At some point, energy breakthroughs may begin to shift the global center of gravity and contribute to the de-prioritization of other national interests.
At some point, energy breakthroughs may begin to shift the global center of gravity and contribute to the de-prioritization of other national interests.
In my contribution to the recent symposium on human rights and the Trump administration, I observed that the global center of gravity is shifting “towards the extended Silk Road, the Indian Ocean basin, and the Asia-Pacific.” This part of the world is “characterized by a mix of illiberal democracies and authoritarian modernizers” whose search for partners is grounded not in ideological preferences but in concrete interests.
Increasingly, governments, especially the above-mentioned regions, will have to deal with the overriding challenge of the 21st century: how to provide sustainable, desirable standards of living for their populations.
This starts with the so-called “water-food-energy” nexus, which Michaël Tanchum describes as a “trilemma” that bedevils states all around the world. Access to reliable, dependable, and affordable sources of these three key resources is critical for governments hoping to address their developmental challenges. Governments are well aware that their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens is going to be measured against their ability to maintain “reliable water, energy, and food infrastructures guaranteeing the accessibility and availability of those resources.”
Thus, the water-food-energy nexus connects to the “prosperity-legitimacy equation”: that governments will be assessed positively or negatively to the extent that they are able to take the steps necessary to provide a more stable, middle-class lifestyle and, at minimum, guarantee a basic level of access to staples, consumer goods, and welfare services.
The Biden administration attempted to frame international politics as a competition and a divide between democracies and autocracies. Survey and polling data, however, suggest that the middle classes, especially in developing and rising powers, are apt to identify water, food, and energy shortages as the most pressing threats to their national security.
In assessing regime transitions over the past forty years, Bahar Leventoğlu has stressed the centrality of middle-class aspirations and has shown that rising middle classes are prepared to support either democratic transition or authoritarian modernization based on their assessment as to which choice would better protect and enhance their status. If, as John Sitilides observes, “[e]nergy abundance means greater domestic prosperity, industry, and quality of life,” then “shared values” may diminish in importance against “guaranteed access” as the primary driver of a state’s foreign and domestic policies. Or, to put it more bluntly, there is no nobility in poverty.
This trilemma is not going to be limited only to developing economies or countries in the so-called Global South. At the 2025 Budapest Global Dialogue, Sunjoy Joshi, the chairman of India’s Observer Research Foundation, noted that, for the first time, the “First World” is experiencing “Third World” problems — and he predicts this will accelerate as a rising global middle class strains the capabilities of governments’ attempts to secure needed resources.
We are in the midst of observing two tests of this thesis. The first is the accelerating level of investment and technological partnership between the United States and the states of the Persian Gulf. Per Freedom House, none of these governments is considered to be a free society or a democracy — they are all ranked in the “not free” category. This has not precluded a close and accelerating geo-economic and geo-technological relationship that has been designed, in part, to continue to guarantee the viability of critical supply chains for the United States.
The second is the Trump administration’s announcement that, if Russia does not agree to a ceasefire in its military campaign against Ukraine by the fall, the United States will begin to impose significant tariffs on countries continuing to import Russian energy. Yet, in the absence of large quantities of comparably priced alternatives, not only will countries like China but also the US’s partners and allies, such as India or Japan or even European states (who may have reduced Russian imports but have not been able to completely disconnect from Russian sources of supply), be more likely to fight US tariffs rather than accept conditions of energy deprivation. This is why Eddie Fishman (among others) has called into question the seriousness of such threats.
At some point, Fourth Industrial Revolution breakthroughs may begin to ameliorate the trilemma challenge. Until that happens, these economic pressures will contribute to the ongoing de-prioritization of human rights as a central organizing principle in US foreign policy.
About the Author: Nikolas K. Gvosdev
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College and the director of the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. This essay draws on work that will appear in the forthcoming ‘Oxford Handbook of Human Security.’
Image: Shutterstock/metamorworks
