The core differences between the East German “National People’s Army” (NVA) and the Nazi German Wehrmacht that came before it were doctrinal in nature.
Despite having a handful of outward similarities with the Second World War-era Wehrmacht—notably its eerily similar uniforms—the Soviet-backed East German National People’s Army (NVA) was quite dissimilar from the old German Wehrmacht.
For one thing, the two armies’ ideologies were far apart. The Wehrmacht was directed by Nazi ideas, whereas the NVA was directly controlled by the communists. A more obvious flaw in this comparison lies in the fact that the Wehrmacht had the complete support of Germany and its conquered territories, whereas East Germany was truly just a vassal of the Soviet Union based in Moscow.
However, like their Wehrmacht predecessors, the East German NVA was viewed by most outside intelligence analysts as being one of the more competent, technically proficient Soviet satellites. If war ever had erupted between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, it was assumed that the NVA would be a very dangerous foe on the European battlefield.
The Rise of the East German Army (NVA)
The NVA was born from the ashes of WWII in a divided Germany, under the shadow of Soviet occupation. Founded on March 1, 1956, as a response to the creation of West Germany’s Bundeswehr, the NVA was explicitly a “party army,” serving the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and, according to their official line, the “working class.”
Unlike the Wehrmacht of old, the NVA’s ideology was deeply rooted in Marxist-Leninism, emphasizing the protection of so-called socialist achievements, anti-imperialism, and in pure solidarity with their Soviet benefactors.
Nearly 95 percent of NVA officers were SED members by the 1960s, ensuring tight political control and indoctrination. Interestingly, though, at the start of its existence, the NVA did incorporate many former World War II-era Wehrmacht officers—up to 27 percent of its officer corps in the first postwar years. Many of these officers were supposedly “converted” by their Soviet captors after having fought on the Eastern Front against the Soviets. Ultimately, however, these former Wehrmacht officers were viewed with suspicion, and were merely used to jump-start the NVA. By the 1960s, they had been retired, replaced by officers with working-class backgrounds who were loyal to the SED. This shift marked a decisive rejection of the old Germany, with its elitist traditions being used to inform the officer corps of the Wehrmacht; by replacing the old-line officers with working-class Germans, the SED was supposedly creating an ideologically pure force that favored the proletariat.
Structurally, both the Wehrmacht and NVA were tri-service organizations, but their compositions and command hierarchies diverged significantly. The Wehrmacht consisted of the Heer (army), Kriegsmarine (navy), and Luftwaffe (air force), coordinated under the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) this force was plagued by intense inter-service rivalries and Hitler’s direct meddling—which often bypassed traditional chains of command. The Wehrmacht also operated alongside parallel, ideological entities, such as the Waffen-SS, which only served to fragment authority more in Nazi Germany’s armed forces.
The NVA, by comparison, included Landstreitkräfte (ground forces), Volksmarine (navy), and Luftstreikräfte/Luftverteidigung (air forces/air defense), and Grenztruppen (border troops)—all of which were commanded by the Ministry of National Defense. It was a tightly integrated force that was tied closely to the Warsaw Pact’s Unified Command, reflecting Soviet oversight in equipment, training, and operations.
Conscription was mandatory for East German males aged 18-60, with an 18-month service term, and it uniquely allowed “construction soldiers” for conscientious objectors—a concession noticeably absent in the Wehrmacht’s more rigid mobilization during World War II.
At its peak in 1987, just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NVA numbered 175,300 personnel, bolstered by reserves and party militias, like the Combat Groups of the Working Class. Unlike the Wehrmacht’s expansion to millions during wartime, the NVA remained a smaller, defensive-oriented force, avoiding direct combat involvement beyond Warsaw Pact interventions like the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The Wehrmacht and the NVA Had Totally Different Doctrines
At its core, though, the differences between the NVA and the WWII German Wehrmacht were their doctrinal differences. Hitler’s Wehrmacht evolved from interwar reforms under Hans von Seeckt, emphasizing mission-based tactics (Auftragstaktik) that granted commanders operational flexibility to exploit opportunities in combat. Indeed, the Wehrmacht’s doctrinal approach to warfare was infinitely more aggressive and innovation-driven than its cautious and deliberate NVA successor.
Consider the blitzkrieg that terrorized Europe in the early years of World War II. This was the inevitable culmination of the innovation and mission-based tactics that Seeckt and other strategists in the Wehrmacht had developed. It integrated tanks, infantry, and close air support for rapid, offensive breakthroughs and encirclements aimed at annihilation of enemy formations in battle. The invasions of Poland and France in the opening months of World War II showcased this doctrine’s emphasis on speed, surprise, and maneuver—though it faltered in the face of prolonged, attritional warfare of the kind that the Soviet Red Army subjected the Wehrmacht to throughout the Eastern Front.
By contrast, East Germany’s doctrine was molded by Soviet models, prioritizing collective security within the Warsaw Pact and deterrence against “imperialist aggression.” Influenced by Stalin’s 1952 decree to build East German forces—and later the Brezhnev Doctrine justifying Soviet intervention throughout the Eastern Bloc—it emphasized ideological discipline, hierarchical command, and integration with Soviet operational plans.
In essence, the East German military was but one cog in a massive Soviet-run machine for defending Eastern Europe and, if necessary, dominating NATO-controlled Western Europe.
Training incorporated Wehrmacht tactical experience critically, but subordinated those lessons to the Soviet paradigm, such as operational-level warfare emphasizing echelons and rapid advances.
Moreover, unlike the Wehrmacht’s flexibility, NVA doctrine stressed political indoctrination and party loyalty, with socialization efforts aimed at instilling socialist values—though these were not always effective in creating ideological fervor. And because East Germany’s military equipment was Soviet-sourced, the Soviet doctrines were similarly reinforced.
In all, the aesthetics of the East German National People’s Army may have been like those of the Wehrmacht, they were radically different forces. The Wehrmacht was predicated upon waging aggressive, expansionistic wars in the name of Nazism. As a vassal state of the USSR, East Germany had a fundamentally different doctrine; its operations were entirely shaped and dependent upon Soviet control.
When the Cold War ended in 1989 and the two Germanies were reunited, the NVA was dissolved in 1990. The East was subsumed by the West, and the NVA dissolved, highlighting its transient nature.
The post-Cold War German military was largely predicated upon the NATO-backed Bundeswehr and much of the NVA was simply erased. Still, had the Cold War turned hot, the East Germans would have given NATO a very serious bloody nose. Thankfully, those heady days are over—at least for now.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / Amateur007.
