Continued fossil fuel consumption and a total cutoff each present their own terrible risks, but Europe’s green delusion is still subject to geopolitical reality.
Last month, on June 17, the European Commission made an important announcement that largely went unnoticed amid the chaos of the twelve-day war between Israel and Iran. EU decision-makers in Brussels put forward a plan to stop all Russian oil and gas imports by the end of 2027. This highly contentious issue has long been a cause for concern across the bloc and will almost certainly become yet another wedge that will further deepen the divide between its Western and Eastern member states.
Although framed as a bold step toward the green transition and strategic autonomy, the deadline is, in practice, an arbitrary benchmark that will hurt EU economies, raise costs for consumers, and jeopardize its energy supply, all without doing much major damage to Russia’s war machine. Its primary value is symbolic: severing ties with Moscow. It is completely impractical by any other measure.
The core problem is that the EU has not found a viable substitute for Russian fossil fuels, which remain cheaper and more accessible than most alternatives. Sticking to this deadline will actually reduce Europe’s energy security, because it doesn’t improve the bloc’s energy mix. Also, greater energy security relies on diversification. Europe’s dependence on Russia became problematic in 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine because, instead of diversifying its fossil fuel imports earlier, the EU had placed its bets on the future green transition.
A more prudent approach would have simultaneously aimed to reduce reliance on Russian energy through diversification and a more long-term plan for green development, albeit at the expense of short-term climate targets.
Because it failed to do this earlier, the bloc now finds itself scrambling to diversify, without the security buffer it might have had if this was done earlier. Russian imports will be replaced with Middle Eastern fuels, increasing its dependency on states like Saudi Arabia, which can hardly be described as much more reliable partners than Moscow. This is a risky move, as Joe Biden learned during his ill-fated presidency after his administration released an intelligence report in 2021 implicating Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman in the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The Saudis retaliated by cutting oil production, which contributed to higher prices for American consumers. For Brussels, increased reliance on Riyadh would mean holding back any criticism of the kingdom. This would make any attacks on Russian autocracy profoundly hypocritical.
Diversification would also make the EU more reliant on Azerbaijan and Turkey. Azerbaijan supplies gas to Southeastern Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor, a pipeline over 2,000 miles long running through neighboring Turkey. Brussels wants Baku to boost exports, but Azerbaijan claims that the system is currently running at its maximum capacity and demands further investments, which it won’t fund alone. Europe, prioritizing net zero, is reluctant to commit to long-term fossil fuel infrastructure, which puts the two sides at a loggerhead.
Azerbaijan’s highly pragmatic relationship with Russia also complicates matters. Baku does not want to expose itself to Moscow’s wrath. So, even if capacity of the southern corridor were to increase, it isn’t clear what sort of deal the Azerbaijanis would ultimately agree to. In addition to this, the EU will have to import more liquefied natural gas (LNG) to offset the loss of piped Russian fuel, which is more expensive and logistically demanding due to infrastructure requirements.
The end result of this quagmire will be higher energy costs for consumers and businesses, which will hurt economic output. But the impact won’t be evenly felt across the EU. Its member states depend on different energy mixes, and their economies vary in their reliance on industry. Services-based economies will be more insulated, while those reliant on manufacturing and heavy industry — like those in Central and Eastern Europe — will suffer the most in the event of a premature cut off.
Indeed, this was a major topic of discussion at this year’s Visegrad Four Business Conference, which took place in the Slovakian capital of Bratislava a little more than a week before the EU commission announced its proposed 2027 deadline. The conference, which could be described as a Central European Davos, brings together business and political leaders from across the Visegrad Four (V4) countries — Czechia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia — as well as a number of international diplomats stationed in the region, in order to discuss some of the challenges and opportunities facing businesses in the V4. Alongside Trump’s tariffs and growing competition from China, the energy issue was right at the top of the conference agenda.
Virtually every keynote speech and panel discussion emphasized how essential energy security is to the continued growth of the V4, which has recently outpaced Western Europe. Yet nobody addressed the Russian question directly. Most speakers discussed energy in the broadest terms possible, stressing the need for diversification while avoiding specifics.
Some in the business sector adopted a more cautionary tone, seemingly aiming subtle warnings at the political leaders who were in attendance —among them EU Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maroš Šefčovič — just how much energy impacts both their companies and regional economies. The conference organizers did, however, present the commissioner with a written memorandum backed by business associations and employer unions from across the V4 region calling for immediate measures to reduce costs for energy-intensive industries. The memorandum was also shared with other top EU officials.
Although Šefčovič stated in his speech to the conference that the European commission has been closely coordinating with business operatives from across the Visegrad group to ensure that their concerns are heard in Brussels, the proposal to end Russian oil and gas imports by the end of 2027 appears to suggest that the economic interests of the V4 countries are of secondary concern to EU leaders. And while nobody on the conference stage clearly spelled out just how damaging this sudden cutoff could be, those on the sidelines were much more candid.
“Industry in Slovakia relies on fossil fuel imports,” Lukáš Parízek, Chairman of the Council of Slovak Exporters, told me. “Diversification is key for risk mitigation in all areas of business and economy, energy sourcing included. However, completely cutting off Russian oil and gas would seriously harm the already falling competitiveness of Slovak industry and economy.”
The 2027 deadline remains a proposal and could yet be delayed. But if Brussels insists on sticking to its guns, this will harm the EU economically and reveal that its ambitions to reduce its security dependence on the United States through rearmament has always been nothing more than a noble lie. Rearmament is costly, and defense autonomy requires rebuilding Europe’s weapons manufacturing sector — something that simply cannot be done without fossil fuels. The EU is already struggling to secure independent supply chains for electric vehicles, let alone arms production. It can either rearm or stop Russian energy imports. Not both.
Once this becomes clear, the deadline will almost certainly be pushed back. But what’s more likely is that the 2027 cutoff was simply the opening offer for what Brussels understands will be a long and protracted negotiation with the EU member states. It might therefore be more appropriate to view this deadline as an overly-ambitious statement of intent designed to placate idealistic voters who demand tough action on Russia. But resistance is likely, both within the V4 and elsewhere across the continent.
“This is something [Budapest] would definitely veto,” said one Hungarian strategist with knowledge of his government’s thinking on this matter, speaking off the record. “If [the European Commission] go around that, we’d claim it was illegal and sue. We won’t comply until the court procedures are over.”
If so, the 2027 deadline is likely dead on arrival, which may not be a bad thing. Delay gives the EU time to diversify and build up its green capacity, including stockpiling key resources like lithium, cobalt, and nickel. But there is also an argument that the bloc should, at least temporarily, consume more fossil fuels – not less. Speaking on one of the panels at the Visegrad Four Business Conference, Jacek Bendykowski, president of the Gdańsk Foundation, suggested that rearmament presents a strategic opportunity for the Visegrad countries that they would be well advised to lean into.
According to Bendykowski, the V4 should capitalize on President Trump’s famously transactional approach to foreign policy by striking a deal to purchase more American fossil fuels. Not only will this help the region’s energy diversification, it could also help curry favor with the White House when it comes to EU tariffs. This way, the V4 could position itself as a “Trump whisperer,” alongside Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni (who he specifically mentioned).
Bendykowski also proposed that the V4 use its manufacturing base to forge joint ventures with U.S. arms producers in order to boost domestic weapons production. This would benefit both sides economically, create homegrown jobs, help the EU pull its weight in NATO, and give American firms a stake in Europe’s defense sector — potentially softening Trump’s stance on tariffs.
This approach has merit. It would diversify the bloc’s energy sources and enhance its defense capacity at Russia’s expense.
These are the difficult tradeoffs that governments, industry leaders, and policy makers are forced to contend with. Unlike voters, they don’t have the luxury of superficially fixating upon a single issue, whether that be the climate emergency or Ukrainian sovereignty.
Yes, climate change might be the bigger threat, but unlike present-day wars, it is far less tangible and critical right now. It also makes little sense for the EU to unilaterally commit itself to a rapid green transition when faced with the potential threat of an expansionist Russia that is operating on a war economy.
Continued fossil fuel consumption and a total cutoff each present their own terrible risks. But the latter is at least focused on an imminent danger, which is why the EU should seriously consider Bendykowski’s proposal and reevaluate its 2027 deadline.
About the Author: Aleks Eror
Aleks Eror is a freelance journalist and media consultant from Belgrade. His work has been published by Foreign Policy, Politico, Unherd, and others.
Image: Shutterstock/Martin Bergsma
