, lowering prices is intended to punish members that are exceeding their production quotas. Over the longer term, this move could enable Saudi Arabia to expand its market share once those producers are sidelined. While this approach may temporarily increase the Kingdom’s debt levels, Riyadh appears willing to absorb that cost in exchange for strategic positioning.
While Russia is Saudi Arabia’s competitor on the international oil market, China is Riyadh’s largest customer, with China importing around 1.9 million barrels of Saudi oil per day. Recently, the two countries have been expanding their relationship beyond trade. During a 2022 visit to Beijing, Saudi officials signed an agreement with China that turned the Sino-Saudi relationship into a comprehensive strategic partnership involving infrastructure projects and advanced technology transfers that Saudi leaders believe will help accelerate Saudi Arabia’s economic development away from hydrocarbons. According to figures by the American Enterprise Institute, Chinese investments in Saudi Arabia between 2005 and 2024 totaled just under $70 billion.
When asked about Western criticism and fears about this burgeoning relationship, Saudi Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih told CNBC that he does not consider Saudi Arabia’s relationships with China and the United States to be mutually exclusive and that they “complement each other.”
When Donald Trump returned to office, there were initial signs that he recognized that the Middle East of 2025 was very different than that of 2017 and that his regional policy and approach would more closely align with the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) own interests. Gulf leaders initially welcomed his return, preferring him over Biden, who was viewed as overly idealistic and often dismissive of Gulf security concerns. Trump, by contrast, was widely seen as a man without a clear vision for the region and whose transactional leadership style, lack of interest in ideology, and greater focus on striking deals aligned well with the GCC’s own pragmatic worldview.
However, much of that goodwill evaporated when Trump backed Israeli strikes on Iran and ordered direct airstrikes on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities. The move abandoned prior signals about diplomacy and non-intervention and shattered hopes that Trump would prioritize de-escalation. While Trump has demanded that Netanyahu commit to not striking Qatar again, the Israeli premier has pushed back against international criticism and threatened to strike Doha again if it refuses to expel Hamas’ political leadership. Trump’s inability to control Netanyahu has undermined both Trump’s personal credibility and American security guarantees in the region.
For Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, these events have confirmed their deepest fears: Washington is no longer a reliable security guarantor but is instead a potentially volatile actor whose actions may compromise Saudi Arabia’s national security and economic ambitions, especially with the increased risk of regional instability and conflict that would inarguably impact the Gulf states. By pursuing a multi-vectored strategy, Riyadh seeks to balance the great powers against one another while preserving maximum flexibility. The Kingdom’s alignment is no longer binary but pragmatic and situational.
Nearly half a century after Carter misread Iran as an “island of stability,” Washington risks making similar mistakes in the Gulf. Trump’s decision to directly target Iranian enrichment facilities and perceived inability to rein in Netanyahu will accelerate the unraveling of the United States’ most important partnership in the Middle East. Riyadh will not abandon the United States but is increasingly determined not to be trapped by it. By hedging with China and Russia, as well as other emerging powers such as India and Turkey, Saudi Arabia is signaling that its future lies in a diversified set of relationships, not in reliance on a single guarantor. The message from Riyadh is clear: America is still wanted, but not at any price. If Washington hopes to remain the Kingdom’s indispensable partner, it must show that its actions will stabilize the region.
About the Author: Joe Boueiz
Joe Boueiz is an independent analyst who specializes in the international relations of the Middle East with a focus on the Levant and the Persian Gulf. He is a graduate of the American University of Beirut and the University of Texas at Austin.
Image: Shutterstock/Fitria Ramli
